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Abstract 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a pervasive developmental disorder 
characterized by two distinct features; the social, including impairments in 
communication and social functioning (empathizing), and the non-social, including 
preoccupation with restricted interests and repetitive behaviours (systemizing). This 
thesis investigated non-social cognition in the autism spectrum by undertaking six 
studies, three with neurotypical participants from the general population and three 
with an ASD group and matched neurotypical controls. These studies measured 
autonomic arousal to social and non-social stimuli and stimuli associated with the 
participant’s own special interest or hobby, and change blindness tasks that utilized 
both social and non-social changes, along with measures of attention to detail and 
anxiety in an attempt to understand some of the cognitive and affective mechanisms 
that underlie non-social cognition in ASD and in the wider autism spectrum. A 
further study assessed ‘drive to systemize’ along with an objective behavioural 
assessment of logical thinking ability and a measure of preference for deliberative or 
intuitive thinking style, to try to further elucidate connections between drive to 
systemize and ability to systemize, and the modes of cognition that relate to 
systemizing. 
 
Findings included the relationship between autistic traits and stronger physiological 
responses to non-social stimuli in the neurotypical sample, and a significantly 
stronger response in the ASD group to non-social stimuli related to personal special 
interest than in controls. Participants with a larger number of autistic traits showed 
enhanced change blindness when changes were social in nature. Self-reported high 
systemizers report that they prefer slow, deliberative styles of thinking and provide 
more accurate responses to questions that should involve logical thinking—yet they 
are less able to provide sound logical reasoning for their correct answers than those 
who are low systemizers.  Together, the results suggest that non-social cognition, or 
systemizing, in autism is motivated by bottom up perceptual and affective processes 











The Autism Spectrum: Features and Theories 
 
1.1 Overview 
This chapter characterizes the two key features/dimensions of autism spectrum 
disorder that comprise its diagnostic criteria—the social and the non-social. The 
concept of the autistic spectrum and the broad autism phenotype are presented and 
explored, along with measures of subclinical autistic traits in neurotypical 
populations. Key cognitive theories of autism spectrum disorder are reviewed, with 
an emphasis on those that provide the theoretical underpinning of the current thesis. 
This chapter will focus on some of the evidence from neuroscience that suggests 
physiological causes of the social deficits of ASD and hints at possible 
neurobiological explanations for its non-social component. The literature on 
repetitive behaviours and restricted interests in ASD will be reviewed, and some of 
the most prominent theories of autism will be discussed, with particular reference to 
the Empathizing-Systemizing theory, which will form the basis for this thesis. 
 
1.2 Definitions of Autism  
 
1.2.1 Diagnostic Criteria and Prevalence 
Since autism was first described by Leo Kanner in 1943, it has been understood as a 
disorder that involves the manifestation of two kinds of behavioural symptoms; the 
social and the non-social. Kanner noted that the children in his case studies had a 
“good relation to objects” and would respond emotionally to them—for example 
with affection or anger—along with a marked indifference in their relations to 
people, ignoring others as though they were part of the furniture (Kanner, 1943). 
Although the specific diagnostic criteria for autism have changed over the years, the 
inclusion of both these social and non-social symptoms, broadly defined, has 
remained.  Current criteria for diagnosis of autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) 
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include persistent and pervasive impaired social communication and non-social 
repetitive and inflexible behaviours and interests, with the broader diagnosis of ASD 
intended to recognise that these symptoms represent a continuum or spectrum 
ranging from mild to severe (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health 
Organisation, 2018).  
 
The social aspects of ASD include an inability to sustain reciprocal social-emotional 
interactions, difficulties with non-verbal communication—including abnormalities in 
eye contact and body language—deficits in the development and understanding of 
social relationships, a lack of interest in peers and reduced sharing of emotions, 
interests or affect. The non-social diagnostic criteria for ASD incorporate repetitive 
or stereotyped movements or behaviours, including echolalia, an insistence on 
sameness or resistance to change that may manifest as rigid adherence to—and 
distress at any changes to—routines, ritualized patterns of behaviour, intense and 
circumscribed interests and hypo- or hyper-arousal to sensory inputs or atypical 
interest in sensory aspects of the environment (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). 
 
ASD is a developmental disorder, so a diagnosis of ASD also recognises that these 
symptoms typically emerge during childhood. Due to the range of severity of 
symptoms across the spectrum, full manifestation of ASD may appear later in some 
individuals at a point at which the demands of social interaction exceed their 
capabilities to handle them (WHO, 2018). ASD is diagnosed by a trained clinician, 
against standardized diagnostic criteria (e.g. the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM–5) or International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11)) 
using diagnostic tools and measures alongside observation of the patient and with 
input from the parent/caregiver on the patient’s history and behavioural symptoms. 
The most commonly used tools for the diagnosis of ASD include the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule, a semi-structured standardized assessment of 
social interaction, communication, play and imagination— a later version of the 
ADOS was developed to enable assessment of adults—(ADOS; Lord et al., 1989; 
2000) and the Autism Diagnostic Interview–Revised, which is used to assess ASD in 
children and adults, focusing on reciprocal social interaction, communication and 




In their most recent incarnations, both the DSM–5 and the ICD–11 have collapsed a 
range of previously distinct developmental disorders under the diagnosis of Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (APA, 2013; WHO, 2018). Previously, the DSM–4 had listed 
Autistic Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder (AS) and Pervasive Development Disorder 
Not Otherwise Specified (PDD–NOS), and the ICD–10 had listed Childhood 
Autism, Atypical Autism, Asperger Syndrome, and PDD-NOS, as separate 
conditions. The change to bring all these categories under a broader diagnosis of 
Autism Spectrum Disorder reflects a move away from the ‘triad’ of autistic 
impairments—which separated social impairment from language and 
communication difficulties, and included restricted and repetitive behaviours and 
interests (RRBs; Wing & Gould, 1979)—to two core dimensions (social impairment 
and restricted interests and behaviours) that the previously separate diagnoses 
shared. This distillation to two behavioural dimensions (the social and the non-
social) of autism is based on the wealth of literature that has found little meaningful 
distinction between social and communication impairments (Gotham et al., 2007) 
and the fact that language/communication impairments occur in the absence of 
autism (Bishop & Norbury, 2002) while not all children with autism experience 
language delays (Kjellmer et al., 2012). The broader diagnosis of Autism Spectrum 
Disorder, encompassing these two cognitive/behavioural dimensions, also 
recognises that research into the neurobiological underpinnings of autism has 
produced heterogeneous findings, failing to find a single genetic cause for the 
condition, despite its strong genetic heritability (Veenstra-VanderWeele, Christian & 
Cook, 2004; Ronald et al., 2006; Geschwind, 2011) and therefore that behavioural 
diagnosis and conceptualizations of autism are essential for clinicians, people with 
autism, and for the basis of future research into the aetiology of the condition (Lord 
& Jones, 2012).  
 
The prevalence of ASD has been rising (Matzon, Koslowski, 2011; Zahorodny et al., 
2012; van Bakel et al., 2015). A study by Baird et al. (2006) found a prevalence of 
autism of approximately 11.6 per 1000 in the South Thames area of the UK; in 2011, 
a study on school-age children found a prevalence of approximately 26.4 per 1000 
(Kim et al., 2011), in 2012 a study in New Jersey found a prevalence of around 17.4 
per 1000 (Zahorodony et al., 2012) and a recent study by the Centres for Disease 
Control in the United States found an overall prevalence of ASD of 16.8 per 1000 
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(Baio et al., 2018). Estimates therefore put the occurrence of ASD in the general 
population at somewhere between 1% and 2.64%. Suggested reasons for the 
increasing prevalence of ASDs includes the impact of increasing traffic-related air 
pollution (Volk et al., 2013; Dawson, 2013), that prevalence rises whenever 
diagnostic methods change (King & Bearman, 2009), that increased awareness 
among the population leads to an increase in people seeking a diagnosis (Kogan et 
al., 2009), and various other suggestions and theories (see Waterhouse, 2008).  
 
The prevalence of ASD in males appears to be significantly higher than in females, 
with male to female incidence ratios ranging from 2.69:1 (Baker, Milivojevich et al., 
2014) to 3:1 (Loomes, Hull, & Mandy, 2017) to 4:1 (Ehlers & Gillberg, 1993; 
Fombonne, 2009; Baio et al., 2018). It has been suggested that this discrepancy may 
be related to a sex bias in the diagnosis of ASD, with clinicians failing to spot autism 
in female patients, leading to under- and misdiagnosis (Giarelli et al., 2010; 
Lehnhardt et al., 2016; Loomes, Hull, & Mandy, 2017). One possible reason for this 
may be that females with ASD are comparably more socially skilled than their male 
counterparts (Koenig & Tstsanis, 2005; Lai et al., 2011; Wing, 1981) or engage in 
fewer RRBs (Mandy et al., 2012; Shefcyk, 2015; Wilson et al., 2016) and it has been 
suggested that there may be two distinct ASD phenotypes for males and females. 
Related to this idea, research found that females are subject to a genetic ‘protective 
effect’ whereby a larger abnormal genetic load is necessary for ASD to manifest, 
leading to fewer females developing ASD or possibly leading to a different 
expression of ASD symptoms (Jacquemont et al., 2014) and that chromosomal 
genes and sex hormones may modulate the impact of genetic variation on the ASD 
phenotype (Werling & Geschwind, 2014). 
 
1.2.2 The Autism Spectrum 
The re-classification of various related developmental disorders under the term 
‘Autism Spectrum Disorder’ in both the DSM–5 and the ICD–11 reflects the fact 
that the symptoms and behaviours within the two dimensions (social and non-social) 
affected, while similar in type, vary greatly in severity across individuals. The concept 
of the Autism Spectrum therefore represents the existence of certain socially and 
non-socially related traits that may appear together with varying degrees of severity, 
ranging from being mild to having a serious impact on daily functioning.  This 
continuum of autistic traits is thought to run from those with severe forms of low 
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functioning ASD to those with milder, higher functioning forms of autism, all the 
way into the neurotypical population, in which some people will experience high 
levels of autistic traits that do not reach clinical significance (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001; Posserud, Lundervold & Gillberg, 
2006).  
 
Evidence suggests that subclinical autistic traits are more prevalent in those who are 
related to someone with a diagnosis of ASD. In his initial case studies describing 
autism for the first time, for example, Kanner makes a point of noting some of the 
rigid behaviours and preoccupation with routines of the parents of his child patients 
(Kanner, 1943). Folstein and Rutter (1977) discovered that the siblings of those 
diagnosed with autism had a much greater risk of developing the disorder 
themselves, and that they were also genetically predisposed to acquiring a ‘lesser 
variant’ of it that involved language and communication impairments. Le Couteur et 
al. (1996) conducted a twin study and found that concordance for the manifestation 
of a broader autism phenotype—identified by social/communication deficits—was 
much greater for monozygotic twins than in dizygotic twins, suggesting a strong 
genetic component for autistic-like traits. Bolton et al. (1994) also found evidence 
for this ‘lesser variant’ of autism, or broad autism phenotype, reporting that first 
degree family members of individuals with ASD exhibited an increased number of 
autistic-like symptoms (communication difficulties, RRBs etc.) compared with the 
relatives of individuals with Down syndrome. Piven et al. (1997) followed up this 
study, using the same criteria and interview schedule, in families with multiple-
incidence autism and found that, in these families, both first and second-degree 
relatives to those with ASD exhibited more autistic-like symptoms (i.e., increased 
social/communication deficits, stereotyped behaviours etc.) than did relatives of 
those with Down syndrome. Similarly, Losh et al. (2008) found that families with 
multiple-incidence of ASD were more likely to express characteristics of the broad 
autism phenotype—which included symptoms/behaviours related to 
social/language impairments, rigidity and anxiety—than single incidence families or 
families with multiple incidence Down syndrome. 
 
The term broad autism phenotype (BAP) is thus used to describe the presence of 
mild autistic-like symptoms in the relatives of those with an ASD diagnosis (Piven et 
al., 1997). These symptoms do not reach clinical significance, but their presence 
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indicates the heritability and genetic foundations of ASD and therefore the study of 
these traits and behaviours, and their neurobiological origins, can help understanding 
of the aetiology of ASD and identify genes associated with it. As mentioned above, 
the notion of the Autism Spectrum has also been proposed to extend beyond those 
with a diagnosis, or those with a relative diagnosed with the disorder, and across the 
entire neurotypical population more generally (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Posserud, 
Lundervold & Gillberg, 2006). Constantino and Todd (2003) administered the Social 
Responsiveness Scale (Constantino et al., 2002), a measure of autistic traits, to the 
parents of 788 pairs of twins, none of whom had ASD, and found that these traits 
were moderately to highly heritable, suggesting that measuring subclinical autistic 
traits in the neurotypical population is useful for genetic research into ASD. A later 
study by the same authors investigated the heritability of autistic traits in 
neurotypical adults by collecting partner/spouse and parent reports on the autistic 
traits of 285 pairs of twins and their parents, finding again that autistic traits were 
highly heritable, and that those whose parents both reported a high number of 
autistic traits were more likely to display a larger number of subthreshold autistic 
traits, and were eleven times more likely to experience clinically relevant levels of 
autistic traits (Constantino & Todd, 2005). Other studies have also found high 
heritability of autistic traits in the neurotypical population, for example Hoekstra et 
al. (2007) conducted a twin study and found high heritability of self-reported autistic 
traits, and Ronald & Hoekstra (2011) provided a review of similar twin studies on 
ASDs and autistic traits, concluding that the aetiology of autistic traits in the general 
population is similar to that of ASD.  
 
Research on subclinical autistic traits in neurotypical populations has therefore 
grown over the past two decades, and various self-report methods for measuring 
autistic traits in neurotypical samples have been developed. The Broad Autism 
Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ) was developed to measure traits such as 
aloofness, pragmatic language and rigidity in the subclinical population, developed 
with family members of those with an ASD (Hurley, Losh, Parlier, Reznick, & Piven, 
2007). The Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS) was developed to distinguish between 
those with and without ASD and focuses largely on autistic traits related to the social 
dimension of ASD (Constantino & Gruber, 2002). The Subthreshold Autism Trait 
Questionnaire (SATQ) was developed to provide a self-report measure for adults of 
a broader range of subclinical autistic traits than had been included in previous 
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measures (Kanne, Wang & Christ, 2012). The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ), 
possibly the most widely used measure, was developed as a self-report questionnaire 
to assess both social and non-social autistic traits in the neurotypical population 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001; see Chapter 3 for 
further detail on this measure).  
 
Investigating subclinical autistic traits and their relationship to various cognitive, 
affective and attentional processes can therefore help to illuminate the behavioural, 
neurobiolgical and cognitive mechanisms underlying the development and 
manifestation of ASD (Elsabbagh et al., 2009a; 2009b), can facilitate experimental 
designs in neurotypical samples that may cause distress or anxiety in clinical groups 
(Kanne, Wang & Christ, 2012) and can allow for hypothesis testing in neurotypical 
individuals prior to the recruitment of clinical samples. This thesis includes studies 
that measure autistic traits in neurotypical (NT) samples to study the relationship 
between autistic traits and aspects of non-social cognition, as well as follow up 
studies with ASD groups and NT controls, which allows for the assessment of any 
similarities and differences in non-social cognition between those on either side of 
the threshold for ASD diagnosis.  
 
1.3 Theories of Autism 
 
Autism research in the fields of neuroscience, genetics and cognitive psychology 
attempts to explain how both the social and non-social behavioural symptoms of 
ASD manifest at genetic, biological and cognitive levels, and the current thesis 
focuses on cognitive and affective aspects of interaction with non-social stimuli in 
order to contribute to the understanding of this core dimension of ASD. Within the 
two dimensions of ASD (social and non-social), symptoms vary widely across the 
spectrum and between individuals, making it a challenge to identify a single cause of 
the disorder, with some conceding that one distinct explanation of ASD and its 
heterogeneous manifestations may never be possible (Happé, et al., 2006). Despite 
both being necessarily present for a diagnosis of ASD, it is not yet clear how its 
social and non-social symptoms relate to one another. Twin studies indicate that 
these social and non-social behaviours, though both highly heritable, may in fact be 
genetically independent of one another and therefore benefit from being considered 
separately (Ronald, Happé and Plomin, 2005; Happé, Ronald and Plomin, 2006). A 
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review of research on the relationship between the social and non-social features of 
ASD also found a stark lack of evidence that the two dimensions are correlated with 
one another and suggests that these symptoms may have distinct underlying causes 
(Mandy & Skuse, 2008).  Many theoretical attempts to elucidate the cognitive profile 
of ASD have, however, focused on finding unitary explanations, while 
neurobiological studies have tended to focus on one or other of these two general 
diagnostic criteria. One of the main issues with most theories of autism is that they 
fail to account for all aspects of autistic symptomatology, and fail to explain the 
heterogeneity in the disorder. Although there is, as yet, no overall consensus on a 
grand unified theory of autism, several of the key neurobiological and cognitive 
theories that have contributed to the theoretical underpinning of this thesis are 
detailed below. 
 
1.3.1  Cognitive Theories 
 
1.3.1.1 Theory of Mind 
The Theory of Mind (ToM) account of autism suggests that those with ASD suffer 
from a type of ‘mind blindness’ whereby they are unable to understand or gauge the 
perspectives, feelings or motivations of others (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). 
A perspective-taking task performed with autistic children found that the majority of 
them were unable to imagine themselves in another person’s position, and the 
authors concluded that the inability to develop a theory about what others might be 
thinking, feeling or planning would lead to difficulties predicting behaviour resulting 
in difficulties with social interactions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). These results and 
subsequent theory later led to the development of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Task (RMET), whereby participants are presented with emotionally expressive eyes 
and must choose which of four emotions the eyes are conveying (Baron-Cohen, 
Joliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997). Results of experiments using the RMET 
have consistently found that those with ASD perform worse than controls (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001; O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, & 
Plaisted, 1999; Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 2000), yet while the ToM 
account may illuminate a underlying factor that explains the social deficits seen in 
ASD, it does not explain how such ‘mind blindness’ arises, not does it account for 
the other, non-social aspects of ASD. 
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1.3.1.2 Executive Dysfunction  
Executive functioning refers to the cognitive processes involved in controlling 
behaviour, including planning, working memory, inhibition of inappropriate or 
irrelevant responses, attention shifting and flexibility of thought. Executive 
Dysfunction (ED) theory suggests impaired frontal lobe function in ASD, resulting 
in an inability to switch attention from one task to another, resulting in an 
abnormally heightened focus for a restricted number of interests or features in a 
given environment (Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991). Ozonoff et al. (1991) 
administered tasks testing ability to empathize, emotional processing and executive 
functioning to participants with ASD and age, sex and IQ matched controls. They 
found that the ASD participants performed less well on all tasks, and that deficits in 
emotion understanding and executive function were related to one another in the 
ASD group, concluding that executive dysfunction is a primary deficit in both high 
and low functioning ASD. Problems with ED theory include the fact that not all 
individuals with ASD exhibit executive dysfunction (predominantly in high-
functioning autism (HFA)), suggesting that it cannot be a core feature of the 
condition (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), and that executive dysfunction is not specific 
to ASD, with reports of executive function difficulties in conditions such as ADHD 
(Shang, Wu, Gau & Tseng, 2013), depression (Lockwood et al., 2002) and even in 
menopause (Epperson et al., 2015).  
 
 
1.3.1.3 Weak Central Coherence Theory 
Weak Central Coherence (WCC) theory was put forward by Frith and Happé (1994) 
as an attempt to explain not only the deficits seen in ASD, but also the aspects of 
cognition that appear to be preserved or even enhanced. Central coherence refers to 
the ability to process information as a whole, that is, in context and including the 
assimilation of semantically relevant features. WCC suggests that autistic individuals 
are unable to process information at this global level, instead focusing on local 
details, which leads to both an inability to grasp the wider context and ‘black-and-
white’ thinking. This local information processing style, however, also yields an 
enhanced aptitude for attention to detail, supported by studies showing that ASD 
participants perform as well as, or better than, neurotypical controls on tasks that 
measure attention to detail, such as the Embedded Figures Task (EFT) (Shah & 
Frith, 1983; Frith, 1989; Jarrold, Gilchrist, & Bender, 2005; Happé & Frith, 2006). 
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The fact that weak central coherence accounts for strengths in ASD as well as 
weaknesses means that it is seen as a cognitive difference rather than as a deficit 
(Happé, 1999). WCC, in conjunction with reduced Theory of Mind, is suggested to 
account for the full range of ASD characteristics (Happé & Frith, 2006). One 
problem with WCC theory is that it predicts that those with ASD will be unable to 
grasp ‘wholes’ that are made up of many parts, yet many with even low functioning 
ASD are able to derive overarching general rules from complex parts, and apply 
these rules in certain ways to predict or calculate outcomes, for example performing 
calendrical calculation or factorising vast numbers without prior mathematical 
education (Saks, 1985; Baron-Cohen et al., 2007). It therefore seems that WCC 
theory is unable to account for the affinity for, and ability to understand, systems in 
ASD (Baron-Cohen, 2004). 
 
 
1.3.1.4 Enhanced Perceptual Functioning 
While the WCC theory proposes that those with ASD possess an enhanced local 
processing style along with difficulties processing information globally, the 
Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (EPF) theory of autism posits that this aptitude 
for local details is the result of superior visual processing and an ‘overfunctioning’ of 
certain regions in the brain responsible for primary perceptual functions (Mottron & 
Burack, 2001; Mottron, Dawson, Soulières, Hubert & Burack, 2006). EPF theory 
accounts for the ability of those with ASD to process global information, such as 
mathematics as mentioned above, or a piece of music, by suggesting that there is not 
a deficit in global processing, but that enhanced perceptual processing prompts 
adaptive responses that manifest as restricted interests or as extraordinary abilities in 
people with ASD and savant syndrome (Mottron et al., 2006). EPF also explains 
repetitive behaviours in ASD by suggesting that the overstimulation of sensory input 
leads to a mitigating response such as tapping, rocking, etc., in order to try to reduce 
what would otherwise be an overwhelming sensation.  
 
There is evidence to support EPF theory, such as the finding that local processing 
enhancement in those with a talent for observational drawing was related to an 
ability to successfully filter global information, rather than a deficit in global 
processing (Chamberlain et al., 2013). Additionally, Bertone et al. (2005) 
administered a task to an ASD group and controls whereby they had to distinguish 
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the orientation of a stimulus that was determined by either texture or luminance 
contrast. The luminance discrimination task is simple and involves processing in 
only one receptive field—area V1—of the visual cortex and can be determined by a 
single neuron in that area, whereas the more complex texture discrimination task 
requires integration from more than one receptive field.  They found that those with 
ASD performed significantly better than controls at distinguishing orientation by 
luminance contrast than by texture, and worse than controls on the texture 
discrimination task. Bertone et al. (2005) suggest that these results provide evidence 
that the strengths in local processing seen in ASD are related to enhanced perceptual 
functioning for simple stimuli, that the deficits seen in global processing are related 
to poorer perceptual functioning for complex stimuli and that these differences are 
contingent on the complexity of the neural network that is required to process each 
type of stimuli and atypical neural connectivity, rather than on an inability to process 
meaning globally (as suggested by WCC theory). 
 
 
1.3.1.5 Social Motivation Theory 
The Social Motivation Theory (SMT) suggests that the socially-related symptoms of 
ASD arise from a lack of interest in social information. The background to this 
theory includes research that has shown that people with ASD will show reduced 
fixation on eyes compared to controls and that this reduced attention to eyes is 
related to social deficits (Klin et al., 2002); hypoactivation in ASD in areas of the 
brain usually specialised for processing faces (the fusiform face area (FFA)) when 
presented with images of faces (Schultz, 2005); and evidence from face processing 
studies in ASD, which indicates impaired face recognition and discrimination, 
reduced attention to the eyes and slower face processing, which is suggested to be 
due to a primary deficit in motivation to attend to social stimuli (Dawson, Webb & 
McPartland, 2005). Based on this evidence, the Social Motivation Theory proposes 
that the social difficulties in ASD arise from reduced or absent motivation to attend 
to social information, leading to reduced exposure to faces and other social stimuli, 
which in turn leads to reduced opportunity for developing social understanding, 
resulting in the social deficits characteristic of autism (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, 
Brodkin & Schultz, 2012).  
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There is much evidence suggesting reduced attention and orienting towards social 
stimuli in ASD, for example, a study using social orienting tasks found that NT 
children exhibited a preference for orienting to social information, where children 
with ASD did not (Burnside, Wright & Poulin-Dubois, 2017); a study investigating 
orienting to social stimuli found atypical gaze cue and face processing in children 
with ASD and children with a diagnosis of ASD and ADHD, compared with those 
with a diagnosis of ADHD alone and controls, suggesting that reduced social 
attention is specific to autism (Groom & Kochar et al., 2017); an eye tracking study 
looking at social orienting in children with ASD during dyadic interactions in 
naturalistic settings found that those with ASD oriented towards faces to a lesser 
extent than NT controls, and that they are much slower to attend to speaking faces 
(Magrelli et al., 2013). The Social Motivation Theory suggests that while social 
motivation seems to be an innate feature of neurotypical individuals, with most 
people seeking out relationships with others and preferentially orienting towards 
faces and social stimuli, even in the first months of life (Mares, Smith, Johnson, & 
Senju, 2016; Tomalski, Csibra, & Johnson, 2008), in ASD the atypical social 
orienting and reduced attention to social stimuli reflects a diminished drive towards 
the social that appears at an early age and may therefore have a knock-on effect on 
social functioning later on. 
 
Results of studies investigating social attention in ASD have not been consistent, 
however. A change blindness task (see Chapter 5 for further detail on change 
blindness paradigms) found no differences between an ASD group and controls in 
attending to people and animals in naturalistic scenes (New et al., 2010); a study on 
infants at risk for autism (by virtue of having an older sibling who had been 
diagnosed with ASD) found that those who later went on to develop autism showed 
clear orienting towards faces and typical social attention patterns (Elsabbagh et al., 
2013); and research on orienting towards protoface stimuli (e.g. black dots where the 
eyes and mouth would appear on a face) found that the orienting response to these 
face-like configurations was intact in individuals with ASD (Shah, Goule, Bird & 
Cook, 2013).  
 
These conflicting results may be due to the fact that it is not that individuals with 
ASD lack motivation for social stimuli, but simply that they prefer or are more 
motivated towards non-social stimuli. Sasson & Touchstone (2014) found that 
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children with ASD attended to social information as much as NT controls unless 
there was a competing image of an object related to typical autistic circumscribed 
interest, in which case they attended significantly less to faces. Similarly, an eye 
tracking study in adolescents with ASD and NT controls found that the presence of 
a non-social object alongside social stimuli within a scene was associated with 
reduced preference for attending to the social image and suggest that atypicalities in 
social motivation in autism may be context dependent (Unruh, Sasson & Shafer et 
al., 2016). It may therefore be that social motivation in ASD is modulated by non-
social motivation and that a preference for, or stronger orienting response towards, 
non-social information interferes with social attention in certain contexts but not in 
others. The aim of the present thesis is to explore this non-social attention and 
motivation in ASD and the subclinical autism spectrum. 
 
1.3.1.6 Empathizing-Systemizing & Extreme Male Brain  
The Empathizing-Systemizing (E-S) theory of autism attempts to explain both the 
social and non-social characteristics of ASD by postulating that restricted interests 
and repetitive behaviours (RRBs) represent a form of extreme ‘systemizing’, that is, 
an overdeveloped drive to construct and analyse rule-based systems (Baron-Cohen, 
2009). Baron-Cohen’s Empathizing-Systemizing and Extreme Male Brain (EMB) 
theories of autism posit that the spectrum of autistic traits extends from those with 
few autistic symptoms (good social communication, no repetitive and restrictive 
behaviours) right across the neurotypical population to those with mild, and then 
severe, ASD (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Baron-Cohen, 2002). These theories therefore 
account for the evidence for the broad autism phenotype and the presence of 
autistic traits in the general population (as discussed in Section 1.2.2). 
 
The development of the self-report Systemizing Quotient (SQ; Baron-Cohen, 
Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan & Wheelwright, 2003) and Empathizing Quotient (EQ; 
Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) to measure both drive to systemize and drive to 
empathize, allowed for the investigation of sex differences in the neurotypical 
population in terms of these two cognitive dimensions. Along with behavioural 
assessments to measure systemizing and empathizing abilities more objectively, 
studies found that females tend to outperform males on empathizing tasks while 
scoring higher on the EQ, and males show the opposite pattern, outperforming 
females on systemizing tasks while self-reporting higher systemizing drive (Baron-
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Cohen et al., 2003; BaronCohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Carroll & Chiew, 2006; 
Nettle, 2007). These sex differences led to the hypothesis that the repetitive 
behaviours and restricted interests of ASD represent an exaggeration of typically 
‘male’ cognitive attributes in the form of heightened systemizing ability and fewer 
typically ‘female’ abilities, such as empathizing (possessing a ‘theory of mind’ that 
enables the understanding and successful navigation of the social environment).  
 
The theory that ASD represents the extreme of a typically male cognitive style is 
supported by evidence from various studies including one that tested empathizing 
and systemizing ability in males with Asperger Syndrome (AS) and NT males and 
females, and found that females outperformed both AS and NT males on the 
empathizing task, with NT males outperforming the AS males, while both NT and 
AS males outperformed females on the systemizing task (Lawson, Baron-Cohen, & 
Wheelwright, 2004). Other research also supports these findings—in a study by 
Wakabayashi et al. (2007), people with ASD and neurotypical controls were 
administered both the SQ and the EQ, and the results showed that those with ASD 
scored lower on the EQ and higher on the SQ than controls. Further evidence 
suggests that cognitive ability associated with both empathizing and systemizing are 
linked to levels of testosterone, both pre- and post-natally. Research has found that 
higher pre-natal exposure to testosterone correlates with social communication 
difficulties in female children and restricted interests in male children (Whitehouse, 
et al., 2010; Knickmeyer et al., 2005), and that a proxy for circulating testosterone 
correlates with systemizing ability (measured using the intuitive physics test) 
(Brosnan et al., 2010). 
 
While there is evidence to support the Extreme Male Brain theory of autism, the 
Empathizing-Systemizing (E-S) theory (Baron-Cohen, 2009) may provide a better 
approach. Although empathizing and systemizing can very generally be thought of as 
female and male attributes respectively, it may be more useful to consider the autistic 
spectrum in terms of the abilities themselves, to allow for the occurrence of female 
high systemizers and male high empathizers, of which there are many. For example, 
a recent study found that scores on the Empathizing and Systemizing quotients were 
a better predictor of degree subject than gender, with those scoring highly on the SQ 
more likely to be taking a science degree, and those scoring higher on the EQ more 
likely to be studying a subject from the arts and humanities (Manson & 
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Winterbottom, 2012). More recent research also suggests that females with ASD 
may be underdiagnosed and that there may be two distinct ASD phenotypes for 
males and females respectively, so it makes sense to discuss autistic traits in terms of 
their qualities rather than in terms of their maleness (Mandy et al., 2012; Bargiela, 
Steward, & Mandy, 2016; Lehnhardt et al., 2016; Loomes et al., 2017). There is an 
established link between empathizing and systemizing abilities; those that are very 
good at one tend to be challenged when it comes to the other (Baron-Cohen , 2009), 
so this way of framing the social and non-social dimensions of ASD is useful for the 
purposes of this thesis.  
 
1.3.1.7 Dual Process Theories 
There is evidence that Theory of Mind cognition is an automatic process, for 
example, a study showed that adults are significantly slower to spot the location of a 
ball if an onlooker has a false belief about where the ball is located, even when that 
belief is irrelevant to the task, suggesting that the tracking of others’ beliefs is 
automatic (Kovacs et al., 2010), and other studies reveal automatic identification of 
what others perceive (Samson et al., 2010; Qureshi et al., 2010). However, there is 
conflicting evidence, suggesting that ToM cognition involves slower processes that 
involve working memory and attention, for example Back and Apperly (2010) found 
that participants were significantly slower answering questions about the beliefs of 
another person compared to questions about reality. Additionally, while infants as 
young as 18-months can typically pass false-belief tests to assess ToM (measuring 
eye gaze behaviour), children up the age of 4 typically do not pass verbal false-belief 
tests (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). Conversely, individuals with ASD will pass an 
explicit verbal false-belief test but, on implicit false-belief tasks, will not exhibit eye 
gaze behaviour consistent with false-belief understanding (Senju, 2009). This 
conflicting evidence suggests that ToM and social cognition more broadly, may 
involve two separate processes or styles, one automatic and one slower that involves 
a processing cost (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). These two conjectured styles of social 
cognition are consistent with classic dual process theories of cognition, which 
propose two different domain-general reasoning and decision-making styles or 
systems (Stanovich & West, 2000; Evans, 2008) and investigating ToM and social 
understanding within this framework is thought to be promising (Happé, Cook & 
Bird, 2017).   
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Beyond Theory of Mind, Brosnan et al. (2014) suggest that the two distinct cognitive 
styles proposed by dual process accounts of cognition parallel the concepts of 
empathizing and systemizing. The first thinking style (Type 1) is characterized as a 
fast, low effort, automatic, intuitive and unconscious processing style that is 
independent of working memory and general intelligence, and has been linked to 
emotion and the rapid attribution of emotional/mental states and intention to others 
(Stanovich & West, 2000; Epstein, 1994; Hassin et al., 2004). It is also argued that as 
Type 1 processes do not require controlled attention, they can be involuntarily 
triggered by certain stimuli but can also be mediated by higher level reasoning 
processes (Stanovich, 2009; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Type 2 is characterized as a 
slow, analytical, reflective, conscious and controlled deliberative processing style that 
is dependent on general intelligence and working memory and is linked to the 
representation of rules and underlying principles (Stanovich & West, 2000).  
 
Brosnan, et al. (2014) suggest that Type 1 type processing is related to empathizing, 
due to the rapid, autonomic and intuitive nature of emotion recognition that has 
been conjectured in the literature (Clark, Winkielman, & McIntosh, 2008; Kahneman 
& Egan, 2011; Tracy, et al., 2011; Oliva & Anikin, 2018). Type 2 type processing, 
they propose, is related to systemizing, which involves slower, more deliberative and 
higher-order cognitive processes. Their research on the relationships between self-
reported systemizing and empathizing biases (using the Empathizing Quotient (EQ) 
and Systemizing Quotient (SQ)) and measures of intuitive and deliberative cognitive 
mechanisms (using the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 
1999) and the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT; Frederick, 2005) found correlations 
between empathizing and intuition/Type 1 type processes  and systemizing and 
deliberation/Type 2 type processes (Brosnan, Hollinworth, Antoniadou & Lewton, 
2014).  These findings were explored by Brosnan et al. (2016; 2017) in the autism 
spectrum to establish whether the cognitive profile of ASD could be understood in 
terms of dual process accounts of cognition, and discovered that people with ASD 
produced fewer intuitive responses on the CRT and that a higher number of autistic 
traits in a pooled sample of NT and ASD participants was related to more 
deliberative responses and fewer intuitive responses.  
 
Another study also explored the relationships between empathizing–systemizing 
constructs and the Type 1/Type 2 constructs proposed by dual process accounts of 
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cognition, by administering the EQ, SQ and various measures of deliberative and 
intuitive reasoning style to a large NT sample (n=2789) and found that self-reported 
systemizing drive was significantly positively correlated with deliberative thinking 
style and significantly negatively correlated with intuition, and that self-reported 
empathizing drive was negatively correlated with deliberative thinking style but not 
related to intuition (Svedholm-Håkkinen & Lindeman, 2017). An aim of the present 
thesis is to explore systemizing as an aspect of non-social cognition, the processes 
and mechanisms underlying both systemizing drive and ability, as well as attentional 
and physiological responses to non-social stimuli in ASD and in relation to autistic 
traits. The Dual Process theory as conceptualised by Brosnan et al. (2014; 2016; 
2017) is a useful framework for bringing together, thinking about and analysing the 




1.3.2 Biological Explanations 
 
1.3.2.1 Genetics 
There is high heritability of ASD and autistic traits and it is widely accepted that 
there is a genetic basis for ASD (Woodbury-Smith & Scherer, 2018). However, the 
genetic findings thus far have been complex and heterogeneous, making elusive yet 
again the idea of a single underlying cause (Veenstra-Vanderweele et al., 2004; Lord 
& Jones, 2012). Between 200 and 1000 genes have been implicated in susceptibility 
for ASD (Chen et al., 2015) and the disorder is associated with many different 
genetic patterns, sharing them with numerous other disorders and psychiatric 
conditions, making it difficult to identify a genetic aetiology for the majority of 
individuals with an ASD diagnosis (Guilmatre et al., 2009). A recent review of the 
progress in research on the genetics of ASD is hopeful, however, suggesting that 
new insights into its genetic aetiology may offer opportunities for identifying 
molecular targets for intervention (Woodbury-Smith & Scherer, 2018).  
 
 1.3.2.2  The Social Brain 
A great deal of research into ASD has focused on the social aspects of the disorder, 
due to the negative impact of social deficits on daily functioning, with much 
attention being paid to the areas of the brain involved in emotion and face 
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recognition and processing. Brain structures involved in social cognition include the 
amygdala, the superior temporal sulcus, and the fusiform gyrus, or fusiform face area 
(FFA), which various studies have shown to be abnormal in ASD (Brothers, 1990; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Bookheimer, et al., 2008; Ashwin, et al., 2007; Schultz, 
2005; Boucher, et al., 2005; Gaigg and Bowler, 2007; Howard, et al., 2000; 
Kanwisher, et al., 1997; Pierce, et al., 2001; Critchley, et al., 2000; Schultz, et al., 
2003).  
 
The amygdala has been identified as a crucial part of the ‘social brain’ (Brothers, 
1990) as there is evidence it plays a role in recognising emotion in facial expressions 
(Adolphs, Russell & Tranel, 1999) and in orienting to socially salient stimuli 
(Birmingham et al., 2010). In non-human primate studies, it has been shown that 
ablation of the amygdala in rhesus macaques results in a withdrawal from social 
interactions (Kling, 1986).  Studies also indicate that the amygdala functions 
abnormally in ASD, for example Baron-Cohen et al. (2000) discovered that the 
amygdala is not activated while performing the ‘reading the mind in the eyes task’ 
and other studies indicate that those parts of the brain activated in controls when 
processing emotional facial expressions, including the amygdala, are not activated in 
adults with high-functioning ASD (Bookheimer, et al., 2008; Ashwin, et al., 2007; 
Schultz, 2005) and that the amygdala is abnormally developed in ASD (Boucher, et 
al., 2005; Howard, et al., 2000).  
 
There is growing evidence to suggest that autistic individuals are in fact able to 
recognise both ‘non-social’ (e.g. fear or happiness) and ‘social’ (e.g. guilt or 
embarrassment) emotions in others under experimental conditions (Williams and 
Happé, 2010; Hobson, et al., 2006). The authors of these studies acknowledge that 
while autistic individuals may possess cognitive processes for recognising emotions 
similar to non-autistic individuals, it is clear that they cannot apply these processes 
flexibly across a variety of contexts in daily life. For example, it may be that the 
focused and systematic structure of the experimental tasks facilitates that processing, 
while the pressures and complexities of real life situations makes social emotional 
processing particularly difficult for those with ASD. While social emotional 
processing in ASD is impaired in everyday contexts, the ability to recognise social 
emotions in experimental conditions, and the ability to identify the appropriate 
emotional content of music suggest that ASD may not involve a complete deficit in 
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emotion recognition and processing. In another study, autistic adults and adolescents 
demonstrated intact learning and perception of emotionally relevant non-social 
stimuli equivalent to that of NT controls (South et al., 2008). This indicates intact 
amygdala function for other aspects of emotional processing and decision-making 
where social stimuli are not involved. This study however did not compare 
emotional facilitation with social stimuli, and suggests that future research should 
examine this. 
 
Another area of the brain implicated in ASD is the superior temporal sulcus (STS), 
which appears to be involved in social perception (Allison, Puce & McCarthy, 2000), 
including the analysis of biological motion (Bonda et al., 1996) and the interpretation 
and prediction of the intentions and actions of others (Mosconi et al., 2005). Brain 
imaging studies with individuals with ASD found atypical activation of the STS 
when performing social tasks, and that there is reduced grey matter in the STS in 
ASD subjects (Saitovich et al., 2012). It has been suggested that abnormalities in the 
early development of the function and anatomy of the STS may trigger a cascade of 
dysfunction in other neural processes, leading to the social impairments 
characteristic of ASD (Zilbovicius et al., 2006).  
 
Neurons are remarkably selective and will fire only for specific stimuli that they code 
for, with neurons in the visual cortex being highly specialised towards certain kinds 
of stimuli (Quiroga et al., 2005; Quiroga et al., 2008). For example, there are face-
selective neurons involved in face perception that only fire when a face appears in 
the visual field (Afraz et al., 2006), ‘canonical’ neurons that respond to objects 
(Rajmohan & Mohandas, 2007), neurons that code for specific quantities (Nieder & 
Miller, 2003) and there are neurons known as mirror neurons (MNs), found in the 
STS, that are specialised for the visual processing of information about the actions 
of others (Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Carey, 1996). Mirror neurons are so-called because 
they code for/are activated by patterns of movement perceived in others and form a 
kind of pre-motor representation of the same pattern of movement in the observer. 
It has been suggested that MNs allow for the development of a theory of mind—by 
internally reconstructing the neural patterns that accompany particular movements 
and behaviours it may be possible to then experience an impression of the kind of 
mental and emotional states, and intentions, that are associated with those 
movements and behaviours (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). It is theorized that MNs are 
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important for developing imitative behaviour, theory of mind and social 
understanding and that early dysfunction in the MN system may lead to difficulties 
interpreting, predicting and understanding the behaviours of others, causing the 
social deficits characteristic of ASD (Williams et al., 2001).  A recent review of 17 
studies on mirror neurons in autism found that 13 of them reported that the MN 
system plays a role in ASD, while 4 studies reported no such influence (Guedes Neta 
& Varanda, 2016). 
 
A further area of the brain proposed to be dysfunctional in ASD is part of the 
middle aspect of the right fusiform gyrus, or the fusiform face area (FFA) as it has 
come to be known due to its activation during facial processing tasks in the typically 
developing population (Kanwisher, et al., 1997; Puce, et al., 1995, 1997; Sergent, 
1992; McCarthy, 1997). Studies have shown that in ASD, however, this area is not 
activated when viewing faces (Pierce, et al., 2001; Critchley, et al., 2000; Schultz, 
2005). Another study discovered that the FFA is also activated by social attribution 
tasks that involve human like interactions between non-human geometric shapes 
with no involvement of facial imagery (Schultz, et al., 2003), which suggests that the 
FFA performs a function when meaning is assigned to socially relevant gestures and 
stimuli during social cognition in general. The conclusion of this study was that 
hypoactivation of the FFA in ASD could be indicative of a more general 
malfunctioning of the larger ‘social brain network,’ in which the FFA plays a crucial 
role along with the amygdala. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that dysfunction or abnormal development of these 
regions of the ‘social brain’ are not related to ASD symptomatology. For example, a 
more recent non-human primate study by Emery et al. (2001) found that adult 
rhesus monkeys with bilateral lesions of the amygdala were still able to engage in 
social interactions, understand social gestures and initiate and receive social contact. 
A case study of two patients with a rare disease (Urbach–Wiethe disease) causing 
bilateral atrophy of the amygdala revealed no association with ASD when they were 
assessed with standard diagnostic tests for ASD (Paul et al., 2010) and other research 
has shown more differences between individuals with amygdala lesion and those 
with ASD than similarities (Birmingham et al., 2011).  This conflicting evidence may 
suggest that it is not solely the amygdala that is responsible for either social 
proficiency or social deficits, but a more complex ‘social brain network’ of which the 
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amygdala forms a part, and which can produce ordinary social functioning even 
when one of its components fails, perhaps due to compensatory activity by the other 
parts (Schultz et al., 2003; Hadjikhani et al., 2004). 
 
Further research shows that the amygdala and the FFA are not not necessarily 
damaged or dysfunctional in ASD. One fMRI study found that there were no 
significant differences in FFA activation between adults with ASD and controls 
when shown facial stimuli in comparison with non-social stimuli (Hadjikhani, et al., 
2004), also suggesting that the social deficits in autism are due to the overall 
dysfunction of a distributed social processing network in the brain rather than 
abnormal functioning in a particular area. A more recent study investigated the 
performance on tasks previously identified as involving engagement of the amygdala 
of  adults and adolescents with ASD (South, et al., 2008). The tasks chosen were not 
socially related, and involved identifying (non-social) threats, assessing (non-social) 
risk and affective word memory. They found that  there was no difference in 
performance between the ASD group and controls, suggesting again that 
impairment of the amygdala in ASD is specific to social information.  
 
Evidence suggesting activation of both the FFA and the amygdala in ASD to non-
face stimuli was found in an fMRI study on a child with autism, when he was shown 
images of Digimon characters, which were an example of his particular restricted 
interest (Grelotti, et al., 2005). The child did not show activation of these areas when 
viewing images of faces, suggesting that while the areas of the brain usually 
associated with social processing may be intact in ASD, they may instead be 
activated by non-social stimuli, or stimuli specific to a particular obsession or special 
interest. A study by Rosset et al. (2008) further supports this finding, reporting that 
children with autism could identify emotions in cartoon faces using the same 
configural processing strategy as that employed by NT controls when identifying 
emotion in human faces. When autistic children attempted to identify emotion in 
real human faces, they used an atypical perceptual strategy that focuses on details 
rather than the face as a whole. These studies suggest that the brain structures 
employed for such processing in NT controls are not necessarily defunct in ASD. 
Although the amygdala is typically associated with response to social stimuli and it is 
therefore presumed dysfunctional in ASD, evidence such as this implies that in ASD 
the amygdala is in fact functional, but is responsive to non-social rather than social 
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stimuli. The current thesis aims to explore this idea by investigating attention and 
physiological responses to non-social compared with social stimuli across the 







Systemizing and Non-Social Cognition 
in the Autism Spectrum 
 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter provides a summary of the non-social features of autism, beginning 
with a review of the restricted interests and repetitive behaviours that broadly 
constitute the non-social diagnostic criteria for ASD, before discussing the concept 
of Systemizing, from the Hyper-Systemizing and Empathizing-Systemizing theories 
of autism, which is used to describe the cognitive style of individuals with ASD. A 
summary of Chapters 1 and 2 is provided and the aims of the research are stated. 
 
2.2 Restricted Interests and Repetitive Behaviours 
 
2.2.1 High and Low Level RRBs 
The mechanisms underlying the non-social dimension of the core diagnostic criteria 
for ASD are less frequently studied than the social and communicative deficits, due 
in part to the perceived comparatively negative impact of social dysfunction on daily 
life and in part to the considerable challenge of studying such a heterogeneous set of 
behaviours (Turner, 1999). The restricted interests and repetitive behaviours (RRBs) 
that constitute key symptoms of ASD encapsulate a wide variety of activities and 
inclinations, some of which can be harmful or inappropriate, and others of which 
can be harmless at worst and beneficial or enjoyable at best.  
 
RRBs can be reliably divided into two subtypes: high and low level behaviours 
(Turner, 1999; Leekam, 2011). Factor analyses of measures of RRBs, such as the 
Repetitive Behaviour Scale Revised (RBS-R; Bodfish, Symons, Parker & Lewis, 
2006), the ADOS (Lord et al., 2000) and ADI-R (Lord et al., 1994) reveal that the 
low level subtype can be broadly categorised as repetitive sensory motor behaviours, 
and the high level subtype as insistence on sameness behaviours (Bishop et al., 
2013). Low-level behaviours therefore include actions such as arm flapping, 
rhythmic movements and rocking; and self-injurious actions such as head or face 
slapping, hand biting or hair pulling (Cuccaro et al., 2003). These behaviours are 
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more characteristic of low-functioning autism and occur more frequently in younger 
ASD patients, as well as occurring as symptoms of other intellectual disabilities, 
developmental or neurological disorders and psychiatric conditions such as 
Tourette’s syndrome, Parkinson’s disease and schizophrenia (Bishop & Richler, 
2006; Carcani-Rathwell et al., 2006). High-level, or ‘insistence on sameness,’ RRBs 
include having restricted interests; repetitive speech (palilalia and echolalia); ritualistic 
behaviours such as repetitive manipulation and arrangement of objects (e.g. 
obsessively lining up toys); and an intense dislike of change, which can result in great 
distress if routines or environments are disrupted. Restricted interests are particularly 
common in high-functioning autism (HFA) and represent the highest level of RRB, 
referring to the (often obsessive) pursuit and regurgitation of information about a 
circumscribed entity or set of entities such as a certain film franchise, a football 
league, train timetables or a particular make of vehicle, with little desire to engage 
about anything else. Some analyses suggest a three-factor model of RRBs, in which 
restricted interests load onto a factor of their own, indicating that restricted interests 
may have a different pathology to the repetitive behaviour and insistence on 
sameness RRBs in ASD (Lam, Bodfish & Piven, 2008).  
 
Despite the relative lack of in depth research into the underlying causes of RRBs 
compared to the social and communicative symptoms of ASD, the importance of 
researching the non-social features of the autistic cognitive profile in order to better 
understand the aetiology of the condition has been highlighted and research is 
growing in this area (South, et al., 2005; Spiker et al., 2012; Jiujias, Kelley & Hall, 
2017). Leekam et.al. (2011) state the need for further integration of the research into 
RRBs from the disciplines of developmental and cognitive psychology, neuroscience 
and psychiatry in order to develop a conceptual framework for understanding these 
behaviours and their role in the broader diagnosis of ASD. Much of the research on 
RRBs in these various disciplines attempts to understand their underlying causes and 
what functions they might serve. The fact that these behavioural symptoms are so 
heterogeneous and are characterised by their apparent lack of purpose, makes these 
investigations challenging. A thorough review by Turner (1997) of earlier research 
into RRBs suggests that to explain the presence of these behaviours in autism, a 
sound theory must account for the variance in symptoms between individuals, the 
rigidity and inappropriateness characteristic of these behaviours and the reasons for 
their resistance to treatment or change with time, and their prevalence across all ages 
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and abilities within the autistic spectrum.  Over the past two decades there have 
been theoretical and empirical developments that have made some progress in 
attempting to answer these questions and explain what drives restricted and 
repetitive behaviours in ASD. 
 
2.2.2 Hyper- and Hypo-Arousal in RRBs 
There is evidence to suggest that RRBs may be related to hyper-arousal, both in 
ASD and in other conditions such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), 
schizophrenia, Fragile X syndrome and Rett syndrome, as well as in amphetamine 
users, who attest to finding repetitive motion calming when under the influence of 
the stimulant (Kinsbourne,  2011). Several studies have shown that abnormal 
sensory responses are related to RRBs in ASD (Gabriels, et al., 2008; Boyd, et al., 
2009; Chen, et al., 2009) but there is as yet no real consensus on the nature of this 
relationship (Leekam, et al., 2011). One prevalent and longstanding hypothesis 
related to the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning theory (Mottron et al., 2006) 
suggests that the simple repetitive motions seen in low-level RRBs provide sensory 
input that modulates hyper-arousal, displacing the negative feelings associated with 
an overactive sympathetic nervous system, and that the avoidance of new objects 
and situations (‘insistence on sameness’) in ASD is due to the inability to cope with 
the heightened arousal that is elicited by novel stimuli (Hutt et al., 1964; Hutt & 
Hutt, 1965; Hutt & Hutt, 1970; Kinsbourne, 1980; Repp et al.,1992).  
 
However, a review by Rogers and Ozonoff (2005) of all research undertaken since 
1960 into sensory abnormalities in ASD found that these accounts are likely to be 
inaccurate, as while the research suggests that sensory abnormalities occur more 
frequently in ASD than in NT controls, this does not distinguish ASD from other 
developmental disorders such as Fragile X syndrome, and there is insufficient 
evidence to support the hyper-/hypo- arousal theory. The majority of findings 
would suggest that hyper-arousal is not a core feature of ASD, and while some 
studies found evidence to support a theory of hypo-arousal in ASD, the diversity of 
methods and the lack of replication across the research render the overall picture of 
arousal in ASD inconclusive. 
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2.2.3 Anxiety and RRBs 
The presence of restricted interests and repetitive behaviours may interfere with 
overall functioning in ASD, as an obsessive narrow focus of attention can cause 
important information in the environment to be overlooked (Attwood, 2003). 
Indulgence in RRBs has been found to have a negative impact on social interaction 
as it interferes with the ability to engage in reciprocal communication, and intensity 
of the expression of RRBs is associated with poorer social outcomes (Klin et al., 
2007). Spiker et al. (2012) suggest that this interference of RRBs in social functioning 
may lead to increased anxiety levels in those with ASD. Clinically significant anxiety 
symptoms are commonly experienced by people with ASD, with studies finding that 
between 30-81% of individuals with ASD suffer from some form anxiety, such as 
general anxiety, social anxiety and separation anxiety, as well as symptoms of 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), (Rodgers et al., 2012; Wood & Gadow, 
2010). Studies have found that anxiety symptoms are related to restricted interests 
(Lidstone et al., 2014). As restricted interests in ASD are often related to positive 
affect (Sasson, Dichter & Bodfish, 2012) it is thought that engaging in restricted 
interests and other RRBs may help to relieve anxiety so the correlation between the 
two may be due to excessive engagement with RRBs that provoke positive feelings 
to mitigate already existing anxiety symptoms, which has been suggested before 
(Jiujias et al., 2017; Baron-Cohen, 1989).  
 
2.2.4 Motivation for Restricted Interests  
Despite evidence that time spent obsessively engaging in restricted interests impacts 
negatively on social functioning and daily life (South et al., 2005; Turner-Brown et 
al., 2011), restricted interests are enjoyable and very rewarding for individuals with 
ASD and may help to reduce anxiety, as mentioned above (Mercier, Mottron & 
Bellvile, 2008). Research on motivation and reward in ASD has found diminished 
neural (Kohls et al., 2012) and behavioural (Lin et al., 2012) responses to social 
stimuli, inspiring the Social Motivation Theory of autism (Chevallier et al., 2012; see 
Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1.5). Atypical responses to monetary reward have also been 
reported (Delmonte et al., 2012; Zeeland et al., 2010), which could indicate perhaps a 
general dysfunction in the reward system in ASD. However, studies have found 
intact reward processing for objects relating to typical restricted interests in ASD, 
such as vehicles and trains (Dichter et al., 2012) and enhanced activity of the reward 
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system when presented with images relating to the individual’s own particular special 
interest (Cascio et al., 2014).  
 
A study by Watson et al. (2015) found that children with ASD were willing to receive 
less money to view images related to their restricted interest than controls, indicating 
that restricted interests have reward value in autism. Foss-Feig et al. (2016) 
conducted a neuroimaging study with children and adolescents with ASD and 
controls, all of whom reported having a special interest or hobby. Participants were 
then shown images relating to their own interest while undergoing fMRI, and the 
results showed a stronger activation of the FFA in the ASD group compared to 
controls, suggesting that brain regions usually associated with social functioning are 
not dysfunctional in ASD, but are employed in the attention to, and perception of, 
non-social stimuli related to restricted interests. Other studies have reported similar 
findings, with ASD groups exhibiting larger responses to non-social restricted 
interest-related stimuli than to social stimuli (Benning et al., 2016; Kohls et al., 2016; 
Clements et al., 2018). Authors tend to suggest that these findings indicate a 
dysfunction in the reward system in ASD that manifests as diminished social 
motivation and underlies an increased interest in restricted interests, extending the 
Social Motivation Theory of autism to include motivational differences in the non-
social domain, although explanations for the mechanisms by which this occurs are 
the subject for further study (Clements et al., 2018).  
 
The evidence outlined here and in Chapter 1 suggests that while those with an ASD 
diagnosis may have dysfunctional activation of brain areas that are normally engaged 
in processing social information, these same areas may in fact function for 
processing different types of non-social information. Research has shown that the 
FFA may be employed for processing any category in which we have become an 
expert, faces simply being a category in which most NT humans have naturally 
acquired expertise (Kanwisher, 2000; Gauthier, et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2003; Mckone, 
et al., 2005; Xu, 2005).  For example, the FFA has been shown to activate in expert 
chess players when undertaking chess-relevant tasks, suggesting that similar brain 
functions may underlie automatic and holistic processing of both social and non-
social domains of expertise (Bilalić,  et al., 2011; Boggan et al., 2012). These findings 
have relevance for the study of restrictive interests and repetitive behaviours in ASD, 
as it is commonly accepted that in NT children and adults, repetition of activities 
 36 
and experiences is a major contributor to the development of expertise in a given 
area (Piaget, 1952; Gesell, et al., 1974; Ericsson, et al., 1993).  
 
2.3 Systemizing  
 
Systemizing involves focusing on input-operation-output processes, attempting to 
understand how they work and predict what they will do (see also Chapter 1 Section 
1.3.1.6). It is something almost all human beings do, but in extreme ‘hyper–
systemizers,’ the drive towards this approach to the world is enhanced, and can lead 
to the types of repetitive behaviours and restricted interests that form the diagnostic 
criteria for the non-social dimension of ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003). The neural 
and cognitive mechanisms underlying the drive to systemize and the cognitive 
processes involved in systemizing are poorly understood. A recent paper by Baron-
Cohen and Lombardo (2017) advocated for more research into systemizing in ASD. 
They suggest five areas in which additional research could help to elucidate the 
cognitive and neurobiological means by which systemizing occurs. The first is to 
clarify how systemizing is implemented in the brain, and how it leads to enhanced 
skills in autism. They also suggest that components of systemizing, such as drive and 
ability, should be further explored. Systemizing in ASD, like the condition itself, has 
heterogeneous manifestations. For example, the drive to systemize can be expressed 
at a low level by spinning a pencil on a table, and at a high level by engaging in 
complex mathematics. Baron-Cohen and Lombardo suggest that drive (or 
motivation) to systemize is probably highly related to ability, and that those with the 
highest drive to systemize will be motivated to practice more and enhance their skill, 
but call for additional studies investigating and comparing drive and ability in 
systemizing. Related to motivation, they propose future research to establish the 
neural basis of the restricted interests seen in ASD, where a particular topic or 
‘system’ is pursued with fervour, and ask whether this process of developing special 
interests involves a mapping of the laws that govern their chosen system and if it 
impacts on neural circuitry in such a way that confers expertise. They also suggest 
that work needs to be done to understand the heterogeneous presentation of 
systemizing drive and ability in individuals with ASD, and finally ask for additional 
future brain imaging studies to explore neural activity during systemizing tasks 
(Baron-Cohen and Lombardo, 2017). The present thesis contributes to work on 
differentiating systemizing ability and drive (see Chapter 6) and also investigates 
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attention and physiological responses to restricted interests in order to better 
understand the cognitive processes underlying motivation towards non-social stimuli 
and systems.  
 
As described in Section 2.2.4 above, there is evidence from various neuroimaging 
and psychophysiological studies that non-social stimuli related to special interests 
elicits stronger affective responses in people with ASD than controls, and stronger 
responses than do social stimuli. Alongside diminished social motivation, they 
appear to show increased motivation towards certain non-social stimuli. One 
possible way of characterizing this non-social motivation is as a drive to systemize. 
The Empathizing- Systemizing theory is useful for conceptualizing the drive to 
systemize as analogous to the drive to empathize. While it has long been assumed 
that the regions in the brain that are responsible for social cognition in the NT 
population are dysfunctional or impaired in ASD, research indicates that these areas 
may in fact function correctly, but in response to non-social stimuli (Kanwisher, 
2000; Gauthier, et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2003; Mckone, et al., 2005; Xu, 2005; Benning 
et al., 2016; Kohls et al., 2016; Clements et al., 2018; Foss-Feig et al., 2016; Dichter 
et al., 2012; Cascio et al., 2014; Grelotti et al., 2005; Sasson & Touchstone, 2013). If 
those with ASD adopt the social brain network for attending to, understanding and 
predicting non-social features of the environment then it may be that hyper–
systemizers experience a strong affective response in relation to systems-related 
stimuli and particularly special interest-related stimuli equivalent to the response in 
an NT individual when meeting a person or seeing the face of their best friend, i.e., 
when empathizing.  
 
There is evidence to suggest that individuals with ASD and those with high levels of 
autistic traits in the NT population do experience emotion in response to non-social 
and systems-related stimuli. Music is a prime example of a rule-based system, and 
one that frequently elicits emotional responses in the neurotypical population 
(Levitin, 2006). Research indicates that people with ASD show intact or superior 
musical pitch processing (Heaton, et al. 1998) and that they are able to identify the 
emotional content of music, a ‘complex non-social affective stimulus’ (Caria et al., 
2011). The fact that while social emotional processing in ASD is invariably affected, 
the ability to identify the emotional valence of a piece of music is not, suggests that 
ASD may not involve an overall deficit in emotion recognition and processing. 
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There is also anecdotal evidence that people who usually score highly on the Autism 
Quotient derive emotional pleasure from the predictability of physics and patterns in 
the world and have an emotional response to abstract concepts and systems (Baron 
–Cohen, et al., 2001a).  
 
Accounts of autistic savants also indicate that there is a strong emotional component 
to the drive to systemize, and that this emotion has a social quality to it, even though 
it is directed at the non-social. Savant syndrome is a condition in which individuals 
with developmental disabilities (usually ASD, Treffert, 2009) also possess an 
extraordinary ability in some domain, such as a prodigious aptitude for music along 
with absolute pitch or an ability for calendrical calculation, mathematical calculation 
or prime number derivation, along with a remarkable memory that is usually narrow 
in its focus on the individual’s area/s of interest (Treffert, 2009). Savant syndrome is 
rare, but there is evidence that its prevalence is increasing, with a 2009 study on 137 
autistic individuals finding that almost 30% of them met the criteria for savant 
abilities (Howlin et al., 2009). Like ASD, savant syndrome is a very heterogeneous 
condition, the aetiology of which is poorly understood in terms of the juxtaposition 
of extraordinary systemizing-related ability with socially-related disability, 
representing the very extreme end of the Empathizing-Systemizing continuum.  
 
Several autistic savants, and reported observations of such individuals, have 
expressed their drive to systemize in terms that sound more appropriate for speaking 
of social relationships. For example, Sacks describes several mathematical savants 
who claim that numbers are their friends, and the joy experienced by a pair of 
developmentally disabled autistic savant twins as they factorized large numbers, 
subitized huge quantities of matchsticks and calculated primes (Sacks, 1985). A rare 
high-functioning autistic savant with number-colour synaesthesia, who is able to 
describe his experience, also claims that numbers are his friends and talks about their 
distinct personalities (Tammet, 2007). It is also suggested by the mathematician 
Keith Devlin that mathematicians (scoring on average higher on the AQ than other 
scientists (Baron-Cohen, 2009)) ‘view mathematics as a soap opera’ and that 
‘numbers are like gossip’ (Devlin, 2000).  
Further still, although as yet very under-researched, there is evidence suggesting that 
there is a higher incidence of paraphilia (forming intense emotional, romantic and 
sexual bonds with inanimate objects) in those with ASD compared with NT and 
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other groups (Hellemans, et al., 2007; Hellemans, et al., 2010; see also 
http://www.objectum-sexuality.org).  However, there is little research on the nature 
of the emotional response to the non-social in ASD and whether it is analogous to 
social-emotional responses in the NT population (Baron-Cohen, 2009). 
 
This all suggests that the drive to systemize in ASD may be rooted in experiences of 
positive emotion towards, and a strong, innate preference for, certain non-social 
stimuli, patterns and/or relationships, and that this bias may be influenced by 
bottom-up, unconscious processes. The current thesis investigates this hypothesis by 
conducting studies to elucidate any differences in orienting responses to non-social 
stimuli, non-social stimuli of interest (to the individual) and social stimuli between an 
ASD group and controls, and in relation to autistic traits across the general 
population. Further studies are conducted to investigate attentional processes and 
the salience of non-social stimuli in an ASD group vs controls and in relation to 
autistic traits in an NT sample. An exploration of cognitive processes underlying 
systemizing drive, including the intuitive and deliberative thinking styles associated 
with dual process accounts of cognition, and whether the motivation to systemize 
translates into ability to perform on objective behavioural assessments of 
logical/systems reasoning are also carried out. 
 
 
2.4  Summary and Research Questions  
 
There is little evidence to show how the social and non-social dimensions of ASD 
(social impairment or lack of Empathizing, and repetitive/restricted behaviours or 
Systemizing) are related to one another or whether they can even be explained by a 
single theory (Happé et al., 2006). Cognitive theories of autism (such as the E-S 
theory), while often able to explain the social deficits of ASD, cannot account for 
the non-social aspects of the disorder; and those theories that adequately explain 
repetitive and restricted behaviours are unable to provide a satisfactory account of 
how they relate to social difficulties. This raises the question of how these co-
occurring behaviours interact with each other in ASD, and at what level, if any, they 
are related, and therefore whether they should be studied separately. Happé et al. 
(2006) suggest that due to the requirement of both these social and non-social 
characteristics for a diagnosis of ASD, studies to establish whether these core 
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features are indeed fractionated or have a unitary explanation need to be carried out 
on the general population. The aim of this thesis is to explore cognitive, affective 
and attentional features of the approach to the non-social in ASD, asking whether 
the drive to systemize is related to ability to understand and manipulate systems; 
whether the cognitive style of hyper-systemizers is rational and deliberative or if it 
involves an intuitive grasp of patterns and rules that is analogous to the intuitive 
grasp of emotions and social situations most typically developing individuals have; 
and whether drive to systemize is influenced by bottom up perceptual processes 









This thesis presents the results of several studies conducted with both neurotypical 
(NT) participants recruited from the general population and with participants 
diagnosed with an ASD along with an NT control group matched for age, gender 
and level of educational attainment. All participants recruited were adults, aged 18 
years or older. The present chapter discusses the rationale for the recruitment of 
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All participants were adults, aged between 18 and 67 years (M=31.18 years, 
SD=13.23). Adults were chosen for this research primarily because while the 
concept of systemizing as a characteristic of ASD does include ‘low level’ RRBs, a 
greater understanding of systemizing—and particularly of restricted or circumscribed 
interests—as a whole, both within ASD and the broader autism phenotype, is 
possible only by conducting research on people with high-functioning autism 
(HFA), in which high level RRBs are more common. Many people with HFA are 
misdiagnosed in childhood or only diagnosed with HFA as late as adulthood (NICE, 
2012) and this is particularly true of females (Bargiela, Steward, & Mandy, 2016; 
Lehnhardt et al., 2016; Loomes et al., 2017). Females with ASD have been relatively 
overlooked both diagnostically and when it comes to autism research, and it has 
been suggested that biological sex differences may account for much of the 
heterogeneity in ASD (Lai et al., 2013). Adult participants were therefore chosen for 
this study to increase the likelihood of recruiting sufficient numbers of people with 
HFA that would include as close to a balanced male-female sample as possible in 
order to elucidate any sex differences in systemizing behaviours in ASD. Adults are 
also increasingly a focus of ASD research due to the previous relative lack of 
attention on the disorder in adulthood, along with findings from various studies that 
ASD presents specific and ongoing challenges for people throughout life (Barnhill, 
2007; Howlin et al., 2004; Levy & Perry, 2011; Seltzer, Shattuck, Abbeduto, & 
Greenberg, 2004; Weiss & Fardella, 2018). RRBs are a feature of ASD that persist 
well into adulthood and can have a negative impact on social functioning (Mercier et 
al., 2000). However, the circumscribed or ‘special’ interests of adults with ASD have 
been shown in some cases to help improve quality of life, with a recent study 
suggesting such interests be considered a resource for coping with the difficulties of 
navigating adult life with ASD, rather than simply as a symptom (Dachez & Ndobo, 
2018).   
 
3.2.2. Sex 
Sex differences are explored in the analyses for the several studies reported in this 
thesis (Chapters 4–8). This includes sex differences in aspects of non-social 
cognition in neurotypical samples and an exploration of sex differences in an ASD 
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sample with NT controls. Sex is known to play a part in the autistic spectrum, with 
males being diagnosed with an ASD four times more than females (Fombonne, 
2009) and with differences found between the sexes in the NT population when it 
comes to subclinical autistic traits, with NT males exhibiting more such traits than 
NT females, as assessed with the Autism Quotient (AQ), although the sex 
differences in AQ do not extend to ASD samples (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Ruzich 
et al., 2014). The Extreme Male Brain (EMB) theory of autism explains the sex 
differences in the NT population that disappear in the ASD population by positing 
that ASD is an extension or exaggeration of male cognitive attributes, so that both 
female and males with an ASD diagnosis represent an extreme version of a typically 
‘male’ cognitive profile—i.e. enhanced systemizing and reduced empathizing (Baron-
Cohen, 2002). Consistent with this, in the NT sample recruited for the studies in 
Chapters 4 and 5, the male mean AQ was 18.2 (SD=7.03), which was higher than 
that of the female mean AQ of 17.2 (SD=6.51) although this difference was not 
statistically significant (t(44)=–.591, p=.558)), as found by previous studies (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). The mean AQ for NT females was higher in this sample than 
has been reported elsewhere; Baron-Cohen et al. reported a mean NT female AQ of 
15.4 in the general population and 16.4 among female undergraduate students (2001) 
and Ruzich et al. report a mean NT female AQ score of 14.88 (2014). The majority 
of participants in the NT sample for the current thesis were university students or 
graduates/postgraduates, which may account for the higher AQ scores among NT 
females in this sample.  
 
The male bias in ASD prevalence has been consistently reported since the condition 
was first described  (Kanner, 1943), with epidemiological studies and the DSM-5 
putting the sex ratio at around 4:1 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; 
Fombonne, 2009). More recent research suggests the true ratio may be closer to 3:1 
due to a sex bias in the diagnosis of ASD, leaving females who meet the diagnostic 
criteria at risk of being undiagnosed or misdiagnosed as children and subsequently 
receiving an ASD diagnosis later than males (Giarelli et al., 2010; Lehnhardt et al., 
2016; Loomes, Hull, & Mandy, 2017). There are several possible reasons for this bias 
in ASD diagnosis, including that females may be better able to compensate for their 
social and communication impairment than males (Lai et al., 2011; Wing, 1981), that 
females are subject to a genetic ‘protective effect’ whereby a larger abnormal genetic 
load is necessary for ASD to manifest, leading to fewer females developing ASD 
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(Jacquemont et al., 2014), that the neurobiology of ASD is affected by sex (Lai et al., 
2013), and that diagnostic criteria may over-emphasise behavioural symptoms of 
ASD that are exhibited more strongly in males than in females (Lai, 2011; Shefcyk, 
2015). The latter relates to the suggestion that there may be two distinct ASD 
phenotypes for males and females, with the female ASD phenotype involving a 
different manifestation of typical ASD symptoms and behaviours, including the 
internalising of symptoms such as anxiety and depression where males are more 
likely to exhibit symptoms externally through hyperactivity or impulsivity (Mandy et 
al., 2012).  
 
Studies have also found evidence that females with ASD exhibit fewer repetitive and 
restrictive behaviours (Van Wijngaarden-Cremers et al., 2014; Wilson et al., 2016) 
and others have found that females with ASD perform comparably with 
neurotypical females in non-social cognitive domains, where neurotypical males 
outperform their ASD counterparts, suggesting that sex in ASD influences non-
social cognition in particular (Lai et al., 2012). There have been calls for more 
research into females with ASD (Pellicano, Dinsmore, & Charman, 2014) but the 
ASD sample size recruited for the studies in Chapters 7 and 8 (10 males and 7 
females) was too small to be able to make meaningful comparisons between genders 
within the ASD group alone. It is interesting to note, however, that the male: female 
ratio of the ASD participants recruited for the study was approximately 1.4:1, which 
is much lower than the usually cited 4:1 diagnosis ratio (Fombonne, 2009) and the 
3:1 (Loomes, Hull, & Mandy, 2017) and 2.69:1 (Baker et al., 2014) ratios reported 
elsewhere.   
 
3.2.3. Education 
Research that uses the AQ as a measure of autistic traits in the NT population is 
conducted on participants with normal or above-average intelligence (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001; Ruzich et al., 2014), and as mentioned above, the research on an ASD 
sample presented in this thesis was focused on high-functioning autism (HFA), 
which is a term often used to describe ASD without intellectual disability 
(Ghaziuddin & Mountain-Kimchi, 2004). Because the studies presented in Chapters 
7 and 8 with the ASD and NT groups involved several long self-report measures 
along with several computer-based tasks, the control group was matched on 
educational level instead of administering an IQ test for matching by IQ in order to 
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reduce study time and potential participant frustration. All participants were asked to 
report any psychological diagnoses and all ASD participants provided diagnostic 
reports from their doctor, so it was confirmed that all participants were at least of 
normal IQ or above (>70).  For the study on the ASD sample, controls were 
matched according to educational attainment and were given the following options: 
No education; Primary education; GCSEs; A/AS Levels; Undergraduate (studying 
for a first degree); Graduate (have received a UG degree); Post-Graduate (studying 
for PG degree); Post-Graduate (have received a PG degree). All participants had 
attained A/AS levels at a minimum. 
 
 3.3. Measuring Autistic Traits 
 
It is theorized that autistic traits are present within the neurotypical population at 
levels that are not clinically significant, distributed on an ‘autistic spectrum,’ the 
extreme end of which results in diagnosis of either high-functioning or low-
functioning ASD. Research supports this theory; findings from various studies 
indicate that the aetiology of autistic traits in the general population is similar to that 
of ASD (Constantino et al., 2003; Ronald & Hoekstra, 2011). An understanding of 
how (and whether) these traits relate to one another within the general population 
can help provide insight into cognitive processes in ASD and in general. The present 
thesis seeks to contribute to the understanding of the non-social symptoms of ASD 
and how they may relate to the socially-related symptoms in the context of the 
broader autism phenotype. It was therefore necessary to measure autistic traits in 
both NT and ASD samples in order to establish how they related to aspects of non-
social cognition. The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) was chosen for this purpose.  
 
The AQ was developed to study the traits that characterise the broader autism 
phenotype (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The AQ is a 50-item self-report measure 
widely used in research to establish the degree of autistic-like traits in NT samples, as 
well as in ASD groups and other clinical control groups (e.g., schizophrenia, 
anorexia nervosa, obsessive compulsive disorder) (Ruzich, 2014; Mito et al., 2014; 
Spek & Wouters, 2010; Westwood et al., 2016). The AQ consists of 50 statements 
with which participants either definitely agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree or 
strongly disagree on a dichotomous scale (0/1). Originally validated with 58 adults 
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with HFA, 174 NT controls, 840 university students and 16 winners of the UK 
Mathematics Olympiad, the AQ was found to have good test-retest and interrater 
reliability and was able to discriminate between ASD and NT groups; 80% of those 
with an ASD diagnosis scored 32+ versus 2% of NT controls, so Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2001) established a score of 32 as a clinically relevant cut-off point, with a later 
study on using the AQ to screen adults for Asperger Syndrome suggesting a 
threshold score of 26 (Woodbury-Smith, Robinson, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 
2005).  
 
The AQ has been independently validated by several authors since its development; 
Austin (2005) reported similar results to the original 2001 paper, finding a normal 
distribution of scores with good internal reliability of the overall AQ score (a=.82) 
and Hurst et al. (2007) produced similar findings with regard to total AQ score 
(a=.67). The traits the AQ measures have been shown to have high heritability 
(Hoekstra et al., 2007; Scherff et al., 2014; Wheelwright et al., 2010) and the AQ has 
been validated cross-culturally in many countries, including Italy (Ruta, et al., 2012), 
the Netherlands (Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath, & Boomsma, 2008), Japan (Wakabayashi, 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Tojo, 2006), France (Sonié et al., 2013), and China 
(Zhang et al., 2016). The AQ has been used in a variety of research into the broader 
autism phenotype in the neurotypical population, such as assessing attentional 
differences between high and low AQ scores in an NT sample (Bayliss & Tipper, 
2005), exploring the relationship between AQ, self-categorization and shared-
attention (Skorich, Gash, Stalker, Zheng, & Haslam, 2017) and investigating 
reasoning processes across the autism spectrum (Brosnan, Lewton, & Ashwin, 
2016). 
 
While the AQ is the most widely used self-report measure of autistic traits in non-
clinical populations, some authors have suggested that it needs improvement 
(Stewart & Austin, 2009). The 50 questions of the AQ comprise five theoretically-
derived subscales of 10 questions each—communication, social skill, imagination, 
attention to detail and attention switching.  The subscales were not empirically 
validated during the development of the AQ, but marginal–moderate internal 
consistency was reported for each of them (social skill a=.77; imagination a=.65; 
communication a=.65; attention to detail a=.63; attention switching a=.67) (Baron-
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Cohen, Wheelwright, et al., 2001). These subscales have not been well validated in 
the literature, with various authors exploring the factor structure of the AQ and 
suggesting different factor models to improve upon them. Austin (2005) and Hurst 
et al. (2007) found similar factor structures, suggesting a three-factor alternative to 
the AQ of social skills, patterns/details and poor communication. Stewart and 
Austin (2009) found four factors (Socialness, Pattern, Understanding 
Others/Communication and Imagination) and Kloosterman et al. (2011) found 
three- and four-factor solutions that were a better fit than the original five suggested 
subscales but still did not accurately represent the data.  There is yet to be consensus 
on the best model to use for delineating specific traits within the AQ, due to varying 
results from factor analyses.  
 
At least one study suggests that other self-report measures may be more reliable and 
internally consistent than the AQ for measuring autistic traits in the neurotypical 
population (Ingersoll, Hopwood, Wainer, & Donnellan, 2011). The authors of the 
latter compare the AQ with two other self-report measures of autistic-like traits—
the Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ; Hurley, Losh, Parlier, Reznick, 
& Piven, 2007) and the Social Responsiveness scale (SRS; (Constantino & Gruber, 
2002). The BAPQ was developed specifically to measure traits such as aloofness, 
pragmatic language and rigidity in the subclinical population, developed with family 
members of those with an ASD. The SRS was developed to distinguish between 
those with and without ASD and focuses largely on the socially-related traits of 
ASD.  Ingersoll et al. found that while all three measures exhibited satisfactory 
internal consistency on the overall scores (a>.70 for all), in line with the previous 
research mentioned above, there was low internal consistency for the five theoretical 
subscales of the AQ whereas the internal consistency of the subscales of the BAPQ 
and SRS were good (Ingersoll et al., 2011).  They conclude that all three measures 
can be used as reliable self-report measures of autistic traits in non-clinical samples 
but suggest that the AQ had the weakest performance in terms of factor structure, 
gender differences and criterion validity. However, for the purposes of this thesis, 
the AQ was the most suitable measure because the BAPQ is not intended for use in 
ASD populations (Piven & Sasson, 2014), whereas the follow-up studies (Chapters 7 
and 8) were planned with ASD and control samples. The SRS was also not suitable 
as it focuses on social behaviours and cognition, whereas the AQ includes questions 
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relating to non-social behaviours and cognition, which were the main focus of this 
research. 
 
The initial stage of this research (Chapters 4 and 5 in this thesis) investigated 
systemizing in the NT population as it relates to autistic traits, in order to increase 
understanding of non-social cognition and behaviours in subclinical samples and 
across the broader ASD phenotype. The Autism Quotient was used to assess autistic 
traits in this sample, in order to investigate whether there was any difference in 
results between those scoring higher on the AQ and those with a low score. If ASD 
is indeed at the extreme end of a spectrum on which we all lie, it was hypothesised 
that the results from this study should provide an indication of how people with 
ASD might respond to social and non-social stimuli. The subsequent studies in 
Chapters 7 and 8 then explored this further with ASD/NT groups. The AQ was 
suitable again for these studies, firstly to maintain consistency with the initial study in 
order to compare results and, because the AQ has been shown to discriminate 
between those who meet the criteria for an ASD diagnosis and those with subclinical 
autistic traits (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Woodbury-Smith et al., 2005), to support 
the diagnostic information provided by the participants in the ASD group. 
 
 
3.4  Diagnosis 
 
One of the inclusion criteria for the ASD sample (in the studies reported in Chapters 
7 and 8) was having a verified diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder. This included 
diagnoses of conditions previously listed in the DSMIV and incorporated under 
ASD in the DSMV, including Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise 
Specified, Asperger Syndrome and Autistic Disorder. Each participant provided a 
diagnostic report from a trained clinician, verifying that they had received a diagnosis 
of ASD according to official international diagnostic criteria. Other methods are 
available for determining/diagnosing ASD for the purposes of research, the main 
ones being the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, et al., 2000) 
and the Autism Diagnostic Interview Revised (ADI–R; Lord, Rutter, & Couteur, 
1994). Several studies have however confirmed that diagnosis by trained, 
experienced professional clinicians that includes taking a thorough history from 
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patients along with, in many cases, interviewing their parents, teachers, partners 
and/or caregivers is much more reliable than administering a single instrument such 
as the ADOS or ADI–R, and the ADI–R in particular has been criticized for missing 
diagnoses of individuals with HFA (Fitzgerald, 2017; Jones & Lord, 2013; Risi et al., 
2006). These instruments also require training to perform and they are time 
consuming (adding approximately 40 minutes to the overall study time for each 
participant) and the minimal resources available for this research project meant that 
this was not practically feasible. Verification of diagnosis by way of checking 
participants’ clinical reports was therefore deemed the most reliable and practical 
way to ensure inclusion criteria were met for the ASD sample.  
 
As mentioned above, the AQ has been shown to distinguish between individuals 
with ASD and subclinical autistic traits, with 80% of subjects with confirmed ASD 
scoring 32 or above on the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The results for the ASD 
group in this research were more or less consistent with this, with a mean AQ score 
above 32 (mean=34.7 (SD=8.87)) and scores ranging from 13 to 44, with 76.5% of 
ASD participants scoring 32 or above.  Three participants scored below the clinically 
relevant cut-off of 26 suggested by Woodbury-Smith et al. (2005), representing 
17.6% of the group, a larger percentage than for either of the above-mentioned 
studies. This this is not unexpected due to the larger sample sizes employed in the 
Baron-Cohen et al. (n=58) and Woodbury-Smith et al. (n=73) studies in comparison 
with the sample size of 17 in the ASD group for the present study, meaning that the 
three scores below 26 represented a bigger percentage of the overall group, and this 
would likely decrease with a larger sample as AQ scores have been found to be 
normally distributed across the population.  
 
A t-test revealed that the difference between ASD and control groups was 
statistically significant, as expected (t(31)=4.84, p<0.0001). The mean AQ of the NT 
control group was 22.5 (SD=6.5), with a range from 8 to 33, which was higher than 
most reported scores in nonclinical samples. Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) reported a 
mean AQ score of 16.4 in an NT control group (n=174) and Ruzich et al. (2015) 
report a mean AQ score of 16.94 in NT samples from a review of relevant AQ-
related research (n=6934). One possible reason for this higher mean AQ score is 
that the majority of participants were either university students or graduates, and 
studies have shown that students and graduates tend to score higher on the AQ on 
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average, particularly in scientific disciplines (m=17.6, (SD=6.4); Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001). Because the NT control group was matched to the already-recruited ASD 
group on education level, and the majority of the ASD group were university 
educated, this potential bias was unavoidable, although it will be considered when 
analysing and discussing the results of the studies in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
The NT sample recruited for the initial studies (Chapters 4 and 5) had a mean AQ of 
17.74 (n=46, SD=6.7) with a range from 5 to 35, which is not statistically 
significantly different to the typically reported average NT AQ scores (t(45)=1.36, 
p=.182). All NT participants in both the initial study with AQ as a variable and in 
the control group were asked whether they had been diagnosed with any psychiatric 
or neurodevelopmental condition and only those participants who answered this 




3.5.1 Initial Neurotypical Sample 
There is little previous research using the same overall methodology as used in these 
studies, although research on the AQ and Embedded Figures Test with NT 
participants (see review by Cribb et al., 2016), studies using electrodermal activity to 
assess emotional significance in ASD (Mathersul, McDonald and Rushby, 2013) and 
change blindness experiments with ASD adults (Hochhauser et al., 2017) all reported 
medium to large effect sizes. A priori power analyses in G*Power using a 
conservative estimate of a medium effect size (eta squared statistic of 0.4) 
determined that a sample size of at least 34 would be needed to achieve a power of 
0.8 with an alpha level of 0.05, or 46 for an effect size of eta squared 0.35. Forty-six 
NT participants, aged between 18 and 66 years (M=26.7 years), (25 female (M=26 
years), 21 male (M=28 years)) were recruited from the University of Bath population 
through the Department of Psychology electronic notice board, posters displayed 
around campus and through the Call for Participants website (Jisc, 2015). 
Participants were provided information on the basic background of the study 
(without mention of ASD) and what participation would involve. Participants 
provided informed consent before each part of the study and had to complete the 
online survey before coming to the lab for testing, where they were each paid £5 on 
completion of the tests.  
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3.5.2 ASD Group 
The sample size for the ASD group was calculated on the basis of the results of the 
initial studies with the neurotypical population. For the change blindness study 
(Chapter 5), the effect size of the paired samples t-test was large, with an eta squared 
statistic of 0.68. Using the G*Power software, a sample size of 15 was calculated 
using this effect size, for statistical power of 0.8. For the analyses of physiological 
response and AQ (Chapter 4; Singleton, Ashwin, & Brosnan, 2014), the effect sizes 
for the correlations were around 0.6, for which a sample size of 15 was also 
calculated, given statistical power of 0.8. Thus, a clinical sample of a minimum of 15 
participants was recruited for the clinical study, along with a matched control group. 
 
Various methods were used to recruit the ASD sample, including putting notices on 
the University of Bath electronic notice board, posters on the University of Bath 
campus and around various buildings of the University of Oxford, contacting 
specific Autism support groups and social groups by email, through volunteering 
with a social group for people with Asperger Syndrome and through an Autism 
summer school run at the University of Bath for prospective students with ASD and 
through the Call for Participants website (Jisc, 2015). The advertisements contained 
brief information about what the study involved and the inclusion criteria, and those 
who were interested were sent a detailed information sheet. All participants provided 
informed consent prior to taking part. As with the first studies with the NT sample, 
participants initially completed an online survey before being invited to complete the 
rest of the study in the lab. Participants were each paid £10 on completion of the 
study. Many more people completed the online survey than followed up with 
coming for testing, resulting in a total of 17 participants in the ASD group. Due to 
the difficulty recruiting participants with ASD, funding was obtained to be able to 
offer reasonable travel expenses in order to widen the geographic region from which 
suitable participants could be recruited.  
 
3.5.3 Neurotypical Control Group 
The NT control group was matched to the ASD group by age, sex and education 
level. As with the other NT sample, recruitment was carried out through posters and 
advertisements on the University of Bath campus, the electronic noticeboard and the 
Call for Participants website (Jisc, 2015). The process was the same as for the ASD 
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group, with participants providing informed consent prior to taking part and being 
paid £10 on completion of the study. 17 matched participants were recruited but the 
data for 1 of them was corrupted upon analysis so the total final number in the NT 
control group was 16. 
 
3.5.4 Systemizing Studies 
The study presented in Chapter 6 focused solely on systemizing traits in general and 
how these relate to other measures of reasoning style and ability. A similar previous 
study examining self-report assessments of empathizing, systemizing and the 
rational-experiential inventory (Brosnan et al., 2013) used a sample size of 68, and a 
sample size equivalent to, or larger than this was planned for this study. The sample 
for this study was recruited from the University of Bath population by way of an 
online questionnaire, which was advertised on the University online noticeboard and 
emailed to students and staff. There were 119 participants in total who completed 
the full online survey (60 male, 59 female) and with a range of ages from 18 to 66, 
and a mean age of 22 (SD=6).  
 
The online systemizing survey was replicated for a study with an ASD and a control 
group. It was sent to participants who had been part of the ASD group recruited for 
the studies detailed in Chapters 7 and 8, whose ASD diagnosis had already been 
verified, as well as to participants who had expressed interest in those studies and 
had completed the initial online questionnaire, stating that they had an ASD, but had 
not followed up with coming to the laboratory for testing. The online questionnaire 
was also sent to specific Autism support groups and social groups by email, and 
through the Call for Participants website (Jisc, 2015). The inclusion of the AQ on 
this version of the systemizing survey was considered, for the purposes of 
supporting self-reported ASD diagnosis, but as the completion rates for the initial 
survey had been low, with approximately two thirds of those starting the survey 
abandoning it before completion, it was decided to leave out any additional measures 
to ensure a larger sample. 
 
Only seven of the participants whose ASD diagnosis had been previously confirmed 
completed the systemizing questionnaire, but 23 other participants claiming an ASD 
diagnosis also completed the survey, along with 34 NT controls (who claimed no 
psychiatric diagnoses). This comprised a total sample of 64 participants, 30 reporting 
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ASD and 34 NT controls. The ASD group consisted of 6 females and 24 males, with 
a mean age of 22.33 (SD=3.14) and the NT group was comprised of 21 males and 
13 females, with a mean age of 22.45 (SD=8.52). Analysis revealed no significant 
differences between groups on age (t(45) =–.55, p=.957). Because ASD diagnoses 
could not be confirmed for all ASD participants, this study is reported in Chapter 6 










This chapter details an initial study investigating the relationship between autistic 
traits and physiological responses to social and non-social stimuli in an NT sample. 
Some of the results of this study have been published in the journal Autism Research 
(Singleton, Ashwin & Brosnan, 2014; Appendix A). Co-authors of this paper 
included Professor Mark Brosnan and Dr Chris Ashwin (University of Bath) and the 
research was conducted as part of this PhD, with some financial support from The 
Stapley Trust grant for doctoral students. The following chapter includes and adds to 
the results of the skin conductance response and AQ experiment published in 
Autism Research by including a more in-depth background review of the relevant 
literature and by reporting and discussing the additional results of the investigation 
into the relationship between anxiety, autistic traits and physiological arousal.  
 
Drive towards types of processing may be related to physiological arousal to 
categories of stimuli, such as social (e.g. faces) or non-social (e.g. trains). This study 
investigated how autistic traits in an NT population might relate to differences in 
physiological responses to non-social compared with social stimuli. NT participants 
were recruited to examine these differences in those with high vs. low degrees of 
autistic traits. Forty-six participants (21 male, 25 female) completed the Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (AQ) to measure autistic traits before viewing a series of 24 
images while skin conductance response (SCR) was recorded. Images included 6 
non-social, 6 social, 6 face-like cartoons and 6 non-social (relating to the participants’ 
personal interests). Analysis revealed that those with a higher AQ had significantly 
greater SCR arousal to non-social stimuli than those with a low AQ, and the higher 
the AQ, the greater the difference between SCR arousal to non-social and social 
stimuli. This is the first study to identify the relationship between AQ and 
physiological response to non-social stimuli, and a relationship between 
physiological response to both social and non-social stimuli. These results suggest 
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that physiological response may underlie the atypical drive toward non-social 
processing seen in ASD, and that at the physiological level at least the social and 








4.2.1 The Relevance of Physiological Response 
 
Various physiological responses, including the skin conductance response (SCR), are 
an index of the orienting response (OR), which is a mechanism that facilitates 
information processing through changes in physiological states—such as pupil 
dilation/constriction, heart rate, and electrodermal activity—in response to a novel 
stimulus or environmental change (Barry & Furedy, 1993; Filion, Dawson, Shell, & 
Hazlett, 1991). The somatic marker hypothesis suggests that such autonomic arousal 
to stimuli plays a crucial role in directing attention and influencing decision-making 
(Damasio, 1996). Novel stimuli that are of significance to the organism elicit a more 
extreme orienting response than those that are deemed insignificant, for example a 
potential threat or the presence of prey (Weiner, 1992) and social information, 
particularly faces and facial expressions (Mares, Smith, Johnson, & Senju, 2016; 
Tomalski, Csibra, & Johnson, 2008). The OR can thus be a proxy for what stimuli 
most capture a subject’s interest, i.e., which stimuli have salience for an individual 
within a particular context (for example, SCRs will be larger for task-relevant stimuli 
than they are for task-irrelevant stimuli during task performance in experimental 
settings (Filion et al., 1991)).  
 
Which stimuli provoke such physiological responses therefore vary across species, 
across individuals and across contexts. For example, the shape of a hawk flying 
overhead will elicit an escape response from chicks; the stimulus provokes an 
autonomic response which is translated to a contextually relevant action (Tinbergen, 
1951; Schneirla, 1965). In humans and primates, faces and socially-related stimuli 
provoke greater autonomic arousal, which increases with the salience of the 
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stimulus—e.g., most infants show a heightened physiological response to 
photographs of their mother’s face compared to that of a stranger’s; most infants 
show a heightened physiological response to faces compared to non-social objects 
(Barrera & Maurer, 1981; Pascalis et al., 1995; Frank, Vul, & Johnson, 2009); adults 
exhibit increased arousal for scenes with affective valence in which human beings are 
present compared to similar scenes without a human present (Proverbio, Adorni, 
Zani, & Trestianu, 2009) and show preferential orienting towards faces and face-like 
stimuli (Tomalski, Csibra, & Johnson, 2008); and in the animal kingdom, primates 
such as rhesus macaques show increased attention and sympathetic arousal towards 
videos with subject-directed social content compared to those with non-social 
content (Machado, Bliss-Moreau, Platt, & Amaral, 2011). Physiological responses 
can therefore be used as a measure of which stimuli are attended to most 
immediately and are processed as being particularly salient, enabling investigation of 
the potential mechanisms underlying atypical attention or cognitive processes. 
 
4.2.2 Autistic Traits and Social Orienting 
It has been theorized that the social deficits of autism may be the result of atypical 
attention to social stimuli (Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005; Jones, Carr, & Klin, 
2008). There is a variety of evidence to suggest that individuals with ASD do not 
orient to social information such as faces (Kikuchi et al., 2009; Riby & Hancock, 
2009), direct partner gaze (Freeth & Bugembe, 2018; Helminen et al., 2017), 
social/biological motion (Hubert et al., 2007; Klin et al., 2009; Helt, et al., 2010) and 
speech (Kuhl et al., 2005; Magrelli et al., 2013) compared to controls.  
Studies have also found atypical attention to social stimuli in neurotypical samples 
with subclinical autistic traits. Bayliss and Tipper (2005) found that participants with 
a higher AQ oriented to scrambled parts/faces while those with lower AQ scores 
oriented more towards faces and objects attended to by others, suggesting that 
possessing more autistic traits may be related to an attentional bias towards local 
details rather than socially-relevant stimuli. Another study found that those with a 
higher AQ were less likely to look at the direct gaze of an actor on-screen than were 
those with low AQ (Chen & Yoon, 2011), similar to the results found in more recent 
studies with ASD samples (Freeth & Bugembe, 2018; Helminen et al., 2017). Freeth 
et al. (2013) conducted a study on neurotypical adults in which they compared social 
attention to both video and live interactions with an experimenter, finding that those 
with high autistic traits attended to the face of the experimenter on the video less 
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frequently than did those with low AQ, but that there were no differences between 
high and low autistic traits in attendance to the experimenter in the live situation, 
indicating the increased salience of in-person social interaction for those with more 
autistic traits. A recent study found that those with a higher AQ score were less able 
to accurately identify threatening faces than those with a lower AQ on an attentional 
blink task, replicating abnormalities seen in those diagnosed with ASD (English, 
Maybery, & Visser, 2017). 
 
However, findings of atypical social orienting in ASD and the broader autism 
phenotype have not been consistent. A review of literature on social attention in 
ASD, focusing particularly on eye-tracking studies, found that social orienting was 
not impaired in clinical samples (Guillon, Hadjikhani, Baduel, & Rogé, 2014). A 
version of a dot-probe experiment found no differences between an ASD group and 
NT controls in orienting to protoface stimuli (Shah, Gaule, Bird, & Cook, 2013). 
Freeth et al. (2010) found that the gaze direction of a person cues attention and 
biases preference and memory in both ASD and NT adolescents. A study of infants 
aged 2-6 months, both those at low risk of ASD and those who had an older sibling 
already diagnosed with ASD, involved showing them a video of a female and 
measured their fixation on her eyes (Jones & Klin, 2013). A follow-up three years 
later then revealed which of the infants had gone on to receive an ASD diagnosis so 
that the data could be viewed and compared in light of these outcomes. The authors 
found that at 2 months, infants who went on to be diagnosed with ASD fixated on 
the eyes just as much as those who did not receive a diagnosis, but that after 2 
months fixation patterns began to diverge, with infants in the ASD diagnosis group 
fixating less on the eyes while those in the non-diagnosis group generally increased 
or maintained the level at which they fixated on the eyes, suggesting that, in ASD, 
social orienting may be intact in the first months of life but begins to decline 
thereafter (Jones & Klin, 2013). The authors suggest that while in NT infants this 
initial orienting to faces facilitates the specialization of the social brain, in infants that 
go on to develop ASD this process is somehow disrupted. It has been suggested that 
the combination of research that evidences intact innate social orienting in ASD 
indicates that there may be a disruption in the way subcortical processes guiding 




While ASD involves both deficits in social cognition and behaviour and enhanced 
drive towards non-social cognition and behaviour, few studies of social attention in 
ASD and in relation to autistic traits in the NT population have investigated social 
orienting in direct comparison with non-social orienting.  A study found that female 
neonates spent longer looking at faces while male neonates spent longer looking at a 
mechanical mobile, suggesting that a generally greater drive towards sociability or 
empathizing in females and a generally greater drive towards physical systems in 
males may be biologically hardwired (Connellan et al., 2000).  In line with the 
Extreme Male Brain theory of autism (EMB; Baron-Cohen et al., 2002), it is 
therefore plausible that the development of a stronger orienting response to non-
social stimuli (e.g. geometric shapes, patterns, physical systems etc.) disrupts the 
social orienting and face specialization processes that canalize typical social 
development at around 2 months of age. Visual acuity improves eight-fold over the 
first 5 months of life (Adams, 1987), coinciding with the time during which infants 
can first hold their heads up to look around unsupported (Bayley, 1936), potentially 
providing the first opportunity at around this age for an initial social orienting 
response to be supplanted by a greater physiological response to an increase in 
perceptually available non-social stimuli, thereby interrupting social learning and 
facilitating an ongoing drive towards systemizing-type behaviours and manifesting 
the broad autism phenotype. The present study therefore sought to investigate 
whether there was a relationship between autistic traits in NT adults and 
physiological responses to social and non-social stimuli.  
 
4.2.3 Autism and Skin Conductance Response 
Emotional arousal to presented stimuli can be reliably assessed by measuring SCR 
(Greenwald, et al., 1989) and there have been several studies investigating SCR in 
ASD.  For example, Hubert et al. (2009) found that adults with ASD exhibited lower 
SCRs to emotional faces than typical matched controls, while performing similarly 
on emotional expression judgement tasks. This suggests that while social judgements 
may be mediated by physiological arousal in the NT population, those with ASD 
employ different strategies to achieve similar results. SCR could therefore be an 
important measure of individual differences in the kinds of processing elicited by 
different categories of stimuli.  
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Using heart rate as a measure of arousal, Goodwin et al. (2006) compared responses 
to potentially stressful stimuli in adults with ASD and NT controls, finding that the 
ASD group only exhibited a significant autonomic response to stressors 22% of the 
time compared to controls, who responded significantly to 60% of stressors. 
Similarly, Gaigg and Bowler (2007) demonstrated atypical fear acquistion in ASD, 
with participants exhibiting attenuated autonomic fear responses in comparison to 
NT controls, and similar autonomic responses to both conditioned and non-
conditioned stimuli. This suggests poor connectivity between the amygdala and 
other regions of the brain, leading to abnormal processing of  the emotional 
significance of sensory stimuli. The authors suggest this may underlie the 
behavioural characteristics and social deficits seen in ASD. 
 
A study by Stagg et al. (2013) investigated the relationship between language 
development and arousal to faces and eye gaze in children with ASD, finding that 
SCRs to faces differentiated ASD children from the NT control group, and that 
arousal to faces also differentiated late and normal language onset among the ASD 
group. These results appear to confirm results from previous studies demonstrating 
hypoarousal to faces among ASD individuals (Dalton, et al., 2005; Kylliäinen & 
Hietanen, 2006), as well as providing evidence that there is a relationship between 
SCR to social stimuli and language development. Stagg et al. explain their results by 
suggesting that a relationship between higher arousal to faces and the quality of eye 
contact in early infancy may confer an advantage for language development in 
children with ASD. However, this study did not use non-social stimuli as a control 
measure, so these results could alternatively be explained if ASD participants display 
hypoarousal to all forms of stimuli in general, or alternatively if there are other kinds 
of stimuli that elicit ‘normal-’ (in comparsion to NT arousal to faces) or hyper-
arousal. It is therefore important for studies of this kind to investigate arousal to 
different kinds of stimuli in order to understand more fully the role of arousal in the 
social deficits of ASD. 
 
Differences in autnomic arousal to social stimuli have also been found in relation to 
autistic traits. Nummenmaa et al. (2012) found that neural response to faces was 
related to self-reported autistic traits in various regions of the brain that are activated 
for social attention and perception, indicating that differences in the activation of 
physiological responses to social information extend to subclinical traits in the NT 
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population. Despite a number of other studies investigating physiological responses 
to social stimuli in ASD (Blair, 1999; James & Barry, 1984; Baron-Cohen, 2009; 
Kylliäinen & Hietanen, 2006), as yet no substantial research has been undertaken to 
assess emotional response to the non-social in ASD. The non-socially-related 
diagnostic criteria for ASD include restricted interests—an atypical and intense focus 
on a narrow (usually non-social) topic or subject area. The presence of circumscribed 
interests is a widespread feature of autism, with an estimated 75%-90% of people 
with ASD developing at least one topic of intense interest early in life (Klin, 
Danovitch, Merz, & Volkmar, 2007). Of course, many NT people also develop 
special interests and hobbies, and it has been suggested that the development, 
intensity and topic of such interests lie on a continuum, for example with the 
focused interests of scientists, academics and hobbyists representing a subclinical 
expression of a drive towards understanding and collecting information on a 
particular topic that can manifest as the more circumscribed, intense and often 
obsessive and disruptive interests typical of ASD (Jordan & Caldwell-Harris, 2012).  
 
As well as investigating physiological responses to non-social compared with social 
stimuli and autistic traits in an NT sample, this study sought to investigate whether 
there was any relationship between autistic traits and responses to stimuli relevant to 
the individual’s own special interest. The aim of the present study was to investigate 
the mechanisms behind the non-social features of the broad autism phenotype by 
analysing physiological responses to both social and non-social stimuli, and to 
identify the possibility of a relationship between response to these two categories of 
stimuli in the NT population (and therefore assessing their relatedness as suggested 
by Happé et al., 2006) as well as the relationship to autistic traits. 
 
The presence of anxiety symptoms is also widespread in those with a diagnosis of 
ASD (Kim et al., 2000; Leyfer et al., 2006). It has been suggested that circumscribed 
interests may play a role in comorbid anxiety in ASD due to the negative 
interference the intense focus on non-social topics may have on social interaction 
and social outcomes (Klin et al., 2007), as well as that engaging in restricted interests 
may serve as a method for coping with anxiety and distress (Baron-Cohen, 1989). A 
study of children with HFA found an association between anxiety symptoms and 
play-enactment of restricted interests (Spiker et al., 2012). Similar associations have 
been found in relation to subclinical autistic traits in the NT population. A study by 
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Liew et al. (2015) made a distinction between socially-related anxiety and more 
general non-social obsessive-compulsive/worry type anxiety, and investigated 
mediators between autistic traits in an NT sample and these two manifestations of 
anxiety. They found that autistic traits were positively correlated with anxiety 
symptoms, that social competence mediated the relationship between autistic traits 
and social anxiety, and that being prevented from engaging in repetitive behaviours 
and frequent aversive sensory experiences mediated the relationship between autistic 
traits and the non-socially related anxiety symptoms. To explore a potential 
relationship between anxiety and physiological response to non-social stimuli related 
to interests, a measure of anxiety—the State Trait Anxiety Index (STAI; Spielberger, 
1983)—was taken as part of this study (see Chapter 2 Section 2.3.3 for further 
information on anxiety in ASD). 
 
4.2.4 Hypotheses 
It was hypothesised that, in line with previous research, AQ would be positively 
correlated with anxiety (Romano et al., 2014; Reed et al., 2016). If restricted interests 
are indeed related to anxiety in ASD, a relationship would be expected between 
scores on the STAI and SCR to non-social stimuli of special interest. In line with the 
Empathizing-Systemizing theory, it was hypothesised that those with a higher 
number of ASD traits would have a higher physiological response to non-social 
stimuli and a lower response to social stimuli, and a positive relationship between 
AQ and SCR to non-social stimuli was predicted. It was also predicted that the 
difference between arousal to social and non-social stimuli would be larger the 
higher the AQ, suggesting that the social and non-social are related to one another 
(and to AQ) in an NT population, and that difference in physiological response to 







As participants in this study were recruited from the NT population, the AQ was 
used to assess whether there was any difference in results between those scoring 
higher on the AQ and those with a low score. If ASD is indeed at the extreme end 
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of a spectrum on which we all lie, it was theorized that results from this study should 
provide an indication of how people with ASD respond to social and non-social 
stimuli. An a priori power analysis in G*Power using a conservative estimate of a 
medium effect size (eta squared statistic of 0.4) determined that a sample size of at 
least 34 would be needed to achieve a power of 0.8 with an alpha level of 0.05, or 46 
for an effect size of eta squared 0.35 (see Section 3.5.1). Forty-six NT participants 
were recruited (as described in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1) aged between 18 and 66 
years (M=26.7 years), (25 female (M=26 years) and 21 male (M=28 years)). All 
participants reported having normal to corrected normal vision, and no psychiatric 
diagnoses. Participants were provided information on the basic background of the 
study (without mention of ASD) and what was involved before giving their consent. 
The experiment was conducted in two parts; the first part involved completion of an 
online survey and the second part was carried out in a quiet laboratory on campus. 
Participants had to complete the online survey before coming to the lab for testing, 
where they were each paid £5 on completion of the tests.  
 
4.3.2  The Autism Spectrum Quotient 
 Participants were administered the full 50 item Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) 
questionnaire (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001) as part of an online survey that also 
established age, gender and non-social objects of interest. The survey was created 
and run between December 2011 and August 2012 using Bristol Online Surveys 
(2012). Answering each question on the survey was mandatory, so there were no 
missing data for any participants completing it. The results were scored according to 
Baron-Cohen et al.’s (2001) specifications, resulting in an ‘AQ score’ for each 
participant (minimum possible score was 0 and maximum possible score was 50), 
and scores (minimum score of 0 and maximum score of 10) for each of the 
theoretical subscales suggested by the original authors—social skill, communication, 
imagination, attention-to-detail and attention switching. For more detail on the AQ 
and the subscales, see Chapter 3 Section 3.3.  
 
4.3.3 State–Trait Anxiety Inventory 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI Form Y; Spielberger et al., 1983) includes 
two 20-item questionnaires, one designed to measure trait anxiety (i.e., an 
individual’s general propensity to respond to situations with anxiety) and the other to 
measure state anxiety (i.e., the present existence of anxiety symptoms within an 
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individual).  Each 20-item questionnaire includes both anxiety–present (e.g., I feel 
nervous) items and anxiety–absent (e.g., I feel calm) items. Participants mark how 
much each statement applies to them on a four-point Likert scale, with anxiety–
absent items scored in the opposite manner to the anxiety–present items, a 
minimum–maximum score of 20–80 on each questionnaire, with a total maximum 
combined STAI score of 160. The STAI has been widely used in psychology to 
assess anxiety levels in various clinical and non-clinical populations (Bortolon & 
Raffard, 2015; Muschalla et al., 2010; Simon & Thomas, 1983), to predict anxiety 
disorder diagnoses (Hishinuma et al., 2001; Kvaal et al., 2005) and with both ASD 
groups (Corbett et al., 2017; Simon & Corbett, 2013) and the broader autism 
phenotype (Conner et al., 2013; Horder et al., 2014). Participants completed the 
STAI-Trait questionnaire as part of the initial online survey, and then completed the 




 Each participant was shown a total of 24 images. Each image belonged to one of 
four conditions: Social – Face, Social-Cartoon, Non-Social and Non-Social of 
Interest. There were 6 images in each condition. Images in the Social-Face condition 
were sourced from an online database (Tarr, 2012) and depicted photographs of 
human faces with direct gaze. Images in the Social-Cartoon condition were sourced 
from previous research that had identified the emotion in the cartoon could be 
reliably recognised by those with ASD (Brosnan et al., 2013).   The Non-Social and 
Non-Social of Interest images were freely available for use and sourced from the 
Google Images search engine (Google, Inc, n.d.). Images chosen for the Non-Social 
condition were items or objects that neither involved any human nor animal subject, 
and were not the subject of any participant’s interest. The images included: a bicycle; 
a paintbrush; a car; a paperclip; a train, and a telescope.  
 
As well as investigating physiological responses to non-social compared with social 
stimuli and autistic traits in an NT sample, this study sought to investigate whether 
there was any relationship between autistic traits and responses to stimuli relevant to 
the individual’s own special interest. The online survey therefore included several 
questions about the participants’ own hobbies and interests, how much time and 
money they spent on their main hobby and the objects that they most associated 
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with it. Relevant images were then selected for presentation on the basis of this 
survey. Each image was converted to greyscale, sized to 100 pixels per inch, cropped 
and centred on a white background with a width of 20cm and a height of 10cm 





      
 
The experiment was built and run using the E-Prime® 2.0 suite of applications. The 
order of stimulus presentation was initially randomised and each participant was 
shown images in that order. Individual Non-Social of Interest stimuli were changed 
for each participant according to images selected for them on the basis of their 
reported interest. Each stimulus was presented on screen for 5 seconds. The inter-
stimulus interval (ISI) varied randomly between 8- 12 seconds, with a mean ISI of 10 
seconds over the whole procedure in accordance with previous studies (Breska, et 
al., 2010). A fixation in the shape of a small cross appeared in the centre of the 
screen during each interval.  
 
4.3.5 Skin Conductance Response 
Skin conductance response (SCR) was chosen as the measure of arousal and 
orienting response to visual stimuli, in line with previous studies (Greenwald et al., 
1989; Siddle, 1991). A Biopac GSR100C was used to measure skin conductance. An 
emotional or physiological response was deemed to have occurred when there was a 
rise in the amplitude of the skin conductance level of at least 0.01 µS within 1–4 
seconds of a stimulus onset, as suggested by the literature (Dawson, et al., 2007; 
Venables & Christie, 1980). Acqknowledge™ 4.1 software was used to calculate 
SCRs from the recorded skin conductance level of each participant. SCRs were 
Figure 4.1. Examples of Social-Face, Non-Social and Social-Cartoon stimuli presented to participants. 
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measured by comparison to a localized baseline that was established by the software 
using median value smoothing. The calculation of skin conductance amplitude was 
determined by the change in the amplitude of the skin conductance level from the 




Participants were seated on an adjustable chair in an acoustically and electrically 
sealed booth, approximately 60 cm from a 20 inch Dell monitor, with a keyboard 
positioned in front of them on a small table. An isotonic gel was applied to the 
Biopac EDA finger transducer which was attached to the distal phalanx of both the 
fore and middle finger of the dominant hand in accordance with recommendations 
(Screbo et al., 1992). The on-screen instructions told the participant to passively view 
each image and to ensure they remembered each in preparation for a memory test at 
the end. This was included as an incentive for the participants to pay attention to 
stimuli in what was an otherwise passive task.  
 
4.3.7 EDA Analysis 
 Electrodermal activity (EDA) was analysed for each participant from the recording 
using the Acqknowledge™ 4.1 software.   The initial sampling rate was 1kHz, but 
due to high frequency noise obscuring the signal, the SCR waveform was 
downsampled to 30 samples/second to capture the true nature of the signal, and was 
‘cleaned up’ by running a 1hz FIR low pass filter, as instructed by Biopac technical 
support (pers. comm). If a stimulus did not elicit a response according to the 
parameters described above, then this was recorded as a zero response. Log of (SCR 
+1) was calculated across all responses as recommended when including these zero 
responses. A mean SCR magnitude was calculated for each participant, for each 
condition (Dawson, et al., 2007). To correct for individual differences in skin 
conductance level between participants, the mean SCR magnitudes for each 
condition were transformed into z-scores and these were used for the statistical 
analysis.  
 
4.3.8 Statistical Analysis 
The data were explored using IBM SPSS Statistics 19 and the alpha was set at 0.05.  
A Shapiro-Wilk test revealed that all data for the transformed mean SCR magnitudes 
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for each of the four conditions were not normally distributed (for all conditions, 
p<0.05), and it was not possible to transform the data to a normal distribution. Non-
parametric tests were therefore employed for analysis. A one-tailed bivariate 
Spearman correlation was run to explore the relationship between AQ and mean 
SCR magnitude to each condition. To explore the average difference in arousal to 
non-social images compared with the response to social images, the transformed 
mean SCR magnitudes for the social condition were subtracted from those for the 
non-social condition. 
The AQ and STAI scores were normally distributed so Pearson’s correlations were 
run to investigate the relationship between AQ and anxiety. To investigate the 
relationship between anxiety and physiological response to non-social stimuli of 
interest, a Spearman’s correlation was performed. Partial Pearson’s correlations were 
run to explore the relationship between AQ and mean SCR magnitudes to all 




The mean age for the total sample was 27 (SD=10) and the mean AQ was 18 
(SD=7). An independent-sample t-test revealed that there were no significant gender 
differences in AQ (t (44) = –.59, p=.558). The mean SCR magnitudes for each 




Mean SCR Magnitude Mean SD 
Non-Social 42 103 
Non-Social: Of Interest 52 78 
Social: Faces 24 56 
Social: Cartoon 25 59 
      N=46 
 
For the whole group, AQ was significantly positively correlated with mean SCR 
magnitude to non-social stimuli (r=.407, p=0.002). There was also a significant 
negative correlation between AQ and social–cartoon stimuli (r= –.312, p =0.017). 
Table 4.1. Total mean SCR magnitude for each condition 
 67 
AQ was not significantly correlated with mean SCR magnitude to either the non-





   
   
 
 
In addition, there was a significant correlation between mean SCR magnitude to 
non-social of interest and social–faces conditions (r=.317, p=0.016) and between the 
mean SCR magnitude to social–faces and social–cartoon conditions (r=.424, 
p=0.002).  
 
There was also a correlation between AQ and the average difference in mean SCR 
magnitude to all non-social images compared with that to all social images (r=.267, p 
=0.036), indicating that the greater the AQ, the larger the gap between the higher 






Figure 4.2  Mean SCR Magnitude for each condition plotted against AQ 
score 
Figure 4.3  Difference in mean SCR magnitude between 
total non-social and total social conditions 
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Finally, as expected, AQ was significantly positively correlated with Trait Anxiety 
(r=.451, p=.002). However, AQ was not significantly correlated with State Anxiety 
(r=.186, p=.216). There was also a significant positive correlation between Trait 
Anxiety and mean SCR magnitude to the non-social of interest condition (r=.353, 
p=.016), but no relationship of significance between Trait Anxiety and mean SCR 
magnitude to any of the other conditions. When controlling for Trait Anxiety, the 
relationship between AQ and mean SCR magnitude to non-social stimuli remained 
significant (r=.417, p=0.004), as did the negative relationship between AQ and mean 
SCR magnitude to the social–cartoon condition (r=–.314, p=.036). 
 
4.5 Discussion 
The results of this study largely support the initial hypotheses, finding that those 
reporting a higher number of autistic traits have higher physiological arousal to non-
social stimuli than those reporting fewer autistic traits. The correlations suggest that 
the higher the AQ, the greater the physiological response to non-social stimuli, and 
the higher the AQ, the greater the difference between physiological response to non-
social compared with social stimuli. However, the results do not support the 
hypothesis that AQ would be negatively correlated with SCR to social stimuli, and it 
was also expected that there would be a correlation between AQ and arousal to the 
non-social items of interest, which was not found. The possible reasons for this are 
discussed below. 
 
The finding that AQ is positively correlated with arousal to non-social stimuli 
demonstrates, for the first time, a connection between high self-reported autistic 
traits in an NT sample and a greater physiological response to the non-social. 
Although further research is needed to tease out the nature of this relationship, it 
suggests that physiological response may underlie the development of certain traits 
and behaviours seen in ASD, including poor or limited social functioning, and 
restricted and repetitive behaviours. This finding, along with the negative correlation 
found between AQ and mean SCR magnitude to the cartoon condition, supports the 
theory that physiological arousal to social and non-social stimuli differs across the 
subclinical range of the broader autism phenotype as it is defined by the E-S theory. 
Those self-reporting more ASD traits (higher Systemizing, lower Empathizing) 
display greater arousal to the non-social condition than those with a lower AQ, and 
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those with fewer ASD traits (i.e. higher Empathizing, lower Systemizing) display 
greater arousal to abstract social images (in the case of cartoons) than those with a 
higher AQ. If these results extend to an ASD population, physiological response to 
non-social stimuli could be part of the mechanism underlying both enhanced 
Systemizing and reduced Empathizing in ASD, for example by producing a stronger 
orienting response to non-social objects than to social information during a crucial 
stage for social learning.  
 
That there was no correlation between AQ and the non-social of interest condition, 
contrary to the prediction, is possibly due to the participants’ anticipation that this 
type of item would appear during the task eliciting a higher average response across 
all participants regardless of AQ (given that they had been asked in advance to 
provide details of their non-social interest). After having undertaken the task, several 
participants commented on seeing the images relating to their interest and 
sometimes mentioned that the wrong type or make of item had been used. 
Therefore, it would seem that these stimuli may have elicited a reaction across all 
participants that was not necessarily related to interest, but to anticipation, or the 
recognition that this image was ‘for them’ and in some cases that the image was not 
‘correct’ in their view. 
 
It had been hypothesised that those with a higher number of autistic traits would 
show larger responses to personal non-social items of interest, in line with evidence 
from the study by Grelotti, et al. (2005) that showed a ‘social’ response in the brain 
of an autistic child when viewing images of his special interest. It may be, however, 
that in NT individuals the kind of interest invested in non-social items or activities is 
not of the same quality or intensity as that of the autistic individual and their special 
restricted interests, which form a crucial part of an autism diagnosis. It may 
therefore be the case that while there exists a relationship between AQ and arousal 
to non-social items in general, this relationship breaks down in an NT sample for 
non-social items of interest when the responses of the whole group rise. As NT 
individuals, this increased arousal may be due either to heightened attention to an 
object of interest  (in line with the somatic marker hypothesis), or due to other 
factors as mentioned above. To investigate the relationship between AQ and arousal 
to non-social stimuli of personal interest more comprehensively, future similar 
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studies looking at an NT population will need to find a way of minimizing the 
potential influence of such factors.  
 
The significant relationship between arousal to non-social of interest stimuli and the 
response to human faces could be explained by the inherent interest of faces to a 
neurotypical population, and the personal interest in items relating to each 
participant’s hobby. It would therefore make sense that in this sample of NT adults, 
those who are highly responsive to items that interest them are also highly 
responsive to faces. As noted above, it is possible that the arousal to the items of 
interest was in part due to anticipation or recognition of the personal nature of the 
images, in which case this correlation may be explained by individual differences in 
responsiveness to salient stimuli.   
 
As previously mentioned, the fusiform face area is activated when typically 
developing subjects view social stimuli, but can also be activated in ASD subjects 
when viewing images related to their special interest (Grelotti, et al., 2005; Critchley, 
et al., 2000; Kanwisher, et al., 1997).  The suggestion from this previous research is 
that areas of the brain involved in face processing may not actually be specialized for 
faces in particular, but for areas of expertise.  The results from the current study 
suggest that physiological response could be related to what it is that we become 
experts in. Evidence suggests that having a physiological response to faces may 
result in increased attention to faces, thus resulting in having expertise in facial 
expressions and their emotional significance. For example, Dalton et al. (2005) 
demonstrated a link between arousal to faces and the time spent looking at them, 
and the study by Stagg, et al. (2013) suggested that the relationship they found 
between arousal to faces and language onset in ASD children could be due to the 
effect arousal to faces may have in directing attention towards them at an early age, 
facilitating language development.  Conversely, having an increased physiological 
response to non-social stimuli such as geometric shapes, recurring patterns or rule-
governed systems may result in increased attention to such stimuli, the consequence 
being an increased ability or drive towards such objects and systems. If arousal is 
related to attention towards a particular domain, such as people or systems, and thus 
related to cognitive ability in, or drive towards, that domain, then this could explain 
why the social and non-social traits of ASD have low genetic heritability in the 
general population, yet remain related to one another. If there is a primary cognitive 
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drive towards one particular domain (either social or non-social), it makes sense that 
the other is less likely to elicit as strong a response. 
 
The positive correlation between AQ and trait anxiety supported the findings of 
previous research (Reed, et al., 2016; Romano et al., 2014) and was expected due to 
the high prevalence of comorbid anxiety disorders in ASD—if autistic traits are 
distributed along a spectrum then it would be expected that subclinical autistic traits 
would also be related to general disposition towards anxiety. It has been proposed 
that anxiety may play a role in the drive towards systemizing in ASD (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1989; Spiker et al., 2012), in which case anxiety could potentially mediate the 
significant relationship between AQ and SCR mean magnitude to non-social stimuli 
found in this study. However, the results showed that the correlation between AQ 
and response to non-social stimuli was as strong, and still significant, when 
controlling for trait anxiety, indicating that anxiety does not play a role in the 
stronger orienting response towards general non-social stimuli for those with more 
autistic traits.  
 
There was no significant relationship between trait or state anxiety and the non-
social, social–faces or social–cartoon conditions, but there was a significant 
correlation between trait anxiety and the non-social of interest condition. This 
indicates the presence of a relationship between anxiety and special interests or 
hobbies in the NT population but the nature of that relationship is unclear. It is 
possible that hobbies and interests are used to cope with anxiety and so the 
heightened physiological response to objects of interest represents a positive 
association, or it could indicate that high anxiety in the NT population is related to a 
compulsion towards certain topics or activities as a way of dispelling negative 
emotion—this type of distinction has been made, in clinical terms, between ASD 
and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), with the restricted interests and 
repetitive behaviours of ASD seen as being related to seeking positive affect and the 
compulsions and obsessions of OCD as related to reducing negative affect (Paula-
Pérez, 2013). OCD is also a spectrum disorder that is strongly related to anxiety 
symptoms and disorders (Nestadt et al., 2001) and OCD traits are found in 
subclinical populations (Riskind, Abreu, Strauss, & Holt, 1997; Rosen & Tallis, 
1995). So, it may be the case that in some NT individuals, personal interests and 
hobbies are related to feelings of compulsion or necessity to engage, leading to a 
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higher SCR mean magnitude when viewing images related to that interest in those 
who have higher trait anxiety. 
 
The results of this study indicate that a stronger response to non-social stimuli, 
rather than simply a reduced response to social stimuli, may underlie the 
development of autistic traits in the NT population, and provided the basis for a 
later study to investigate whether these results would be replicated with an ASD 










Attention-to-Detail and Attention to Social and Non-





Abnormal attention is a core characteristic of ASD, including difficulty switching 
attention, hyperfocus on small and seemingly irrelevant details and lack of attention 
to social stimuli. This chapter details a study in an NT sample, the aim of which was 
to investigate the relationship between attention to social compared with non-social 
details, general attention to detail, and whether these relate to autistic traits in 
neurotypical adults. The intention was to establish whether attention to social and 
non-social aspects of a visual scene are related to each other and to degree of autistic 
traits, and therefore whether non-social and social behaviours such as those seen in 
ASD may in fact be explained together in terms of attentional biases. Methods for 
assessing attention to detail include the Embedded Figures Task (EFT), in which 
participants identify a shape within a complex visual array, and Change Blindness 
(CB) tasks, which measure how quickly it takes to identify changes in a flickering 
visual scene.  Forty-six NT participants (25 female, 21 male) completed the Autism 
Quotient (AQ) questionnaire to measure ASD traits before completing an online 
version of the EFT and a Change Blindness task designed to include 52 scenes 
including both social and non-social features, with 26 images featuring social 
changes (e.g. changes to a person’s face) and 26 featuring non-social changes (e.g. a 
change to a vehicle).  
 
Analysis revealed a significant correlation between AQ and response time to social 
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changes and no significant correlation between AQ and time taken to spot the non-
social changes. There was a significant correlation between response time to social 
and non-social changes. A paired-samples t-test revealed significant differences in 
response time for social and non-social changes, participants on the whole taking 
significantly longer to identify the non-social changes. The results indicate that AQ is 
related to greater difficulty identifying social changes, implying that those with more 
autistic traits pay less immediate attention to social details. Overall, people took 
longer to identify non-social changes, implying that in a neurotypical population 
social details are attended to more quickly. The strong correlation between response 
time to social and non-social changes indicates that, at an attentional level at least, 
these two cognitive features of ASD may not be wholly independent of one another. 
EFT scores were correlated with response times to spot both social and non-social 
changes, indicating that performance on both these measures of attention are related 




5.2.1 Attention to Detail 
 
The previous study in Chapter 4 investigated physiological response to social and 
non-social stimuli in relation to autistic traits and anxiety.  The aim of the present 
study was to further explore attention to social compared with non-social details and 
general attention to detail in relation to autistic traits and anxiety in a neurotypical 
sample. As discussed previously, atypical attention is thought to contribute to both 
the social deficits and restricted and repetitive behaviours (RRBs) seen in ASD. It 
has been proposed that ASD arises from impairments in social orienting (Dawson, 
Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998, and see Chapter 4), and that abnormal 
ascription of salience to social information may underlie the development of social 
difficulties in ASD (Dawson et al., 1998).  Atypical attention has also been theorized 
to underlie the non-social aspects of ASD—for example the insistence on sameness, 
resistance to change, and distress due to even small changes in the environment or a 
routine, often seen in ASD, may be a result of enhanced attention to detail, meaning 
that even the slightest alteration disrupts the ability to meaningfully process 
information about the world. Attention to detail is also a feature of the high-level 
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RRBs in ASD (Turner, 1999; Leekam, 2011) and is thought to be a prerequisite for 
systemizing ability, allowing for quick identification of features that ‘break the rules’ 
and risk destabilising the system, such as a mistake in a piece of code (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2009). 
 
Attention to detail can also be conceptualized in terms of field-independence, that is, 
as a perceptual or cognitive style that involves the preferential processing of the local 
features of a given scene or stimulus rather than apprehending the whole scene 
globally and contextually. Typically, individuals attend to the properties of a larger 
figure faster than they do to its smaller components, indicating a global processing 
style (or field-dependence) whereby information is processed holistically and 
dependent upon context, before attention is paid to the details (Navon, 1977).  A 
common method for assessing field-dependence and field-independence is the 
Embedded Figures Task, in which a simple shape must be identified from within a 
complex figure (Witkin, 1971). Those who are better able to distinguish the various 
shapes within the figure (i.e. those who have a field-independent cognitive style) will 
be faster and more accurate on this task than those who perceive the figure as a 
complex whole. 
 
Much evidence has been accumulated to suggest that people with ASD have 
superior visuo-spatial skills to controls (Muth et al., 2014; Mitchell & Ropar, 2004) 
and several studies have found enhanced performance in ASD samples compared to 
controls on the Embedded Figures Task (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & 
Frith, 1983; de Jonge, Kemner & van Engeland, 2006; Schlooz et al., 2014), as well 
as on other measures of attention to detail such as the Block Design Task (Shah & 
Frith, 1993; Muth et al., 2014) and other visual search tasks (O’Riordan, Plaisted, 
Driver, & Baron-Cohen, 2001; Plaisted, O’Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 1998). There 
have been various explanations put forward for this, including enhanced visual acuity 
(Brosnan, William & Walker, 2012), a bias towards local rather than global 
processing (Bölte et al., 2007; Happé, 1996) and an ‘overfunctioning’ of regions of 
the brain involved in core perceptual processes (Mottron et al., 2006).  These 
findings of superior performance by ASD groups on measures of attention to detail 
have not been consistent, with several studies finding no such superiority (Dillen et 
al., 2015; Lee et al., 2007; Manjaly et al., 2007; White & Saldaña, 2011). However, no 
inferior performance of ASD groups on such tasks has been noted, and a more 
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recent meta-analysis of 59 studies found that ASD groups reliably exhibit superior 
performance compared with controls on the EFT and the Block Design Task (Muth 
et al., 2014). 
 
Researchers have also investigated attention to detail in relation to autistic traits in 
neurotypical samples. Baron-Cohen et al. (2006) conducted an fMRI study on 
parents of children with ASD as they performed the EFT and found atypical 
patterns of brain activation. Similarly, Spencer et al. (2012) also found atypical 
activation in frontal and temporal regions of the brain during performance of the 
EFT in a group with ASD and their unaffected siblings, compared to controls, 
suggesting that atypical attention to detail is a feature of the broader autism 
phenotype and may be related to subclinical autistic traits. Several studies have 
explored attention to detail in relation to autistic traits as measured by the AQ, with 
some finding enhanced performance of those with a higher AQ on the EFT 
(Almeida et al., 2010, 2014; Grinter et al., 2009; Russell-Smith et al., 2012) and others 
finding no such differences between neurotypical high and low AQ scorers (Carroll 
& Chiew, 2006; Carton & Smith, 2014). A meta-analysis of research on AQ and EFT 
scores (along with other visual search tasks) concluded that superior attention to 
detail is a feature of the broader autism phenotype and that methodological 
differences across studies may account for inconsistent results (Cribb, Olaithe, 
Lorenzo, Dunlop, & Maybery, 2016). 
 
The current thesis seeks to elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
systemizing in ASD, and as attention to detail/field-independence has been posited 
as a prerequisite for systemizing, the EFT was chosen for this study as a well-
established measure of local processing style, in order to assess its relationship with 
autistic traits as well as the relationship between field-independence as a cognitive 
style and attention to social and non-social stimuli. 
 
5.2.2 Change Blindness 
 
Attention can be generally defined as the mechanisms by which an organism 
selectively processes information or sensory inputs. There is too much information 
in the environment at any given moment for it all to be processed at once, so the 
selection of which stimuli to process or attend to is governed by an interplay of 
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endogenous (directed by the knowledge, mental state, goals and beliefs of the 
organism) and exogenous (directed by properties of a stimulus that capture the 
organism’s attention regardless of its goals etc.) factors (Yantis, 1993). The SCR 
study detailed in Chapter 4 focused on single images in isolation—either socially-
related or non-socially related—in order to understand which type of stimuli elicited 
larger responses in the absence of any specific or given goal or task. In order to 
identify any relationship between attention to social and non-social stimuli and 
autistic traits it is also important to investigate which features are attended to in a 
more complex scene in which both social and non-social details are present.  
 
Change blindness is a phenomenon whereby people (NT and with normal or 
corrected vision) have difficulty spotting obvious changes in a given scene when a 
brief visual interruption (e.g. a momentary flicker of a blank screen) occurs between 
the original image and a modified image (Simons & Levin, 1997). Change blindness 
research has revealed that attention is needed for change detection and that, despite 
having the subjective experience of perceiving the full details of our visual field, we 
actually never form a complete visual representation of our environment and that we 
attend only to salient parts of a scene, making identification of changes in those 
areas faster (Rensink et al., 1997). This phenomenon is found not just in laboratory 
experiments but also in real-world naturalistic settings—for example, many people 
will fail to spot that a conversation partner has been replaced by someone else 
during an interaction (Simons & Levin, 1998; Levin, 2002). It has been shown that 
changes to semantically relevant items are spotted faster than semantically irrelevant 
ones, revealing that context is important for guiding attention—the background 
knowledge and expectations of the observer influence the direction of attention 
(Kelley, Chun & Chua, 2003).  
 
Change blindness tasks have therefore been used to elucidate which areas of a scene 
attract initial attention—if a change happens in the area attended to first, it will be 
spotted more quickly (Rensink, 2002; Mazza et al., 2005). Change blindness tasks 
have also revealed that expertise in a particular subject will facilitate faster detection 
of changes relating to that subject more quickly than others, for example American 
football fans spot football-related changes quicker than non-fans (Werner & Thies, 
2010), those with heavy alcohol and cannabis use detect substance-related changes 
faster than those with lighter or no use (Jones, Jones & Smith, 2003) and experts in 
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physics are faster to detect changes that affect the underlying principle of a physics 
problem than novices (Feil & Mestre, 2010). Given that most humans have expertise 
in faces (Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006), it is unsurprising therefore that studies using 
the flicker paradigm have shown that changes to faces are more readily spotted than 
changes to non-social features (Ro, Russell & Lavie, 2001) and changes to eyes are 
detected faster than changes to the mouth (Davies & Hoffman, 2001).  
 
Change blindness studies have also been used to assess attention differences in ASD. 
Some evidence has shown that those with ASD have reduced change blindness 
compared with controls. One study found that an ASD group was faster to spot 
changes in the central interest of a scene, although they were slower than controls to 
spot semantically relevant changes (Fletcher-Watson, et al., 2006) and others have 
found that those with ASD exhibit reduced change blindness to changes in items of 
marginal (as opposed to central) interest (Ashwin, Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 
2017) compared to controls and others finding reduced change blindness in ASD 
overall (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2012; Smith & Milne, 2009). However, other research 
has found no differences in change blindness between ASD groups and controls 
(Burack et al., 2009; Hochhauser, Aran, & Grynszpan, 2018; Loth et al., 2008) and 
some studies found even greater change blindness in ASD (Fletcher-Watson, 
Leekam, Findlay, & Stanton, 2008; Kikuchi, Senju, Tojo, Osanai, & Hasegawa, 
2009).  
 
Given the evidence for enhanced attention to detail and preferential local processing 
in ASD, it would be expected that those with ASD would outperform controls on 
change detection. A possible reason for these varying results may be that different 
experimental designs are used. Rensink (2002), in a review of change blindness, 
explains that the degree of change blindness will rise in a linear fashion as the 
complexity of the task, the setting and the demands of the paradigm rise. If the task 
presents a large number of objects, or more naturalistic scenes with various 
competing visual information, then the failure to detect changes will rise. The nature 
of the task and the change blindness paradigm used will also impact the rate of 
change detection. Some designs will only occlude part of the scene as the change 
takes place, for example with ‘mud splashes,’ whereas others completely obscure the 
image for a brief moment, which increases change blindness (Rensink, 2002). The 
semantic position of the change also has an effect on change blindness—changes are 
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detected much more quickly when they take place in an area of semantic significance 
or of salience to the observer (Kelley, Chun & Chua, 2003). Changes of greater 
semantic salience will even be spotted faster than changes of physical salience, 
suggesting that aspects of a scene that are preferentially attended to are more likely 
to be encoded and then compared within visual short-term memory (Simons & 
Rensink, 2005). This suggests that change blindness tasks are not really a measure of 
overall attention to detail, but, as mentioned above, assess which stimuli within a 
given scene have the most salience for an observer, so the use of different scenes 
and sites of change will produce different results—few, if any, people will be 
superior performers on change blindness tasks as a whole. 
 
For example, the study by Kikuchi et al. (2009) found that children with ASD were 
slower to spot changes to faces than controls, but were not slower spotting changes 
to non-social objects. Within the ASD group, there were no differences in time 
taken to spot social and non-social changes, whereas the control group showed an 
attentional bias for faces, spotting social changes faster than non-social changes. 
There is evidence that people with ASD exhibit an attentional preference for items 
related to their own special interest (Grelotti et al., 2005; Sasson & Touchstone, 
2013), and the results of the previous study in Chapter 4 reveal that higher AQ is 
related to a larger physiological or orienting response to non-social stimuli in an NT 
sample (Singleton et al., 2014). Together, this research suggests that those with ASD 
and with high levels of subclinical autistic traits may spontaneously attend to non-
social items within a given scene before social items, or that what is usually seen as 
more salient in the environment (e.g. faces and social information) may not be 
perceived as such by those with ASD or a high degree of autistic traits.  
 
Several studies have found attenuated change blindness among ASD participants for 
changes to areas of marginal interest, and it has been suggested that this is evidence 
for enhanced local processing (Vanmarcke et al., 2017; Ashwin, Wheelwright & 
Baron-Cohen, 2017; Fletcher-Watson et al., 2012). However, there is debate about 
the usefulness of ‘centre of interest’ (or marginal interest) methods of change 
blindness, as a priori categorization of marginal or central interest items, by assessing 
where in a given scene people typically attend to, does little to explain why such 
features should capture (or not capture) attention and may not be useful in studies 
with clinical populations, depending on what the study seeks to measure. As 
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Zelinsky (1998) argues, “calling something a centre-of-interest essentially just 
redefines an object of attention and adds little to the understanding of how this 
object becomes an attentional attractor.”  
 
As discussed above, there is much evidence that change blindness tasks measure that 
which exogenously captures attention, i.e. which features of a scene prompt rapid 
encoding in short term memory. Given that this will be different across individuals 
and across various populations/clinical samples, these methodological differences 
with the change blindness paradigm may explain why there is variation in the results 
with ASD samples, i.e. change blindness tasks measure the exogenous attentional 
capture of features within a scene, rather than a general facility for attention to detail 
or overall local/global processing style (Scholl, 2000). In which case, it should not be 
surprising that while those with ASD may exhibit superior performance on measures 
of attention to detail and field-independence such as the EFT, they do not perform 
better than controls on all change blindness tasks across the board, given the 
differing methods and items of change reported on throughout the literature.  The 
change blindness task for the present study therefore used only changes to social or 
non-social items, in order to investigate the salience of, and attentional biases to, 
social and non-social information in relation to autistic traits. 
 
There has been little research into the relationship between change blindness and 
autistic traits in NT samples. One study used the AQ in an experiment with 
synaesthetes and an NT control group to assess whether autistic traits in synaesthesia 
relate to performance on both a change blindness task and the EFT (Ward et al., 
2017). They found that synaesthetes outperformed NT controls on both tasks, and 
that the attention-to-detail subscale of the AQ was correlated with this performance, 
suggesting that synaesthetes have an autistic-like cognitive profile in terms of 
attention. However, this study investigated autistic traits in a specific population with 
a neurodevelopmental condition known to often co-occur with ASD (Baron-Cohen, 
et al., 2013; Neufeld et al., 2013). The current study is therefore the first to explore 
the relationship between subclinical autistic traits in the NT population and 
performance on a change blindness task and the EFT specifically to understand the 
non-social aspects of the broader autism phenotype. 
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5.2.3 Attention and Anxiety 
 
There is evidence to suggest that the presence or absence of anxiety affects 
attention. For example, studies have found that induction of positive affect broadens 
attentional focus and increases distractibility, and that negative affect—including 
anger, anxiety and depression—increases local processing and reduces attentional 
flexibility (Basso et al., 1996; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Fredrickson & Branigan, 
2005; Gasper & Clore, 2002; de Fockert & Cooper, 2014). Studies have also found 
various results indicating that anxiety may affect attention in different ways, for 
example, that those with high trait anxiety lack an ability to maintain attentional 
focus (Fox, 1993), that high trait anxiety confers an advantage for attending to local 
information (Derryberry & Reed, 1998), that individuals with high trait anxiety 
exhibit worse selective attention (Bishop, 2009) and that trait anxiety improves 
spatial attention but does not affect postpercetual selection (Caparos & Linnell, 
2012). Because anxiety often co-occurs with autism, it may be that anxiety levels 
affect the attentional differences found in the condition (Kim et al., 2000; Leyfer et 
al., 2006). Research has also found a relationship between higher levels of anxiety 
and self-reported autistic traits in non-clinical samples (Kanne et al., 2009; Scherff et 
al., 2014; Liew et al., 2015).  
 
Burnette et al. (2005) investigated the relationship between anxiety and performance 
on various measures of weak central coherence (including the EFT) in HFA children 
and found no relationship between anxiety and local processing style, but the 
authors propose that this lack of association may be due to the use of self-report 
measures of anxiety, the reliability of which in children with ASDs is unclear. 
Another study on children with ASDs by Hill et al. (2014) found that those with 
high anxiety levels and enhanced local processing possessed better social skills than 
children with low anxiety and enhanced local processing ability. The authors 
suggested that high anxiety combined with a local processing style may confer an 
advantage for social skills over those with low anxiety and enhanced local processing 
due to an amplification effect of the anxiety on local processing, leading them to 
fixate more closely on visual social details such as the mouth, leading to improved 
social understanding and interaction.  However, this would seem to imply that there 
are other mechanisms in ASD, besides anxiety, that account for enhanced local 
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processing and suggests that high anxiety simply amplifies local processing ability in 
social contexts.  
 
Studies exploring anxiety in relation to change detection have found that anxious 
individuals take significantly longer to identify changes than the non-anxious 
(Gregory & Lambert, 2012). Change blindness tasks have also been used to assess 
attentional biases towards threat/phobia related stimuli in people with anxiety 
disorders and specific phobias. For example, Mayer et al. (2006) used the Flicker 
change blindness paradigm to present aracnophobic and non-arachnophobic 
participants with spider-related and non-spider/threat irrelevant changes, finding 
that arachnophobic participants spotted more spider-related changes than the non-
arachnophobic participants, and that overall more spider changes were spotted than 
threat-irrelevant changes. McGlynn et al. (2008) also used the change detection 
paradigm with respect to ophidiophobic participants, alternating scenes between 
those that contained a snake and those that did not. They found that ophidiophobes 
took longer to spot changes to scenes without a snake and suggest that this may be 
related to difficulty disengaging attention from the perceived snake-threat in the 
previously presented scene. Another study found that, using an adapted change 
blindness paradigm, arachnophobes were superior to controls at spotting when a 
spider had been replaced with another item, suggesting that those with a phobia or a 
specific stimulus-related anxiety have a working memory advantage for particular 
stimuli that facilitates threat monitoring (Reinecke, Becker & Rinck, 2010). Taken 
together, this research suggests that the presence of anxiety has an impact on 
directing and disengaging attention and on change detection.  
 
As mentioned above, anxiety has been found to be one of the most common 
comorbid conditions experienced by people diagnosed with ASD (White, Oswald, 
Ollendick & Scahill, 2009; Davis, White & Ollendick, 2014; Vasa et al., 2013) and 
previous research has shown a positive correlation between anxiety and autistic traits 
(Romano et al., 2014; Reed et al., 2016), with the results of Study One in this thesis 
(Chapter 4) also finding a significant relationship between AQ score and Trait 
anxiety score. When investigating attention in relation to autistic traits, it is therefore 
useful to also measure anxiety in order to establish whether, and which, autistic traits 
may be related to attentional differences and whether anxiety mediates any 
relationships between autistic traits and performance on measures of attention to 
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detail and change detection. Self-report measures of anxiety (State and Trait) were 
therefore included in the analyses for this study in order to investigate the potential 
relationships between anxiety and attention and whether anxiety mediates 




This study used the EFT to assess general attention to detail/field-independence, 
and a change blindness task to investigate attentional biases towards social or non-
social stimuli, in relation to autistic traits in an NT sample. It was hypothesised that, 
in line with findings from previous research, performance on the EFT would be 
correlated with AQ score. It was also hypothesised that higher AQ score would be 
related to faster detection of non-social changes, and slower detection of social 
changes, and that better performance on the EFT would be correlated with better 
performance on the change blindness task.  It was planned to divide AQ scores into 
a high and a low AQ group, using a median split (see Section 5.5.1 for more detail), 
and it was hypothesised that the high AQ group would take longer to spot social 
changes and would be faster at spotting the non-social changes. It was also predicted 
that the high AQ group would perform better on the EFT than the low AQ group. 
 
 
 5.3 Methods 
 
5.3.1 Participants 
An a priori power analysis in G*Power using a conservative estimate of a medium 
effect size (eta squared statistic of 0.4) determined that a sample size of at least 34 
would be needed to achieve a power of 0.8 with an alpha level of 0.05, or 46 for an 
effect size of eta squared 0.35 (see Section 3.5.1). Forty-six neurotypical participants 
were recruited (as described in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1) aged between 18 and 66 
years (M=26.7 years), (25 female (M=26 years) and 21 male (M=28 years)). All 
participants reported having normal to corrected normal vision and no psychiatric 
diagnoses. Participants were provided information on the basic background of the 
study (without mention of ASD) and what was involved before giving their consent. 
Participants completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient online prior to coming to the 
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laboratory to undertake the change blindness and EFT tasks. Participants each 
received £5 on completion of the study. 
 
5.3.2 Autism Quotient 
Participants were first administered the full 50 item Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) 
questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) online, using Bristol Online Surveys (2012) 
as a self-report measure of autistic traits. AQ scores were calculated for each 
participant according to Baron-Cohen et al.’s (2001) specifications, resulting in an 
‘AQ score’ for each participant out of a possible 50 (Mean AQ= 17.7, SD=6.7), with 
a minimum possible score was 0 and maximum possible score of 50, and scores 
(minimum score of 0 and maximum score of 10) for each of the theoretical 
subscales suggested by the original authors—social skill, communication, 
imagination, attention-to-detail and attention switching. The higher the score, the 
higher the number of autistic traits. Answering each question on the survey was 
mandatory, so there were no missing data for any participants completing it. For 
more detail on the AQ and the subscales, see Chapter 3 Section 3.3.  
 
5.3.3 Change Blindness Task  
The change blindness task used for the present study was based on Rensink et al.’s 
flicker paradigm (1997) and used images from a change blindness experiment by 
Ashwin et al. (2017). Participants were shown 54 scenes, each of which included 
both social and non-social details such as people and machinery or vehicles and the 
images each featured either one social change (e.g. to a person’s face) or one non-
social change (e.g. a change to a vehicle), totalling 27 social and 27 non-social 
changes (see Figure 5.1 for an example). 
 
Participants were sat approximately 60 cm from a 20 inch Dell monitor, with a 
keyboard positioned in front of them on a small table. Each image was displayed for 
240ms and was interrupted with a blank screen for 80ms, before displaying the 
changed image for a further 240ms, as detailed by Rensink et al. (1997). This cycle 
repeated for 30s (at which point it timed out) or until the participant pressed the 
keyboard to indicate they had spotted the change. After pressing the keyboard, 
participants then indicated to the experimenter what the change had been. 
Participants were each initially given two practice run-throughs (with different 
images from those used in the experiment) to ensure they understood the task 
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before the experiment began.  The experimenter made a note of any errors, and 
misidentified changes and time-outs were recorded as a miss. The experiment was 
run on E-Prime software, and reaction times were recorded from the start of each 
image cycle to the press of the keyboard, in order to establish how long it took the 
participant to spot the change. An average response time for all correct change 
detections was calculated for each participant for both the social and non-social 






5.3.4 The Embedded Figures Task 
A computerised version of the EFT was used for this study, which has been 
validated against the paper version and has previously been used in ASD research 
(Falter et al., 2008; Brosnan et al., 2012). Again, participants were seated 
approximately 60 cm from a 20-inch Dell monitor, with a keyboard positioned in 
front of them on a small table. Participants were asked to select, as quickly and as 
accurately as possible, which of two shapes—presented at the bottom left and right 
 
Figure 5.1 Example of the change blindness flicker paradigm. Participants must 
identify a change from image 1 to image 2, with a brief interruption of a blank 
screen in between. 
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of the screen respectively—appeared in a larger complex picture at the top of the 
screen. Pictures were all abstract, consisting of various configurations of lines and 
colours (see Figure 5.2). Participants selected the shape they had identified in the 
array by pressing either ‘F’ on the keyboard to indicate the shape presented on the 
left-hand side, or ‘J’ to indicate the shape on the right. Once the selection had been 
made, the outline of the correct shape appeared in the picture along with text-based 
feedback of either ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ before the next image appeared on the 
screen. There were two initial training tests with practice images, to ensure 
participants were familiarised with the task.  The experiment itself consisted of 18 
figures, half of which contained the shape on the left and half the shape on the right. 
Response times were automatically recorded by the program, along with the number 
of correct and incorrect responses. Mean response times for correct answers were 
calculated and this was divided by the number of correct responses to provide an 
inverse efficiency score for each participant—the lower the score the more efficient 
the performance (see Falter et al., 2008 and Brosnan et al., 2012). 
 







5.3.5 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI Form Y; Spielberger et al., 1983) was used 
to measure anxiety levels in participants, both their general propensity to respond to 
Figure 5.2  An example of the Embedded Figures Task. Participants are presented 
with image (a), and after selecting one of the two shapes at the bottom of the image, 
the correct shape is displayed as a black outline as seen in image (b). 
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situations with anxiety (Trait anxiety questionnaire) and the level of anxiety they 
were experiencing as they took part in the change blindness and EFT tasks (State 
anxiety questionnaire). The trait anxiety questionnaire was completed online prior to 
coming to the laboratory for testing, and the State anxiety questionnaire was 
administered when the participant arrived for testing, prior to undertaking the EFT 
and change blindness tasks. Further detail on the STAI Form Y can be found in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3. 
 
 
5.4 Statistical Analysis 
All data were explored using IBM SPSS Statistics 19 and the alpha was set at 0.05. 
 
5.4.1 Change Blindness and AQ 
A Shapiro-Wilk test revealed that the AQ scores, response times to the non-social 
change blindness condition and total mean response time to both social and non-
social change blindness conditions were normally distributed (ps>0.05). The 
response time data for the social changes on the change blindness task and the 
number of errors/time-outs were not normally distributed and were positively 
skewed, so a square root transformation was applied to each variable to convert the 
data to a normal distribution so that parametric statistical tests could be employed.   
 
Two-tailed Pearson bivariate correlations were run to investigate the relationships 
between: the mean change detection response time for each condition (social and 
non-social) and both total AQ score and AQ score for each of the five subscales; the 
overall mean change detection response time (social + non-social) and AQ scores 
(total AQ and for each AQ subscale); between AQ scores (total AQ and for each 
AQ subscale) and the number of errors and/or timeouts for each condition; and the 
relationship between mean change detection response times for the social and the 
non-social conditions. The difference scores between mean change detection 
response times for the social and non-social conditions were normally distributed as 
assessed with Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p=.726), so a paired-samples t-test was employed 
to explore differences between response time to the social and non-social changes 
across the whole sample.  
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5.4.2 Embedded Figures Task and AQ 
A Shapiro-Wilk test revealed that the final efficiency scores for the EFT and the 
average response time for correct answers were not normally distributed and were 
significantly positively skewed. A logarithmic transformation was therefore applied 
to these data to convert them to a normal distribution for parametric statistical 
analysis. Pearson bivariate correlations were run to explore the relationships between 
total AQ score and the scores for each of the five AQ subscales, and EFT efficiency 
score, number of correct responses and mean reaction time for correct answers. AQ 
scores were divided into a high AQ and a low AQ group to investigate differences 
between these groups on EFT performance using an independent samples t-test (see 
section 5.5.1 for further detail on the median split process). 
 
5.4.3 Change Blindness and Embedded Figures Task 
To investigate the relationship between attention to detail as measured by the EFT 
and attention to social and non-social changes, bivariate Pearson correlations were 
run between EFT final efficiency score, EFT number of correct answers and EFT 
mean response time for correct answers, and mean response time to each of the 
change blindness conditions, and number of errors/time-outs on the change 
blindness task.  
 
5.4.4 Anxiety Analyses 
Two-tailed Pearson bivariate correlations were run to explore relationships between 
Trait and State anxiety scores and EFT final efficiency score, EFT number of correct 
answers and EFT mean response time for correct answers, and mean response time 
to each of the change blindness conditions, and number of errors/time-outs on the 
change blindness task. Partial correlations between AQ and the various measures of 
attention (EFT scores and change blindness RTs and errors), controlling for Trait 
anxiety and controlling for State anxiety scores, were also carried out. 
 
 
5.5  Results 
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5.5.1 Change Blindness and AQ 
Analysis revealed a significant positive correlation between AQ and the mean change 
detection response time to social changes (r=.406, p=0.005) but no correlation 
between AQ and the mean change detection response time to the non-social 
changes (r=.153, p=.310). To further explore these relationships and to aid 
comparison with studies using ASD and control groups, participants were split into 
two groups of high and low AQ scores using a median split in order to perform 
independent t-tests to investigate differences in change blindness response times 
between groups. This involved grouping all participants scoring above the median 
AQ score (Mdn=17.5) as High AQ scorers and all those scoring below the median 
AQ score for the sample as Low AQ scorers, resulting in two equal groups 
containing 23 participants each. This approach has previously been used in research 
on autistic traits in neurotypical samples for statistical analysis (Brock, Xu, & Brooks, 
2011; Chen & Yoon, 2011; Cox et al., 2015; Mayer, 2017; Stevenson & Hart, 2017; 
Vabalas & Freeth, 2016). The mean change detection response time data for both 
social and non-social changes were not normally distributed for the two AQ groups, 
as assessed by Shapiro Wilk’s test, so a logarithmic transformation was applied to 
convert them to a normal distribution. There was homogeneity of variances for both 
conditions, as assessed by Levene’s test (ps>0.05). Independent t-tests revealed that 
there were no significant differences between high and low AQ scorers on the 
change detection response time for the non-social changes (t(44)=–1.36, p=.18) but 
there were significant differences in change detection response time to the social 
changes for the high (M=3.73, SD=.11) and low (M=3.64, SD=.11) AQ groups 
(t(44)=2.72, p=.009), those in the high AQ group taking significantly longer to spot 
changes to socially-related items than those in the low AQ group.  
 
There was a significant positive relationship between the response time for the social 
changes and scores for the social skill and imagination subscales of the AQ (r=.370, 
p=.011 and r=.380, p=.009, respectively) but no significant correlation with the 
other three AQ subscales. Because overall AQ was not significantly correlated with 
the non-social condition, the alpha for correlations between this condition and the 
AQ subscales was adjusted to p=0.01 to reduce the risk of Type 1 error. The non-
social change blindness condition was close to being significantly positively 
correlated with the imagination subscale of the AQ (r=.343, p=0.02) but not with 
the other subscales. The total combined average change detection response time for 
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both social and non-social conditions was very close to being significantly correlated 
with overall AQ score (r=.287, p=.053) and was significantly positively correlated 
with the social skill (r=.328, p=.026) and imagination (r=.396, p=.006) subscales of 
the AQ. There was no significant relationship between number of missed change 
detections for the social or non-social condition and overall AQ score or any of the 
AQ subscales. There was a significant correlation between mean change detection 






























































































RT Non-Social Changes (ms)
Figure 5.3  Plots representing significant correlations between mean change detection 
response times and the AQ/subscales of the AQ. 
Figure 5.4  Plot representing the statistically significant relationship between mean change 












Detection RT (ms) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Non-Social 7287 1934 
Social 5026 4384 
Combined Total 6156 1483 
N=46         
 
The paired-samples t-test revealed significant differences in response time for social 
(M=5026, SD=1400) and non-social (M=7287, SD=1934) changes, participants 





























Table 5.1  Mean change detection response times for 
each condition 
Figure 5.5  Mean change detection response times across participants for 
each condition. Standard deviations are represented by the error bars 





5.5.2 Embedded Figures Task and AQ 
The correlation between final EFT efficiency score and total AQ score (r=.273, 
p=.067) and mean response time for correct answers (r=.262, p=.079) and AQ both 
approached significance (p<0.1). There was no significant correlation between 
number of correct answers (r=.009, p=.951). Final EFT efficiency score was 
significantly correlated with the Imagination subscale of the AQ (r=.372, p=.011). 
There were no other significant correlations between EFT performance scores and 
AQ subscales. The independent t-test revealed no significant differences between 




5.5.3 Change Blindness and Embedded Figures Task 
EFT efficiency scores were significantly positively correlated with change detection 
response time to both non-social changes (r=.293, p=.048) and social changes 
(r=.425, p=.003) and with the number of errors/time-outs for the social change 
blindness condition (r=.293, p=.048). The mean response time for correct answers 
on the EFT was significantly positively correlated with the time it took to spot social 
changes (r=.339, p=.021) but not with the response time for detecting non-social 






















Figure 5.6  Plot of correlation between EFT efficiency score and Imagination AQ. 
.subscale. 
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condition. The mean change detection response time for non-social changes was 
significantly negatively correlated with the number of correct answers on the EFT 
(r=–.400, p=.006), meaning that being quicker to spot non-social changes was 
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Figure 5.7  Plots of statistically significant relationships between EFT and Change Blindness scores. 
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5.5.4 Anxiety Analyses 
AQ score was significantly correlated with Trait anxiety (r=.451, p=.002) but not 
with State anxiety score (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4). There was a statistically 
significant correlation between Trait anxiety and time taken to identify social 
changes (r=.308, p=.038), but with no other measures. State anxiety was not 
correlated with any of the EFT or change blindness results. When controlling for 
Trait anxiety, the relationship between AQ and reaction time to social changes was 
weaker but still statistically significant (rpartial=.316, p=.035). The correlation between 
EFT efficiency score and the response time to non-social changes became slightly 
weaker and approached significance (rpartial=.285, p=.058) and the relationship 
between EFT efficiency score and response time for social changes was minimally 
affected (rpartial=.424, p=.004). When controlling for State anxiety, however, the 
relationship between AQ and response time for social changes became much 
stronger and more significant (rpartial=.406, p=.006) and revealed a positive and 
significant correlation between AQ and EFT efficiency score (rpartial=.334, p=.025). 
The correlation between EFT efficiency score and response time for non-social 
changes approached significance when controlling for State anxiety (r=.290, p=.053) 
and remained similar for the social-change response times (rpartial=.448, p=.002). The 
relationship between response time to social and non-social changes was largely 
unaffected when controlling for Trait or State anxiety scores, as were the 
relationships between EFT efficiency score and the Imagination subscale of the AQ, 
and between social change response times and both the Social Skill and Imagination 





The results of this study revealed that overall, participants took significantly longer 
to identify non-social changes, supporting the evidence from other research that in 
the NT population, there is an attentional bias to social information, allowing 
changes in the facial expressions, body language or behaviour of other individuals to 
be detected more quickly (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2006; Hershler & Hochstein, 2005; 
Palermo & Rhodes, 2003; Ro, Friggel, & Lavie, 2007). In support of one of the 
hypotheses of this study, AQ score was found to be significantly related to greater 
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difficulty identifying social changes, suggesting that even in the neurotypical 
population, the presence of more autistic-like characteristics may confer a 
disadvantage when it comes to paying attention to social details. This is consistent 
with results from previous studies that have found a relationship between reduced 
attention to social information and the presence of autistic traits in the NT 
population (Swanson et al., 2013) and across the broad autism phenotype, for 
example finding reduced attention to eyes compared to controls in the siblings of 
children with ASD (Dalton et al., 2007). This suggests that a higher level of autistic 
traits is related to social information being less salient than for those with fewer 
autistic traits, which would be consistent with the Social Motivation Theory of 
autism (i.e. social stimuli are less motivating the more autistic traits a person has).  
 
The Extreme Male Brain theory of autism may suggest that the presence of autistic 
traits would result in attention being directed towards non-social stimuli instead, 
such as the vehicles and machinery present in the images in this change blindness 
task. It was hypothesised that higher AQ would be related to a faster performance 
when spotting the non-social changes, however, there was no significant correlation 
between AQ score and reaction time to the non-social changes, and while the results 
of the independent t-tests with the high and low AQ groups showed that those in 
the high AQ group took significantly longer to spot social changes than those in the 
low AQ group, there were no differences in time taken to detect changes to non-
social items. These results were similar in nature to the results of Kikuchi et al.’s 
change blindness study with ASD children (2009), in which those with ASD took 
significantly longer to spot changes to a face than did typically developing children, 
but there were no differences between groups on response times for non-social 
changes. The authors of this study suggest that these results are due to the fact that 
faces capture special attention in NT individuals, leading to a faster performance 
with social changes, whereas for those with ASD, neither faces nor the non-social 
stimuli capture attention over the other, leading to a homogenous performance 
across both conditions for the autistic participants.  
 
The results of the current study therefore suggest that this lack of attentional bias for 
social information extends to those with subclinical autistic traits in the neurotypical 
population but that non-social stimuli do not capture special attention either. 
However, results from Study One (Chapter 4) would suggest that the subjective 
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salience of non-social stimuli is related to autistic traits. The stimuli presented in that 
study consisted of single images on a white background, whereas for the change 
blindness study, images involved complex naturalistic scenes with many competing 
features, so it may be that in the NT population, even if non-social stimuli in 
isolation provoke a stronger physiological response among those with subclinical 
autistic traits, the ability to attend to social information at a certain level in high AQ 
neurotypical individuals mitigates the competing salience of non-social stimuli but 
still results in a slower reaction to social changes than those with a lower AQ. 
 
There was a significant relationship between the time taken to detect social changes 
and the social skill subscale of the AQ. This finding is unsurprising given the 
hypothesis that social details would capture the attention of those with a higher AQ 
less readily than those with a lower AQ. This finding would be consistent with the 
results of research that suggests that atypical orienting to social information leads to 
poorer aptitude for social understanding (Bhat, Galloway & Landa, 2010; Keehn, 
Müller & Townsend, 2013). Response times on the change detection task, for both 
social and non-social changes, were significantly correlated with the imagination 
subscale of the AQ and the score for this subscale was also significantly correlated 
with the EFT efficiency score, indicating that autistic-like imagination traits are 
associated with poorer performance on these measures of attention. It had been 
predicted that AQ would be negatively correlated with EFT efficiency score (i.e., the 
higher the AQ, the better the performance on the EFT) but the results of this study 
did not support this hypothesis, with the correlation between them approaching 
significance, but in the opposite direction to that predicted. There was also no 
difference between the high and low AQ groups on EFT performance. The 
correlation between EFT and the Imagination subscale of the AQ went in the 
opposite direction to what had been hypothesised, and these results seem to 
contradict the idea that subclinical autistic traits are related to enhanced local 
processing. Findings of enhanced performance on the EFT in ASD have been 
inconsistent (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith, 1983; Dillen et al., 2015; 
Manjaly et al., 2007; White & Saldaña, 2011) so it is not surprising that in this study, 
there was no significant positive correlation between EFT performance and overall 
AQ score. The fact that EFT score was related to one subscale of the AQ but not 
the others, and that anxiety impacted performance may suggest that certain 
symptoms, features or traits that are often, but not always, present in ASD are 
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responsible for the varying results of these assessments. As ASD is such a 
heterogeneous condition, it may be that the presence, absence, or severity of certain 
symptoms or common comorbid conditions may underlie performance on 
assessments of attention to detail and local processing, such as the EFT, Block 
Deisgn Task and Navon Task etc.  
 
The imagination subscale of the AQ reflects the fact that poor imagination is a core 
trait of ASD and forms part of the diagnostic criteria for the condition (American 
Psychological Association, 2013; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Imagining is the ability 
to form a mental representation of the world that is different from the world as it is 
actually perceived (Reuland, 2010) and several studies have found imagination 
lacking in those with ASD, with a focus in the literature particularly on socially-
related imagination and pretend play in children (Rutherford & Rogers, 2003; 
Jarrold, 2003). The imagination subscale questions for the AQ mainly relate to 
‘theory of mind’ and other socially-related types of imagination, such as imagining 
the intentions of others or following characters’ intentions in fictional stories, and 
the results of at least one study have suggested that imagination deficits in ASD are 
specific to social stimuli only (Eycke and Müller, 2015). The findings of the current 
study, that deficits in socially-related imagination in particular are related to poorer 
performance on measures of different attentional processes, both social (with regard 
to the social changes in the change blindness tasks) and non-social (with regard to 
non-social changes and the EFT), are curious. Exploring these relationships further, 
it seems that the common element is the response time for each task—poorer 
performance on the change blindness task is indicated by longer response times and, 
when controlling for the mean EFT response time for correct answers, the strength 
of the relationship between the final EFT efficiency score and the imagination 
subscale score reduces and its significance disappears (r=.209, p=.169). One possible 
explanation for this could be that, in the NT population, those with less self-
reported ability to imagine another’s perspective are less likely to pay attention to the 
experimenter’s instructions (e.g. find the shape/change as quickly as possible) or to 
understand that the experimenter is looking for speed as well as accuracy, and 
instead spend more time attempting to ensure they have chosen the correct answer, 
rather than seeking a trade-off between speed and accuracy.  
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A higher EFT efficiency score was indicative of a poorer performance, so the 
finding of a significant positive relationship between EFT score and change 
detection response times for both social and non-social changes indicated that the 
worse a participant performed on the EFT, the longer it took them to spot both 
social and non-social changes. The relationship between poorer EFT performance 
and time taken to spot social changes was stronger than that with the non-social 
change blindness condition, and EFT score was also correlated with the number of 
errors on the social change blindness condition but not for the non-social detection 
errors, suggesting that overall poor EFT performance was more related to social 
deficits in attention than to non-social deficits. This would suggest that enhanced 
local processing ability, the type that is often reported as being enhanced in ASD, on 
its own is not related to social deficits. As with the study by Hill et al. (2014), it may 
be that anxiety mediates the relationship between global/local processing style, social 
attention and social skill. i.e. that higher anxiety levels improve social skills in those 
with enhanced local processing but not in those with a global processing style. 
However, when controlling for State and Trait anxiety, the relationship between 
poor EFT performance and poor social change blindness performance remains the 
same or increases in strength. Controlling for Trait anxiety reduced the strength and 
significance of the relationship between EFT efficiency score and reaction time to 
the non-social changes, suggesting that the presence of anxiety may impede 
performance on both these measures of non-social attention.  It may be that in the 
NT population, the relationships between these measures are due to more general 
attentional capabilities, with anxiety having an influence on performance (as has 
been found by various other studies on the impacts of anxiety on different 
attentional processes, e.g., Caparos & Linnell, 2012; Fox, 1993; Bishop, 2009). 
 
The strong correlation between response time to social and non-social changes 
indicates that, at an attentional level, these two cognitive domains may not be wholly 
independent of one another, reflecting the finding in Study One that physiological 
response to social and non-social stimuli were correlated with one another. This 
relationship between social and non-social attention would appear to contradict the 
proposition by Happé, Ronald and Plomin (2006) that the different cognitive 
features of ASD may be unrelated to one another. However, it is possible that the 
relationship between time taken to spot social and non-social changes may not be 
due to exogenous orienting responses, but could be due to strategies for deploying 
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endogenous attention to detect changes if the site of change was not at the area of 
the scene that initially exogenously captured attention. If the change is not spotted 
immediately, different individuals may employ different visual search strategies for 
locating the change, resulting in an overall relationship between response time to 





Studies Three and Four: 




There are two general cognitive theories that attempt to explain the presence of 
intact or enhanced non-social reasoning abilities that occur alongside deficits in 
social understanding in ASD and those with a high number of autistic traits in the 
NT population. Hyper-Systemizing accounts, which include the Empathizing-
Systemizing theory, suggest that these abilities arise from a drive towards, and ability 
to, construct, understand and predict (i.e. reason about) rule-based systems (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2003; 2009). This is contrasted with Empathizing, which, simply put, 
involves a drive towards understanding people.  While a hyper-systemizing 
orientation has been found in certain professions in the NT population and in those 
with HFA (such as mathematicians, scientists, technologists etc. (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2009; Svedholm-Häkkinen & Lindeman, 2016)), a high drive towards, or preference 
for, systems and repeating patterns in stimuli does not necessarily confer ability in 
these areas.  
 
Hyper-systemizing accounts also explain the non-social biases in low functioning 
ASD, for example an obsession with calendars could be a case of numerical 
systemizing in someone with low functioning autism, where someone with high 
functioning autism may display the same drive through an ability to solve 
mathematical problems (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009). The Systemizing Quotient (SQ) 
is a self-report questionnaire commonly used to measure this drive to systemize, 
although it says little about systemizing ability (Baron-Cohen et al., 2002). Males tend 
to score higher on the SQ than females (Wakabayashi et al., 2007; Byrd-Craven et al., 
2015). The Dual Process Theory of autism, on the other hand, proposes that autistic 
people and people high in autistic-like traits bias towards deliberative processing, 
which is characterised as slow, serial, and more laborious conscious processing that 
is heavily dependent on working memory and correlated with general cognitive 
ability. This is contrasted with a bias away from intuitive, social-emotional 
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processing, which is characterised as rapid, autonomous, effortless, parallel, and 
unconscious, that is independent of working memory and cognitive ability (Brosnan, 
et al., 2016; 2017). Sex differences have been reported inconsistently in these 
capabilities. Baron-Cohen and Lombardo (2017) have recently called for further 
research into the components of systemizing in terms of systemizing drive or 
motivation and systemizing ability, conceptualised as a capacity for understanding 
rules-based systems or logical input-output operations. The objectives of the current 
study were therefore to investigate the relationship between self-reported 
systemizing drive (measured using the SQ short version), systemizing ability 
(measured using an objective assessment of logical ability—the Test of Logical 
Thinking (TOLT; Tobin & Capie, 1981)) and self-reported deliberative and intuitive 
thinking styles (measured using the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et 
al., 1996)) and drive, as well as investigating sex differences in self-reported 
systemizing, deliberation and intuition and logical thinking ability in a general NT 





6.2.1 Systemizing  
Systemizing has been posited as one of two cognitive mechanisms that are employed 
for understanding the world, empathizing being the other (Baron-Cohen, 2006; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2009; see also Chapter 2). Baron-Cohen (2006) suggests that 
those with ASD are hyper-systemizers, that is, they can only process, or have a 
strong bias towards understanding, highly predictable rule-governed information that 
is incompatible with a drive towards, or capacity for, empathizing. The Empathizing-
Systemizing (E–S) theory contrasts this bias towards systems-related cognition with 
a bias toward social-related cognition (i.e. empathizing or mentalizing), which is a 
drive towards understanding the affective states of others and an aptitude for 
responding appropriately to them (Baron-Cohen, 2003; 2009). A systemizing 
approach involves the interpretation of predictable and rule-based systems, where an 
empathizing approach involves the interpretation of intentions and social 
information. Distinguishing systemizing and empathizing as two distinct orientations 
used for understanding aspects of the world prompts the notion that there may be a 
specialised cognitive system for processing non-social information that is analogous 
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to the ‘social brain’ network that is used for understanding others and processing 
social information (Adolphs, 2009; Fields, 2011).  
 
Measures of these two cognitive dimensions include the Systemizing Quotient 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2003) and the Empathizing Quotient (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004), both of which are self-report questionnaires that provide an 
assessment of a person’s drive/bias towards each cognitive style, but do not in 
themselves indicate objective ability in either domain. There is significant evidence 
of sex differences in scores for both these measures, with females generally scoring 
higher on the EQ and males generally scoring higher on the SQ (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004; Baron-Cohen, 2002; 2003; 2009; Wakabayashi et al., 2007; 
Nettle, 2007; Wright & Skagerberg, 2012). Behavioural assessments of both 
empathizing and systemizing ability have also revealed sex differences, for example 
females typically perform better on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) 
than males (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plum, 2001) and males have 
been found to perform better than females on the Physical Prediction Questionnaire 
(Lawson, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) and a Mechanical Reasoning Test 
(Caroll & Chiew, 2004). There is, however, little research on whether a drive for 
systemizing type cognition as measured by the SQ is related to performance on 
measures of systems understanding. Caroll & Chiew investigated this relationship 
using the Mechanical Reasoning Test (Bennett, Seashore & Wesman, 1974), which 
presents multiple choice questions about the relative movements of various wheels 
and pulleys in a diagram, and they found no significant relationship between 
performance on this test and the SQ.  
 
Strengths in systemizing may compensate for empathizing deficits by allowing for 
the formation of certain IF, THEN rules for social understanding, such as ‘if mouth 
is upturned, then happy’ (Rutherford & McIntosh, 2007; Walsh, Vida & Rutherford, 
2014), and studies have shown that those with ASD (i.e. high in systemizing and low 
in empathizing drive) are unable to identify emotion from the expression of briefly 
presented faces compared to controls, when a reliance on such higher level cognitive 
skills is reduced (Clark, Winkielman & McIntosh, 2008). This suggests that in ASD, 
rules-based, higher level cognition is used for making social judgements, i.e. the 
social domain is navigated with a systemizing approach, whereas in the NT 
population, the social world is navigated by way of rapid emotional processing. 
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It has been suggested that there is a strong affective component to systemizing in 
ASD and in those with a high level of autistic traits in the NT population (Fields, 
2011; Overskeid, 2016 and see Chapter 2). The current thesis seeks to understand 
whether there is a ‘non-social brain’ analogous to the ‘social brain’ network in 
neurotypical people whereby systemizing occurs in the same rapid and intuitive way 
that empathizing occurs in the NT population, or whether systemizing represents an 
entirely different cognitive method of information processing. The current study 
therefore investigates components of systemizing by exploring the relationship 
between drive to systemize, or preference for systems-based cognition, with ability 
to reason about systems using a behavioural assessment—the Test of Logical 
Thinking (TOLT; Tobin & Capie, 1981)—a multiple choice test that requires 
problem solving as well as giving the reasoning behind the chosen answer. This 
allows for a comparison of correct answers with correct reasoning—correct answers 
with faulty reasoning may indicate that a more rapid and intuitive method of 
discerning the answer is being utilized rather than a slower more deliberative one; so, 
as well as providing the opportunity to investigate the relationship between 
systemizing drive and systemizing ability, the TOLT also allows the study of how 
answers to logical problems are arrived at.  
 
 
6.2.3  Dual Process Theories 
 
Brosnan et al. (2014) posit that the concepts of empathizing and systemizing parallel 
dual process accounts of cognition, which propose two different reasoning and 
decision-making styles or systems, defined as Type 1 and Type 2 (Stanovich & West, 
2000; Evans, 2008). Type 1 is characterized as a fast, low effort, automatic, intuitive 
and unconscious processing style that is independent of working memory and 
general intelligence, and has been linked to emotion and the rapid attribution of 
emotional/mental states and intention to others (Stanovich & West, 2000; Epstein, 
1994; Hassin et al., 2004). It is also argued that as Type 1 processes do not require 
controlled attention, they can be involuntarily triggered by certain stimuli but can 
also be mediated by higher level reasoning processes (Stanovich, 2009; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). Type 2 is characterized as a slow, effortful, conscious and 
controlled deliberative processing style that is dependent on general intelligence and 
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working memory and is linked to the representation of rules and underlying 
principles (Stanovich & West, 2000). Brosnan, et al. (2014) suggest that Type 1 type 
processing is related to empathizing, due to the rapid, autonomic and intuitive nature 
of emotion recognition that has been conjectured in the literature (Clark, 
Winkielman, & McIntosh, 2008; Kahneman & Egan, 2011; Tracy, et al., 2011; Oliva 
& Anikin, 2018). Type 2 type processing, they propose, is related to systemizing, 
which involves slower, more deliberative and higher-order cognitive processes. Their 
research on the relationships between self-reported systemizing and empathizing 
biases (using the Empathizing Quotient (EQ) and Systemizing Quotient (SQ)) and 
measures of intuitive and deliberative cognitive mechanisms (using the Rational 
Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) and the Cognitive Reflection 
Task (CRT; Frederick, 2005) found correlations between empathizing and 
intuition/Type 1 type processes  and systemizing and deliberation/Type 2 type 
processes (Brosnan, Hollinworth, Antoniadou & Lewton, 2014).  These findings 
were explored by Brosnan et al. (2016; 2017) in the autism spectrum to establish 
whether the cognitive profile of ASD could be understood in terms of dual process 
accounts of cognition, and discovered that people with ASD produced fewer 
intuitive responses on the CRT and that a higher number of autistic traits in a 
pooled sample of NT and ASD participants was related to more deliberative 
responses and fewer intuitive responses.  
 
While the CRT (Frederick, 2005) is a commonly used measure for assessing intuitive 
and reflective reasoning, it does so by asking questions for which there is an 
intuitive, but wrong, answer. For example, one of the three questions asks: “A bat 
and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the 
ball cost?” Many people respond intuitively and impulsively with the incorrect 
answer ’10 cents,’ when contemplating the problem a little more reveals that if you 
take $0.10 from $1.00, you are left with 90 cents, not $1.00. Therefore, the ball must 
cost $0.05 and the bat $1.05. However, many people will answer ‘intuitively’ and 
incorrectly, and studies have shown that those providing the incorrect and intuitive 
answer are generally more impatient and impulsive (Frederick, 2005; Nagin & 
Pogarsky, 2003). This test has therefore been used as a way of determining whether a 
person reflects on a question before answering or whether they prefer taking an 
intuitive approach to reasoning, and Brosnan et al. (2016; 2017) used this to establish 
whether those with ASD adopt a more deliberative cognitive style. The problem 
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with this is that if systemizing ability in ASD is not due to a bias towards Type 2, 
deliberative type thinking, but is due to having Type 1 type responses to systems 
(where in the NT population Type 1 type responses are more related to contextual 
and social information) then perhaps an intuitive response to the above question for 
them may in fact be the correct one, if ability to make accurate inferences about 
logical problems in hyper-systemizers is analogous to the ability to understand facial 
expressions in empathizers.  
 
6.2.4 Sex Differences 
Sex differences have been found in self-report measures of empathizing and 
systemizing drive and in behavioural assessments of empathizing and systemizing 
ability, as well as in Type 1 and Type 2 types of cognition. As mentioned above, 
there is much evidence of sex differences in scores on both the EQ and the SQ, with 
males typically reporting higher systemizing drive and females typically reporting 
higher drive to empathize (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Baron-Cohen, 2002; 
2003; 2009; Wakabayashi et al., 2007; Nettle, 2007; Wright & Skagerberg, 2012). 
More objective behavioural assessments of aptitude for empathizing and systemizing 
also reveal sex differences, with females usually performing better on the Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1997; Wheelwright, Hill, 
Raste & Plum, 2001), girls developing faster empathy skills than boys as measured by 
the faux pas test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) and males outperforming females on the 
Physical Prediction Questionnaire and the Mechanical Reasoning Test (Lawson, 
Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Caroll & Chiew, 2004) as well as on measures 
of attention to detail such as the Embedded Figures Test (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1997). 
 
In terms of dual process theory, earlier research showed that women used empathic 
reasoning more than men when asked to resolve prosocial dilemmas (Mills & 
Grusec, 1989) and that males outperform females on tasks involving mathematical 
reasoning ability (Benbow & Stanley, 1983). Some studies have found that females 
report to prefer an experiential/intuitive and males a rational/deliberative reasoning 
style, as assessed by the REI (Sladek, Bond & Phillips, 2010; Epstein, 2003) while 
others have not found such sex differences (Epstein et al., 1996). However, 
assessments of performance on tasks measuring intuitive and deliberative styles, 
such as the CRT, have found that females tend to adopt an intuitive type process 
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where males are more likely to adopt the deliberative approach (Frederick, 2005; 
Brosnan et al., 2014).  
 
6.2.5 Hypotheses 
The current study sought to understand some of the cognitive mechanisms that may 
underlie systemizing by assessing: Type 1 and Type 2 biases and abilities using the 
REI to measure preferences for rational, “need for cognition” systems or 
experiential, “faith in intuition” systems (Pacini & Epstein, 1999); systemizing ability 
using the TOLT to measure logical ability and understanding; self-report measures 
of systemizing drive, the relationships between all these variables, any sex differences 
between them, and any differences between self-reported ASD and NT groups.  
 
Neurotypical Sample 
It was hypothesised that SQ (drive to systemize) would be correlated with TOLT 
correct solutions (ability to systemize). If hyper-systemizing involves an intuitive type 
process for systems cognition then it would be expected that SQ would not be 
correlated with TOLT correct reasoning score. It was further hypothesised that SQ 
scores would be correlated with self-reported “need for cognition” (NFC), as drive 
to systemize and NFC are similar concepts. It was predicted that TOLT correct 
solution scores would be positively correlated with the “need for cognition” 
subscales of the REI and it was thought that reasoning score on the TOLT may be 
negatively correlated with the “faith in intuition” (FI) subscale of the REI, indicating 
that answers on the TOLT would be intuited/impulsively guessed rather than 
reasoned through. Sex differences were expected, with males predicted to score 
higher than females on the SQ and the “need for cognition” subscales of the REI, 
and that females would score higher than males on the “faith in intuition” subscale. 
In line with E–S theory, it was anticipated that males would score higher than 
females on the TOLT, reflecting greater systemizing ability.  
 
ASD vs Neurotypical Controls Sample 
It was hypothesised that, as with the NT sample, high systemizing drive would be 
related to performance on the TOLT in terms of correct answers, but not with 
TOLT reasoning score; that SQ would be correlated with the NFC subscale of the 
REI; that TOLT solution scores would be correlated with the NFC subscales and 
that the TOLT reasoning score would be negatively correlated with the FI subscale 
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of the REI. Again, sex differences were expected as with the NT sample above. It 
was also predicted that the ASD group would score higher than the NT group on 







A similar previous study examining self-report assessments of empathizing, 
systemizing and the rational-experiential inventory (Brosnan et al., 2013) used a 
sample size of 68, so a sample size equivalent to, or larger than this was planned for 
this study. The sample for this study was recruited from the University of Bath 
population by way of an online questionnaire, with 119 participants in total (60 male, 
59 female) and with a range of ages from 18 to 66, and a mean age of 22 (SD=6). 
Participants were recruited by way of an online questionnaire, which was advertised 
on the University online noticeboard and emailed to students and staff.  
 
 
ASD vs Neurotypical Controls Sample 
As described in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1, data were collected from an additional 
sample that included an ASD group and a control group. As the survey was 
distributed online, ASD diagnoses could not be confirmed for all participants 
reporting an ASD. The questionnaire was again advertised online on the University 
of Bath noticeboard and was emailed to participants who had taken part in Study 1 
and had agreed to be contacted about any future studies. There was no payment or 
reward for participation. The total sample consisted of 64 participants, with an age 
range from 18-54, 30 reporting ASD and 34 NT controls. The ASD group consisted 
of 6 females and 24 males, with a mean age of 22.33 (SD=3.14) and the NT group 
was comprised of 21 males and 13 females, with a mean age of 22.45 (SD=8.52). 




6.3.2 Systemizing Quotient 
The Systemizing Quotient was developed as the first self-report measure of 
systemizing drive (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003). The original SQ has 60 items (40 
systemizing-related and 20 control items), but a shorter version (the SQ–Short) was 
developed and validated by Wakabayashi et al. (2006) with 25 items—this is the 
version used for this study in order to maximize completion rates, as the online 
survey already contained several other questions and measures. As with the original 
version, the SQ–Short consists of statements to which the participant must either 
agree or disagree on a 4-point scale (i.e., Strongly Agree, Slightly Agree, Slightly 
Disagree, Strongly Disagree). Approximately half of the statements are worded so 
that an ‘agree’ answer indicates higher systemizing drive (e.g., “I am fascinated by 
how machines work”) with responses of ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Slightly Agree’ 
receiving 2 and 1 points, respectively, and disagree responses receiving 0 points; and 
half are worded so that a disagree answer indicates higher systemizing drive (e.g., “I 
find it difficult to read and understand maps”) with ‘Strongly Disagree’ receiving 2 
points, ‘Slightly Disagree’ 1 point, and agree responses 0 points. There is therefore a 
maximum possible score of 50 and a minimum possible score of 0. In this study, the 
SQ-Short was found to have a high level of internal consistency with a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .81. Hereafter the SQ–Short will be referred to as SQ. 
 
6.3.3 Rational Experiential Inventory 
The REI (Epstein, Pacini & Heier, 1996) was developed to measure biases towards 
rational “need for cognition” (NFC) or experiential “faith in intuition” (FI) systems. 
It has been used in a wide variety of fields in psychology, including personality, 
depression and anxiety, intelligence, creativity and health psychology research. The 
reliability of the REI has been consistently reported, along with the validation of the 
distinct constructs of need for cognition and faith in intuition (Handley, Newstead & 
Wright, 2000; Epstein, 2003; Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright & Farrelly, 2004). 
The REI is made up of 4 subscales, each of which measures either an individual’s 
engagement with or ability for rational or experiential styles of thinking. Each 
subscale consists of 10 questions/statements to which the participant must respond 
on a 5-point scale from Completely True to Completely False. There are 40 
statements in total, and mean scores, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 5, are 
calculated for each subscale (Rational–Ability, Rational–Engagement, Intuition–
Ability and Intuition–Engagement), with a higher score indicating a stronger 
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preference for that thinking style. In the present study, the REI had good internal 
reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha for the NFC subscale of .785 and for the FI 
subscale it was .804. 
 
Examples of statements for each subscale include:  
Rational/NFC–Ability: “I generally have no problems in thinking things through 
clearly.” 
Rational/NFC–Engagement: “I prefer complex to simple problems.” 
Intuition/FI–Ability: “I trust my initial feelings about people.” 
Intuition/FI–Engagement: “I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.”  
 
6.3.4 Test of Logical Thinking 
There are several behavioural assessments that can be used to evaluate facets of 
systemizing ability (as opposed to systemizing drive or a preference for thinking 
about systems). For example, the Physical Prediction Questionnaire (Lawson, Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright) or the Mechanical Reasoning Test (Bennett, Seashore & 
Wesman, 1974), both of which ask the participant to predict movements or 
outcomes on the basis of a diagram of some mechanical operation. Neither of these 
tests, however, measure reasoning style—participants simply answer either correctly 
or incorrectly and the method by which they arrive at their answer is unknown. 
While this can provide an idea of how higher and lower systemizers perform when 
asked to understand and predict systems, for the purposes of the current study, a test 
was sought that not only assessed ability (i.e. correct answers) but also provided an 
idea of whether logical reasoning was being employed in arriving at the answer. 
There are two tests that ask participants to provide justification for the answer given 
on a non-socially related aptitude assessment, one of which is the Test of Formal 
Reasoning (TOFR; Lawson, 1978) and the other the Test of Logical Thinking 
(TOLT; Tobin & Capie, 1981). A study that compared these two tests found that the 
TOLT had greater reliability and stability over time than the TOFR (Ahlawat & 
Billeh). The TOLT was therefore chosen for this study to evaluate systemizing 
ability and logical reasoning ability. 
The TOLT was originally developed to measure formal reasoning ability (Tobin & 
Capie, 1981) and subsequent studies have confirmed its reliability (Ahlawat & Billeh, 
1987; Jiang, Xu, Garcia & Lewis, 2010). The purpose of the test is to ask participants 
to solve problems and to then justify their answers, in order to assess whether 
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formal reasoning is being used for problem-solving, rather than some other process. 
The test consists of 10 questions with multiple choice answers/solutions, each with 
a sub question asking how the respondent arrived at their answer, offering them a 
choice of 5 possible statements of reasoning, only one of which is correct. For the 
purposes of the current study, scores on the TOLT were divided into a solution and 
a reasoning category, in order to compare accuracy at logical problem solving with 




All measures were converted to an online survey format using the Limesurvey 
platform (Limesurvey GmbH). 
 
6.3.5 Statistical Analysis 
All data were exported from the Limesurvey platform into IBM SPSS version 24 for 
analysis. Data for all variables (SQ, TOLT Solution, TOLT Reasoning, Rational–
Ability, Rational–Engagement, Intuition–Ability and Intuition–Engagement scores) 
were normally distributed for both the NT sample and ASD/Control sample, as 
assessed by inspection of Normal Q-Q Plots. Bivariate Pearson correlations were 
Figure 6.1  Example of one of the questions on the Test of Logical Thinking. 
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performed to investigate possible relationships between the variables along with 
partial correlations controlling for sex. Scores for each variable were normally 
distributed for each level of the categorical sex variable (in both the NT only study 
and the ASD/NT groups study) and for each level of the ASD/NT variable, as 
assessed by inspection of Normal Q-Q Plots, however there were several outliers for 
one or both sexes for the majority of variables in the NT only sample, so a Mann-
Whitney U test was chosen to investigate sex differences in the scores for each 
measure. Independent t-tests were used to investigate differences between the sexes 





As hypothesised, scores on the SQ–Short were significantly positively correlated 
with TOLT Solution scores (r=.444, p=.000) but not with TOLT Reasoning scores 
(r=.162, p=.078), although this relationship approached statistical significance. SQ 
scores were significantly positively correlated with both the Rational–Ability (r=.245, 
p=.007) and Rational–Engagement (r=.351, p=.000) scores, but not with the 
Intuition–Ability or Intuition–Engagement, subscales of the REI. There was a 
significant relationship between TOLT Solution scores and both Rational–Ability 
(r=.187, p=.042) and Rational–Engagement (r=.244, p=.008) scores but not with the 
two Intuition subscales of the REI. TOLT Solution and TOLT Reasoning scores 
were significantly correlated with one another (r=.545, p<.001). 
 
Due to running multiple independent t-tests across the same groups, a Bonferroni 
adjustment was applied, giving an alpha of 0.007. There was one significant sex 
difference for the SQ scores. A visual inspection revealed that distribution of SQ 
scores for males and females were similar, and males (Mdn=23) scored significantly 
higher than females (Mdn=15), U=2621, z=4.53, p=.000. For the Rational–
Engagement measure, there was a similar distribution of scores for males and 
females, and males (Mdn=3.6) scored higher than females but this was not 
statistically significant (Mdn=3.4), U=2189.5, z=2.23, p=.026. Males also scored 
higher (Mdn=3.75) than females (Mdn=3.5) on the Rational–Ability self-report 
measure but this difference was also not statistically significant (U=2123, z=1.88, 
p=.06). There were no sex differences for the “faith in intuition” components of the 
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REI or for the TOLT Reasoning or TOLT Solution measures. These results are 
presented in Table 6.4. 
 
When controlling for sex, the significant relationships between SQ and Rational–
Ability and Rational–Engagement were still positive and statistically significant 
(rpartial=.22, p=.016 and rpartial=.317, p=.000), as was the correlation between SQ and 
TOLT Solution score (rpartial=.423, p=.000). After adjusting for sex, the relationship 
between TOLT Solution and Rational–Engagement scores remained positive and 
statistically significant (rpartial=.225, p=.014) and the correlation between TOLT 
Solution and Rational–Ability scores became less statistically significant, but still 
























































r .245* .351** –.042 .003 .444** .162 
p .007 <.001 .652 .972 <.001 .078 
Table 6.1  Correlations between SQ scores and REI and TOLT subscale scores for the NT sample. 
Table 6.2  Correlations between TOLT scores and REI subscale scores for the NT sample. 



































n=119  *p<0.05  **p<0.01 
 
 Male n=60 Female n=59 p value 
SQ 22.58  ± 9.52 15.34  ± 6.87 <.001 
Rational Ability 3.62  ± 0.70 3.48  ± 0.58 .06 
Rational 
Engagement 
3.52  ± 0.81 3.29  ± 0.61 .026 
Intuition Ability 3.07  ± 0.68 3.11  ± 0.52 .802 
Intuition 
Engagement 
3.06  ± 0.74 3.01 ± 0.59 .693 
TOLT Solution 8.48  ± 3.25 7.51  ± 3.20 .089 
TOLT Reasoning 5.63  ± 2.30 5.36  ± 2.40 .552 
 
 
ASD vs Neurotypical Controls Sample 
As with the NT only sample, across the whole sample, SQ was positively correlated 
with TOLT solution score (r=.386, p=.002) but not with TOLT reasoning score 
(r=.115, p=.364). SQ was positively correlated with the Rational-Engagement 
subscale of the REI (r=.285, p=.022) but, unlike in the NT only sample, systemizing 
drive was not correlated with the Rational–Ability subscale (r=.174, p=.169). SQ was 
again not correlated with either component of the FI subscale of the REI. Neither 
TOLT solution score nor TOLT reasoning score for this sample were correlated 
Table 6.4 Mean scores on all measures by sex for the NT sample (mean ± SD) 
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with either of the NFC subscales of the REI, unlike in the NT sample. Both TOLT 
subscales were also not correlated with the components of the FI subscale of the 
REI. Pearson’s partial correlations were run controlling for sex, and found that the 
correlations between SQ and TOLT score still held (rpartial=.379, p=.002) as did the 
correlation with the Rational–Engagement subscale (rpartial=.269, p=.033). As with 
the NT sample, all scores for the subscales of the REI were positively correlated 





































n=64 *p<0.05  **p<0.01 
 
Independent t-tests revealed sex differences in SQ, with males scoring higher 
(M=24.95, SD=9.28) than females (M=20.1, SD=7.56), t(62)=–2.011, p=.049) but 
no differences between males and females on scores for any of the other measures 
(see Table 6.5 for means of all measures by sex). As the sample sizes for males and 
females were uneven, a Mann Whitney U test was also performed to investigate 
these differences because it is robust with unequal sample sizes (Mann & Whitney, 
1947) and the results were the same, with only sex differences apparent for SQ 
scores (U=570.5, z=2.104, p=.035). 
 
 Male n=45 Female n=19 p value 
Table 6.6 Mean scores on all measures by sex for the ASD/NT sample (mean ± SD) 
 

















Independent t-tests revealed that, as expected, the ASD group (M=30.67, SD=6.16) 
scored significantly higher on the SQ than the NT group (M=17.21, SD=5.89) 
(t(62)=8.928, p<.001). The ASD group (M=3.83, SD=.91) also scored significantly 
higher than the NT group (M=3.31, SD=0.64) on the Rational–Engagement 
subscale of the REI (t(62)=2.69, p=.009) but not on the Rational–Ability subscale. 
The ASD group (M=9.97, SD=3.62) also scored significantly higher than the NT 
group (M=7.76, SD=2.99) when it came to providing the correct solutions on the 
TOLT (t(62)=2.664, p=.01) but there were no significant group differences in the 
TOLT reasoning score (t(62)=.440, p=.661). The difference between TOLT 
solution score and TOLT reasoning score was calculated (TOLT Solution – TOLT 
Reasoning), and an independent t-test was run to investigate whether there were 
differences between groups on their logical reasoning in relation to their ability to 
SQ 24.95  ± 9.28 20.1  ± 7.56 .049 
Rational Ability 3.68  ± 0.73 3.65  ± 0.68 .887 
Rational 
Engagement 
3.61  ± 0.85 3.42  ± 0.73 .398 
Intuition Ability 3.06  ± 0.75 3.10  ± 0.72 .842 
Intuition 
Engagement 
3.10  ± 0.80 3.03 ± 0.74 .725 
TOLT Solution 8.98  ± 3.24 8.34  ± 3.20 .524 
TOLT Reasoning 5.73  ± 2.37 5.58  ± 2.78 .822 
 117 
give a correct answer. It was found that the ASD group were significantly better at 
giving a correct answer without knowing the correct reasoning for reaching that 
answer, the mean difference between TOLT scores for the ASD group being almost 
twice that of the NT group (ASD mean=4.13, SD=4; NT mean=2.21, SD=2; 
t(62)=2.496, p=.015). There were no significant differences between ASD and NT 
groups on any of the other measures. 
 
The TOLT difference score (TOLT Correct Solutions – TOLT Correct Reasoning 
score) was also found to be significantly positively correlated with SQ in the 
ASD/NT sample (r=.327, p=.008) and in the NT only sample (r=.382, p<.001), 
indicating that the higher the systemizing drive, the more correct answers were given 
on the TOLT along with an incorrect logical justification for those answers.  In the 
NT only sample, the TOLT difference score was also significantly correlated with 
the Rational–Ability (r=.246, p=.007) and Rational–Engagement (r=.258, p=.005) 




Both studies found that self-reported systemizing drive was moderately and 
significantly correlated with correct responses on the test of logical thinking but it 
relationship with the ability to justify those responses using appropriate logical 
reasoning was much weaker and only approached statistical significance. In the 
ASD/NT study, those reporting an ASD diagnosis exhibited significantly greater 
performance on the TOLT in terms of getting the answer correct. However, this 
difference did not extend to the ability to justify their answers with the correct 
reasoning, and the ASD group were significantly more likely to get the correct 
answer along with the incorrect reasoning than were the NT group. This suggests 
that a drive to systemize may confer ability to solve logical problems, but does not 
necessarily confer a greater ability to consciously understand the logical reasoning 
that leads to the correct answer. This would seem to contradict the idea that hyper-
systemizers prefer a slow, rational and deliberative method for solving problems, or 
at least that their self-reported preference for such a style actually translates into 
employing this reasoning approach to arrive at correct solutions to logical problems. 
It may be the case that high functioning hyper-systemizers use a Type 1 method for 
solving problems that are generally thought to require System2 type processes. Take 
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the phenomenon of subitization, for example. There is evidence that two processes 
are involved when determining a number of given elements—Type 1 type processes 
for determining small numbers of items (i.e. below four)—called subitizing—and 
Type 2 type processes for determining larger numbers of items—enumeration or 
counting (Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994; Wender & Rothkegel, 2000) There is evidence 
that in cases of savantism in ASD, certain tasks, such as factorization or counting 
very large numbers of items that usually require top-down higher level and more 
time-consuming conscious processes, seem to happen quickly and intuitively 
(Soulières et al., 2010; Sacks, 1985; Treffert, 2009). This suggests that it is at least 
possible for certain individuals to make calculations using cognitive approaches that 
are more akin to the Type 1, intuitive, rapid and unconscious style of problem 
solving, that for others require a more deliberative effort (e.g. counting or 
development and use of an algorithm).  
 
If hyper–systemizers are able to accurately solve logical reasoning problems without 
understanding the reasoning procedure to arrive at the solution, i.e., if these 
problems are solved by some form of system/rules-related intuition, then it might be 
expected that those scoring higher on the SQ would also report higher intuition 
engagement and ability on the REI. However, in these studies, this was not found to 
be the case. SQ was significantly correlated with both subscales of the “need for 
cognition” construct of the REI in the NT sample, and with only the Rational-
Engagement subscale in the ASD/NT sample but in both studies, there was no 
significant relationship between SQ and the “faith in intuition” subscales. This 
would suggest that those high in systemizing drive consider themselves to be Type 2 
type thinkers, while the results for the TOLT Reasoning score seem to contradict 
that. It is possible, however, that the nature of the questions for the intuition 
subscale of the REI mean that it does not measure all types of intuition, especially in 
those with ASD, as the wording often relates to feelings, hunches, gut feelings and 
so on. Alexithymia is a condition whereby an individual finds it difficult to identify 
and describe their own feelings and emotions, and is thought to be highly comorbid 
with ASD, with estimates that the syndrome may co-occur in 40-50% of cases of 
ASD (Berthoz & Hill, 2005). So, the REI may not be a good way of assessing 
intuition about non-social rules-based systems especially in people with alexithymia 
and/or ASD, which may account for low self-reported intuition ability and 
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engagement in those who otherwise seem to exhibit a proficiency for intuitively 
solving logical problems without utilizing deliberative reasoning processes.  
 
 The results of these studies may suggest that findings by Brosnan et al. (2016) that 
people with ASD provided more accurate than intuitive/inaccurate responses on the 
CRT do not necessarily reflect a deliberative reasoning approach, but may instead 
reflect that people with ASD are more likely than controls to intuit the correct 
answer, rather than that they are using a specific slow, deliberative reasoning process 
to arrive at the correct answer. The results of the current study would suggest that if 
participants were asked how they arrived at their answer on the CRT, those with 
ASD would not be able to provide solid reasoning for their correct answers. Because 
these measures, such as the REI and the CRT, are developed with NT samples it 
may be that they are not appropriate for assessing deliberation and intuition in 
people with ASD or other clinical populations, if intuition works differently in some 
groups. However, the findings of these studies are not incompatible with a Dual 
Process account of autism—they simply suggest that instead of ASD involving a bias 
towards Type 2 type cognition with a lower reliance on Type 1 type thinking, it may 
be the case that Type 1 type cognition in ASD involves a bias towards systems, 
abstract relationships and rules-based, predictable mechanisms, where Type 2 type 
cognition is applied to social and emotional phenomena, and vice versa in the NT 
population. 
 
It is interesting to note that in the ASD/NT study, the SQ was only correlated with 
the Rational–Engagement subscale, and that the ASD group scored significantly 
higher on this subscale than the NT group, but with no such correlation or group 
differences for the Rational–Ability subscale. This perhaps suggests that while 
feeling a drive to systemize or a need to engage in what are considered ‘rational’ 
processes might be high in ASD, it does not translate into self-reported ability in 
these areas. Yet, there does appear to be some relationship between these two 
measures in the NT sample and logic and rules-based ability as assessed by the 
TOLT, and with systemizing drive in the ASD/NT sample. The sex differences 
found in the NT sample in self-reported systemizing drive, Rational–Engagement 
and Rational–Ability, and in systemizing drive in the ASD/NT sample, but not in 
scores assessing systemizing and logical reasoning ability suggest that these self-
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report measures do not accurately reflect ability, and that self-assessments of such 






Study Five: Physiological Responses to Social and Non-





The non-social biases and behaviours in ASD may be related to the employment of 
different mechanisms for processing and orienting towards non-social stimuli as 
compared with social stimuli. Study One, presented in Chapter 4, used skin 
conductance response to measure arousal to both social and non-social stimuli in an 
NT sample, and found that a higher number of subclinical autistic traits was related 
to a more pronounced physiological response to non-social stimuli, but not to non-
social of interest or social stimuli. Findings included a correlation between SCRs to 
social and non-social stimuli, suggesting that, physiologically, these two domains may 
be related to one another in the NT population. Based on these findings, the study 
presented in the current chapter explored these relationships in an ASD sample and 
a group of matched controls, finding that those with ASD had a significantly larger 
physiological response to the images of non-social items that were related to their 
personal interests, than controls. Across the whole sample, social skill and 
imagination related autistic traits were both significantly correlated with arousal to 
the non-social of interest condition, suggesting that stronger orienting towards 
special interests is related to poor social skills and imaginative ability. The influence 
of anxiety on these relationships was also investigated, finding again that autistic 
traits were statistically significantly related to Trait anxiety, as well as to State anxiety, 
but there were no significant differences between ASD and NT groups on anxiety 
scores. It was found that when controlling for State anxiety, the correlation between 
autistic traits and the non-social of interest condition became stronger and more 
statistically significant, while controlling for Trait anxiety had the opposite result. 
These findings suggest a difference in the way people with ASD respond to non-
social stimuli that comprise their own special interests and that anxiety may play a 
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role in these responses. Again, significant correlations were found between 
autonomic responses to the social and non-social conditions, suggesting that these 




Study One, detailed in Chapter 4, found a significant relationship between autistic 
traits and physiological response to non-social stimuli, as well as a significant 
correlation between trait anxiety and autonomic arousal to non-social stimuli of 
particular interest to the individual participant in an NT sample. Because ASD is 
proposed to lie at the extreme end of a continuum, with many in the NT population 
possessing subclinical autistic traits to differing degrees, it made sense to explore 
whether these findings would be replicated in an ASD sample, or whether any 
difference would be found in physiological response to various categories of social 
and non-social stimuli between those with ASD and NT controls. See Chapter 4, 
Section 4.2 for information on the rationale for using physiological response as a 
measure of stimuli salience. 
 
7.2.1 Physiological Response and Social Stimuli 
Physiological response, including the measurement of electrodermal activity and 
other measures of autonomic arousal such as heart rate, has been utilised as a 
measure to investigate aspects of cognition in ASD, and primarily relating to social 
attention and perception. There are a large number of findings from this kind of 
research, and, as is often the case when studying such a heterogeneous condition, 
results are often conflicting. Physiological arousal has been employed in finding, for 
example, that children with ASD are hyporesponsive to threatening stimuli but 
respond typically to the distress of others (Blair, 1999); that autistic children do not 
habituate to repeatedly presented simple auditory and visual stimuli (James & Barry, 
1984); that direct eye gaze elicits a stronger physiological response than averted gaze 
in children with ASD, when this difference was not found in controls (Kylliäinen & 
Hietanen, 2006); that despite looking at the eye region (as measured by eye tracking), 
a physiological orienting response is not elicited by direct gaze in children with ASD 
(Helminen et al., 2017) and, in contrast, that children with ASD exhibit larger skin 
conductance responses than controls to faces with both direct and averted gaze, 
which is related to impairments in face recognition (Joseph et al., 2008); and that 
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hypoarousal to faces in children with ASD is related to delayed language onset 
(Stagg, Davis & Heaton, 2013). 
 
Such studies have also been performed on adults, for example, finding that 
emotional faces elicit lower skin conductance responses in adults with ASD than in 
matched NT controls, but that this lower orienting response does not hamper 
performance on emotional expression judgement tasks (Hubert et al., 2009). This 
suggests that SCR could be a way to measure individual differences in the kinds of 
processing elicited by different categories of stimuli. Adults with ASD have also 
been found to display attenuated physiological responses to threatening and stressful 
stimuli, compared with controls (Goodwin et al., 2006; Gaigg & Bowler, 2007). 
 
7.2.2 Responses to Restricted Interests 
The majority of research on autonomic responses in autism has focused on social 
attention, perception and stimuli, but there has historically been less research into 
physiological responses to non-social stimuli in ASD, despite the presence of the 
non-socially related aspects of the condition—such as repetitive behaviours and 
restricted interests—being essential for diagnosis. More recently, however, there has 
been an increase in research into mechanisms underlying the RRBs seen in ASD and 
there is evidence that there is a physiological and affective component underlying 
these interests and behaviours. The social motivation theory suggests that non-social 
circumscribed interests engage the reward system in people with ASD more than 
social stimuli (Chevallier et al., 2012). Much of the recent research in this area has 
involved EEG and fMRI studies to investigate neural responses to non-social and 
circumscribed interest-related stimuli.  
 
Grelotti et al. (2005), in an fMRI study on a child with ASD, found activation of 
both the fusiform face area (FFA) and the amygdala—areas usually active in 
response to social stimuli (Schultz et al., 2003)— when he was shown images of his 
particular special interest, but no activation of these areas when viewing images of 
faces. An fMRI study by Dichter et al. (2012) found that participants with ASD 
showed intact ventral striatal responses to non-social objects typically associated 
with autistic special interests yet diminished response to monetary rewards, 
suggesting that the reward system in the brain in ASD is functional, but for non-
social restricted interest related objects, and functions abnormally compared to 
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controls in relation to the anticipation of what is typically considered a rewarding 
stimulus (i.e. the acquisition of money). Both these studies suggest that networks in 
the brain thought to be dysfunctional in ASD may actually function properly, but 
only in relation to non-social stimuli of interest.  
 
A similar study by Cascio et al. (2014) examined affective neural responses to the 
objects of restricted interest—personalizing the stimuli for each participant to reflect 
their own special interest—in a group with ASD and a group of matched controls. 
They found increased response in the insula and anterior cingulate cortex in the 
ASD group —areas of the brain known to be responsive to the salience of a 
stimulus (Seeley et al., 2007)—when viewing objects related to their special interest. 
They conclude that affective neural networks are involved in the development of 
RRBs in ASD. Another fMRI study involved showing participants with ASD and 
NT controls images related to their own personal restricted interest or hobby, and 
found a response in the fusiform face area to these stimuli in both groups, but that 
this response was stronger in the ASD group (Foss-Feig et al. 2016). An EEG study 
by Benning et al. (2016) found that children and adolescents with ASD exhibited 
larger late positive potential (LPP) amplitudes to non-social objects that are often the 
focus of circumscribed interests in autism than to social stimuli, compared with NT 
controls. A further EEG study by Rivard et al. (2018) also used stimuli relating to 
the individual interests of each participant and found no differences in LPP 
responses between those with ASD and controls, although they did not compare 
responses to circumscribed interests/non-social stimuli with responses to social 
stimuli. These studies have all found evidence for an affective neural component to 
the fixation on restricted interests in ASD, and while Benning et al. found group 
differences in LPP using typically autistic interest images, the use of personalized 
stimuli measures participant responses to restricted interests more accurately, as the 
types of interests can vary widely across individuals.  
 
7.2.3 Anxiety, Emotion and Restricted Interests and Repetitive Behaviours 
As discussed earlier (see Chapter 2 Section 2.3.3), anxiety is one of the most 
common comorbid conditions in ASD, with an occurrence rate as high as 84% in 
people with autism (White et al., 2009; Vasa et al., 2013). Anxiety symptoms have 
been found to be more strongly correlated with the non-social restricted interests 
and repetitive behaviours (RRBs) in ASD than the socially-related symptoms 
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(Guttmann-Steinmetz et al., 2010). This relationship may be bidirectional, with 
evidence suggesting that the presence of anxiety increases RRBs as they are used as a 
type of coping mechanism (Mazefsky et al., 2013; Baron-Cohen, 1989) and 
suggestions that underlying features of RRBs, such as insistence on 
sameness/resistance to change, may increase anxiety levels due to difficulties 
adjusting to novel stimuli and inevitable changes in the environment (Muris & 
Ollendick, 2005). There is also evidence that being prevented from engaging in 
RRBs causes anxiety symptoms in those with a higher level of subclinical autistic 
traits (Liew et al., 2015).  
 
Overskeid (2016) suggests that the drive to systemize is motivated by both positive 
and negative affect, proposing that those with ASD experience emotion more 
intensely than neurotypical individuals and that the enhanced drive to systemize in 
ASD is a reflection of more intense versions of the desire for the status quo and 
dislike of uncertainty that are seen in typically developing subjects (Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988; Anselme, 2010). The theory is that stronger than usual emotional 
responses in ASD lead to RRBs due to both the enhanced positive affect elicited 
when engaging in subjects of interest or behaviours that represent orderliness, 
control and predictability, and due to negative affect, whereby the experience of 
strong anxiety prompts self-soothing measures that include indulging in RRBs that 
increase positive affect in an attempt to achieve emotional equilibrium (Overskeid, 
2016). This would suggest that systemizing drive and behaviours are related to 
general hyper-emotionality in ASD and if this hypothesis is correct, then those with 
ASD should exhibit stronger emotional/physiological responses to both social and 
non-social stimuli than NT controls, regardless of positive or negative affect. 
Measuring anxiety in conjunction with taking measures of physiological responses to 
stimuli related to special interests in ASD should provide the opportunity to 
investigate whether a) there is a heightened response to non-social stimuli of interest 
compared to controls in ASD subjects and b) whether responses to objects of 
interest are related to anxiety levels. 
 
7.2.4 Hypotheses 
The present thesis posits that it may not be a general hyper-emotionality that 
prompts systemizing drive, nor neural dysfunction per se, but that ASD may involve 
a kind of repurposing of systems used for social understanding in neurotypical 
 126 
individuals, instead directing these systems towards understanding predictable rules-
based systems. This could involve stronger orienting responses to non-social stimuli, 
similar to how social stimuli will often elicit a stronger orienting response in the NT 
population (Mares, Smith, Johnson, & Senju, 2016; Tomalski, Csibra, & Johnson, 
2008). Because Study One had found a positive correlation between autistic traits 
and physiological response to the non-social condition, it was expected that the ASD 
group would exhibit stronger physiological responses to the non-social stimuli than 
the control group. No such relationship had been found between AQ scores and 
SCRs to the non-social of interest condition in the NT sample in Study One, and it 
was thought that this may be due to the responses to this condition being higher 
across the whole group, given that it was an NT sample and those with lower autistic 
traits may have also had stronger responses to items related to their personal 
interest. It was hypothesised that, due to the stronger drive to systemize and stronger 
investment in special interests seen in ASD, in this study, the ASD group would 
exhibit higher physiological responses to non-social stimuli related to their own 
interest than the control group. It was also expected that the ASD group would 
exhibit larger responses to the non-social stimuli condition (not of interest) than the 
NT group, and that conversely, the NT group would have stronger responses to the 
social stimuli than the ASD group. Consistent with these predictions, it was expected 
that AQ score would be positively correlated with mean SCR magnitude to both 
non-social conditions. 
 
It was also predicted that, as with Study One, anxiety scores would be correlated 
with AQ score, and that the ASD group would have significantly higher levels of 
anxiety than the NT group. Anxiety has been implicated in the development of 
restricted interests and repetitive behaviours, with conflicting suggestions that 
negative affect may give rise to RRBs as a mitigating response, or that RRBs are 
independent from anxiety and only related in that they produce positive affect and 
so are used to mitigate anxiety when it arises (Lidstone et al., 2014 Sasson, Dichter & 
Bodfish, 2012; Jiujias et al., 2017; Baron-Cohen, 1989). Given that the overall 
hypothesis is that the basis of the non-social features of ASD is related to 
preferential, innate, unconscious orienting towards non-social stimuli, it was 
predicted that while anxiety may be related to physiological response to non-social 
stimuli of interest, controlling for anxiety scores would reveal an intact, statistically 
 127 
significant relationship between autistic traits and physiological response to non-





The sample size for the ASD group was calculated on the basis of the results of the 
study with a neurotypical population detailed in Chapter 4 (and see Singleton, 
Ashwin, & Brosnan, 2014). The effect sizes for the correlations in this study were 
around 0.6, and using this effect size and the G*Power software, a sample size of 15 
was calculated, given statistical power of 0.8. Participants were recruited from the 
University of Bath and University of Oxford populations, and from various Autism 
support groups and online through the Call for Participants website (Jisc, 2015). 
Participants with ASD provided evidence of diagnosis in the form of a report by 
their doctor or clinician. A final total of 17 participants were recruited for the ASD 
group (10 male, 7 female) and 16 for the NT control group (10 male, 6 female), 
matched by age, sex and education level. The age range for the ASD group was from 
19-64 years, with a mean age of 35.71, and for the NT group, ages ranged from 19 to 
67 with a mean age of 39.63. Age was not normally distributed for the NT group, so 
a Mann-Whitney U test was performed, which confirmed that the distribution of age 
was the same across both groups (U=150, z=0.505, p=0.631). 
 
As with the first studies with the NT sample, participants initially completed an 
online survey before being invited to complete the rest of the study in the lab. 
Participants were each paid £10 on completion of the study. See Chapter 3 for 
further detail on participants and recruitment. 
 
7.3.2  Measures  
The measures used in this study were the same as those used in the study detailed in 
Chapter 4. Participants initially completed the online survey that established age, sex 
and education level, non-social objects of interest and included the full 50 item 
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) questionnaire (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001) as well as 
the STAI-Trait questionnaire (Spielberger et al., 1983).  
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The results of the AQ were scored according to Baron-Cohen et al.’s (2001) 
specifications, resulting in an ‘AQ score’ for each participant (minimum possible 
score was 0 and maximum possible score was 50), and scores (minimum score of 0 
and maximum score of 10) for each of the theoretical subscales suggested by the 
original authors—social skill, communication, imagination, attention-to-detail and 
attention switching. For more detail on the AQ and the subscales, see Chapter 3 
Section 3.3. 
 
Participants completed the STAI-Trait questionnaire as part of the initial online 
survey, and then completed the STAI-State questionnaire on paper, when they 
arrived at the laboratory for testing. Each 20-item questionnaire includes both 
anxiety–present (e.g., I feel nervous) items and anxiety–absent (e.g., I feel calm) 
items. Participants mark how much each statement applies to them on a four-point 
Likert scale, with anxiety–absent items scored in the opposite manner to the 
anxiety–present items, a minimum–maximum score of 20–80 on each questionnaire, 
with a total maximum combined STAI score of 160. For more detail on the STAI, 
see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3. 
 
Each participant was shown a total of 24 images. Each image belonged to one of 
four conditions: Social – Face, Social-Cartoon, Non-Social and Non-Social of 
Interest. There were 6 images in each condition. Images in the Social-Face condition 
were sourced from an online database (Tarr, 2012) and depicted photographs of 
human faces with direct gaze. Images in the Social-Cartoon condition were sourced 
from previous research that had identified the emotion in the cartoon could be 
reliably recognised by those with ASD (Brosnan et al., 2013).   The Non-Social and 
Non-Social of Interest images were freely available for use and sourced from the 
Google Images search engine (Google, Inc, n.d.). Images chosen for the Non-Social 
condition were items or objects that neither involved any human nor animal subject, 
and were not the subject of any participant’s interest. Images were chosen for the 
Non-Social of Interest condition for each participant on the basis of their answers 
about their hobbies and interests on the online survey. More detail on the stimuli 
used in this study can be found in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.4. The design of this 
experiment was to measure skin conductance response while participants viewed 
each image to investigate whether there were differences in overall response to each 
of the four conditions and between ASD and NT groups. As SCR is an index of 
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orienting response and attention (Frith and Allen, 1983), higher average SCRs to one 
of the conditions (e.g. the non social images) compared with the other conditions 
would indicate stronger orienting to that class of stimuli in the sense that such 
stimuli prompt greater arousal/readiness to process incoming information. 
 
The experiment was built and run using the E-Prime® 2.0 suite of applications. The 
order of stimulus presentation was initially randomised and each participant was 
shown images in that order. Each stimulus was presented on screen for 5 seconds. 
The inter-stimulus interval (ISI) varied randomly between 8- 12 seconds, with a 
mean ISI of 10 seconds over the whole procedure in accordance with previous 
studies (Breska, et al., 2010). A fixation in the shape of a small cross appeared in the 
centre of the screen during each interval.  
 
Skin conductance response (SCR) was measured using a Biopac GSR100C, to assess 
arousal and orienting response to the visual stimuli. Physiological response was SCRs 
were determined when there was a rise in the amplitude of the skin conductance 
level of at least 0.01 µS within 1–4 seconds of a stimulus onset (Dawson, et al., 2007; 
Venables & Christie, 1980). Acqknowledge™ 4.1 software was used to calculate 
SCRs from the recorded skin conductance level of each participant and were 
measured by comparison to a localized baseline that was established by the software 
using median value smoothing. The calculation of skin conductance amplitude was 
determined by the change in the amplitude of the skin conductance level from the 
time of the SCR onset to the maximum amplitude attained during the SCR (Biopac, 
2013).  
 
Procedure and EDA Analysis 
Participants were seated on an adjustable chair approximately 60 cm from a 20 inch 
Dell monitor, with a keyboard positioned in front of them on a small table. An 
isotonic gel was applied to the Biopac EDA finger transducer which was attached to 
the distal phalanx of both the fore and middle finger of the dominant hand in 
accordance with recommendations (Screbo et al., 1992). The on-screen instructions 
told the participant to passively view each image and to ensure they remembered 
each in preparation for a memory test at the end. This was included as an incentive 
for the participants to pay attention to stimuli in what was an otherwise passive task.  
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Electrodermal activity (EDA) was analysed using the Acqknowledge™ 4.1 software 
and the same procedure as detailed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.7. As in the initial study 
with the NT sample, individual differences in skin conductance level between 
participants were corrected for by transforming the mean SCR magnitudes for each 
condition into z-scores and these were used for the statistical analysis.  
 
 
7.4 Statistical Analysis 
The data were explored using IBM SPSS Statistics 24 and the alpha was set at 0.05.   
 
7.4.1 AQ Analyses 
For the ASD and NT groups, AQ score was not normally distributed for the ASD 
group so a Mann-Whitney U test was performed to assess differences in mean AQ 
score between ASD and NT groups. AQ score was normally distributed for each sex 
category (20 male and 13 female), there were no outliers and there was homogeneity 
of variances (assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances (p=0.88)), so an 
independent samples t-test was performed to investigate the differences in AQ score 
between the sexes. A two–way ANOVA was conducted to investigate possible 
interaction effects between sex and ASD/NT groups on AQ score. Bivariate 
Pearson’s correlations were run to investigate relationships between AQ (and AQ 
subscales) and STAI-Trait and STAI-State scores, and between AQ (and AQ 
subscales) and SCRs to all four conditions (see SCR section below). 
 
7.4.2 Skin Conductance Response Analyses 
The distribution of SCR mean magnitudes for all conditions were non-normal and 
positively skewed so a logarithmic transformation was applied in order to use 
parametric statistical tests. A bivariate Pearson correlation was run to investigate the 
relationships between AQ (and AQ subscales) and SCR to each of the four stimulus 
conditions across the whole sample. Linear regressions were run to investigate 
whether AQ predicts SCR to each of the four stimuli conditions. The SCR data was 
not normally distributed for each of the ASD/NT groups or for either female/male 
category, as assessed by Shaprio Wilk’s test (p<0.05), and were significantly 
positively skewed. It was not possible to transform these data to a normal 
distribution so Mann-Whitney U tests were used to determine differences between 
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ASD and NT groups and between the sexes in skin conductance response to each of 
the stimulus conditions.  
 
7.4.3 State–Trait Anxiety Analyses 
Both State and Trait anxiety scores were normally distributed, so Pearson’s 
correlations were run to examine the relationship between these scores and AQ and 
SCRs to each of the four conditions. The two anxiety scores were also normally 
distributed for each of the ASD and NT groups and for each sex, so independent t-
tests were performed to investigate any differences in anxiety between ASD and NT 
groups and between males and females. As anxiety often co-occurs with ASD and 
there was a correlation between trait anxiety and AQ in the initial study (Chapter 4; 
Singleton et al., 2014), partial correlations were planned between AQ and SCR to 




7.5.1 Autism Spectrum Quotient 
As expected, the ASD group (Mdn=37) had a significantly higher median AQ score 
than the NT group (Mdn=22.5) (U=38.5, z=-3.52, p<0.01). The independent 
samples t-test showed no significant differences between mean AQ score for male 
(mean=28.8, SD=9.89) and female (mean= 28.77, SD=10.25) participants (t(31)=–
0.009, p=0.993). Although typically sex differences are found in AQ scores among 
the NT population, such sex differences are not found within ASD samples, so these 
results are consistent with previous findings given the numbers of female NT and 
ASD participants in the total sample (Ruzich et al., 2015). The two-way ANOVA 
found no statistically significant interaction between gender and autism diagnosis for 
AQ score (F(1,29)=0.006, p=0.939, partial η2=0.000). There was, as expected, a 
statistically significant difference in AQ score between females in ASD and NT 
groups (F(1,29)=7.078, p=0.013, partial η2 =0.196) and in AQ score between males 
in ASD and NT groups (F(1,29)=11.789, p=0.002, partial η2 =0.289).  
 
7.5.2 Skin Conductance Response 
AQ was not significantly correlated with SCR to the non-social (r=0.201, p=0.261), 
social-faces (r=0.252, p=0.158) or social-cartoon (r=0.116, p=0.520) conditions, but 
the relationship between AQ and SCR to the non-social of interest stimuli was very 
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close to being significant (r=0.343, p=0.051). SCR to the non-social of interest 
condition was significantly and positively correlated with the social skill (r=.350, 
p=.046) and imagination (r=.347, p=.048) subscales of the AQ. Because the overall 
relationship between AQ score and the non-social of interest condition was so close 
to statistical significance, the alpha was not adjusted when considering the 
relationship between this condition and the AQ subscales. There were no significant 
relationships between any of the other conditions and AQ subscales. The total SCR 
mean magnitudes to the combined social (faces+cartoons) and combined non-social 
(non-social+non-social of interest) conditions were positively and significantly 





The results of the Mann-Whitney U tests to determine any differences in skin 
conductance response to each of the stimulus conditions between ASD and NT 
groups showed that distributions of the SCR values were similar between the two 
groups for each condition, as assessed by a visual inspection. SCR to the social-faces 
(U=117, z=1.691, p=.51) social-cartoon (U=104, z=-1.19, p=.26) and non-social 




































































Figure 7.1  Correlations between AQ subscales and SCR to Non-Social of Interest stimuli.  
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groups. However, there were significant differences between ASD (Mdn=48.42) and 
NT (Mdn=47.20) in SCR to the non-social of interest condition (U=80, z=-2.023, 
p=0.043), suggesting that people with ASD have a higher physiological response to 
non-social objects related to their own particular interest than do NT people. Mann 
Whitney U tests revealed that were no significant differences between males and 
females in SCR to any of the stimulus conditions.  
 
AQ did not predict SCR to the social-faces (R2=0.06, F(1,31)=1.99, p=0.168), social-
cartoon (R2=0.014, F(1,31)=0.426, p=0.519) or non-social stimuli (R2=0.04, 
F(1,31)=1.297, p=0.263). A linear regression found that AQ score accounted for 
11.7% of the variance in SCRs to non-social of interest stimuli and this result was 
very close to being statistically significant (R2=0.117. F(1,31)=1.99, p=0.051). 
 
7.5.3 State-Trait Anxiety 
AQ scores were significantly positively correlated with both Trait anxiety scores 
(r=.570, p=.001) and State anxiety scores (r=.559, p=.001). Those in the ASD group 
had higher mean Trait anxiety (M=53.18, SD=13.93) and State anxiety (M=38.06, 
SD=10.15) scores than those in the NT group (M=46.25, SD=8.63 and M=31.88, 
SD=7.98, respectively) and these differences approached statistical significance 
(t(31)=1.704, p=.098 and t(31)=1.937, p=.062, respectively). There were no 
significant differences in either Trait or State anxiety scores between males and 
females (t(31)=.421, p=.677 and t(31)=.339, p=.737, respectively).   
 
Neither Trait nor State anxiety were significantly correlated with SCR mean 
magnitudes to any of the stimulus conditions. Partial correlations controlling for 
Trait anxiety revealed a significant relationship between SCR to the non-social 
condition and the Attention Switching subscale of the AQ (rpartial=.374, p=.035). The 
relationship between overall AQ score and the non-social of interest condition was 
slightly weaker and was less significant when adjusting for Trait anxiety score 
(rpartial=.307, p=.087). When controlling for State anxiety, however, the relationship 
between overall AQ score and SCR to the non-social of interest condition became 
stronger and statistically significant (rpartial=.428, p=.015). When controlling for State 
anxiety, the correlations between arousal to the non-social of interest condition and 
the Social Skill (rpartial=.401, p=.023) and Imagination (rpartial=.370, p=.037) subscales 
of the AQ became stronger and slightly more significant. There were no other 
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significant relationships between AQ or AQ subscales and SCR magnitudes for the 
four conditions when controlling for either state or trait anxiety. 
 
 
7.6 Discussion  
 
This study investigated physiological responses to categories of social and non-social 
stimuli, including images that were relevant to the participant’s own special interest 
or hobby, along with a measure of anxiety to investigate the relationship between 
anxiety and strength of engagement in restricted interests in an ASD sample. It was 
found that the ASD group exhibited a significantly stronger physiological response 
to images related to their special interest than controls, and there were no differences 
between the two groups on responses to any of the other stimulus conditions. This 
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that there is an enhanced orienting response 
to restricted interests in ASD that is stronger than the response elicited in the NT 
population when viewing items relevant to a hobby.  It is also consistent with 
findings of other research showing a bias towards non-social restricted interest type 
stimuli, for example in Unruh et al.’s (2016) study, autistic children took significantly 
longer to fixate on social images when a competing image of an object related to 
typical autistic interests was presented alongside it. In that study, the high autism 
interest stimuli influenced social attention more than non-social images that were of 
low autism interest. 
 
 Similarly, an eye tracking study by Sasson & Touchstone (2014) found children with 
ASD attended to faces significantly less than controls only when they were presented 
with a high autism interest image. The present study was different as stimuli were 
presented in sequence and differences in orienting responses analysed, rather than 
assessing attentional preference when given a choice of two types of stimuli to 
attend to at once. This design was intended to measure the extent to which each type 
of stimuli captured exogenous, unconscious attention, as this can add to the 
understanding of the results of the previous studies in which a bias was recorded. 
That the restricted interest condition provoked a stronger response in the ASD 
group compared to controls suggests that the bias or preference for restricted 
interest related images over social ones is due to the increased salience of the item of 
interest and its exogenous capture of the individual’s attention. This would 
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contradict the Social Motivation Theory in that there is no reduced motivation 
towards social information as compared to controls, but instead there is an enhanced 
motivation towards particular kinds of non-social information.  
 
Another study found no differences between children with ASD and controls in 
their attention to faces during an eye tracking task in which participants were 
presented with two social (one direct gaze, one averted gaze) and two non-social 
(one ‘high autism interest’ and one ‘low autism interest’) images (Parish-Morris et al., 
2013). They also found that both the ASD group and the NT group preferentially 
attended to the non-social ‘high autism interest’ images. One possible reason for the 
conflicting findings in the above studies may be the types of images used for the 
high interest conditions. The current study used personalized images for the non-
social of interest condition, instead of stimuli relating to what is typically considered 
to be an autistic-like interest (e.g., trains). Rivard et al. (2018) noted the use of 
general autistic interest images in studies on attention and restricted interests in ASD 
and suggests that tailor made stimuli may be more valuable. As these and other 
studies have shown, as well as being heterogeneous, attention in ASD appears to be 
highly context dependent, so it makes sense when exploring restricted interests with 
attention studies using presented stimuli to tailor the images to reflect each 
participant’s individual manifestation of the symptom. Although it can be time 
consuming and may not be possible in all studies with ASD participants, testing in 
this personalized way may help to mitigate some of the heterogeneous presentation 
of autistic symptoms and help standardize results by ensuring all participants are 
being tested within the same context (i.e. presented with an image that does actually 
interest them).  
 
The fact that the ASD group in this study did not exhibit a reduced orienting 
response to the social stimuli in comparison with the control group indicates intact 
social orienting, and the fact they did not produce a stronger response than controls 
for all conditions conflicts with the idea of hyper-emotionality proposed by 
Overskeid (2016). Although it was predicted for the present study that the ASD 
group would exhibit stronger responses for both non-social conditions—due to the 
findings of Study One—the absence of group differences in SCRs to the ‘low 
interest’ non-social stimuli and the social stimuli is consistent with results from the 
studies on attention and restricted interests mentioned above. Together, these results 
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suggest that it is particular types of non-social information that attract preferential 
attention or a stronger orienting response in ASD and that atypicalities found in 
social attention in ASD may be context dependent rather than evidence of general 
attentional dysfunction.  
 
It had been predicted that across the whole sample, AQ score would be positively 
correlated with the skin conductance responses to both the non-social conditions 
but it was only close to being significantly correlated with the non-social of interest 
condition and no other condition. Partialling out the effect of State anxiety revealed 
a significant and stronger relationship between level of autistic traits and 
physiological response to the of interest condition, indicating that the presence of a 
strong orienting bias towards items related to restricted interests is related to autism 
symptomatology and not to the presence of anxiety. Controlling for State anxiety 
revealed that the SCRs to the non-social of interest condition were significantly 
positively correlated with both the Imagination and Social Skill subscales of the AQ. 
This indicates that a stronger orientation towards restricted interests is related to 
social deficits as measured by the AQ (although not the Communication construct), 
which would be expected if the usual mechanisms for social orienting are instead 
employed for or biased towards non-social stimuli in ASD. 
 
Anxiety can interfere with the orienting response, and those with high state anxiety 
will often produce attenuated skin conductance responses to presented stimuli than 
those with low anxiety (Naveteur et al., 1987; 2005; Neary & Zuckerman, 1976). As 
the ASD group reported higher mean State and Trait anxiety than the control group 
(although it was not quite statistically significant) it may be that anxiety in the ASD 
group during the task hampered their perceptual alerting response. This is something 
to consider in future studies investigating electrodermal activity in ASD, due to the 
high rates of anxiety symptoms in the population and the possibility that engaging in 
an experimental study may increase state anxiety in this group to a greater extent 
than controls. Anxiety scores were not correlated with any of the stimulus 
conditions, which is a different result to studies that have found a relationship 
between anxiety and restricted interests (Lidstone et al., 2014). This, along with the 
strong correlation between AQ and SCRs to the non-social of interest condition 
when controlling for anxiety, and the strong correlations between AQ and both Trait 
and State anxiety, suggest that RRBs and anxiety are related to autistic traits but their 
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relationship to one another is not causal. Additionally, as found in Study One with 
the NT sample, there was a strong, significant relationship between physiological 
responses to the overall social and overall non-social conditions. This relationship 
indicates that orienting responses to both social and non-social domains are related 
to one another, and that explanations of attentional atypicalities in one domain may 
therefore have to account for attention in the other.   
 
The results of this study do not support the Social Motivation Theory (Chevallier et 
al., 2012), as there was no evidence of reduced social orienting in the ASD group 
compared to controls, but instead point towards an enhanced orienting towards 
specific non-social stimuli. The theory of Enhanced Perceptual Functioning could 
perhaps explain the strong orientation towards objects of circumscribed interest, as 
it contends that ASD involves an overfunctioning and overconnectivity of areas of 
the brain involved in sensory perception leading to increased perceptual expertise, 
and so certain stimuli, particularly that which is interesting or the subject of 
expertise, may prompt heightened responses (Mottron and Burack, 2001; Mottron et 
al., 2006; Mottron et al., 2013). The results also support the Hypersystemizing 
Theory (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003), as the strong physiological response towards the 
non-social object of the individual’s special interest may suggest an affective drive 
towards that system, reflecting a heightened drive to systemize in ASD. 
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Chapter 8  
Attention-to-Detail and Attention to Social and Non-
Social  




Study 2 (Chapter 5) compared attention to non-social and social stimuli presented 
together in a change blindness task and found that while social changes were spotted 
faster than non-social, as expected in an NT sample, a higher number of autistic 
traits was related to greater change blindness for social information. Because autistic 
traits are distributed across the general population on a continuum, ranging from 
very low to subclinical to those with a diagnosis of ASD, it was hypothesised that 
running the task with an ASD sample would result in a marked increase in change 
blindness for social changes compared to controls, and reduced change blindness for 
non-social changes. The results from the skin conductance studies detailed in 
Chapters 4 and 7 also supported this prediction, having found stronger orienting 
responses to non-social stimuli in those with ASD and those with a high level of 
subclinical autistic traits. As change blindness is reduced when the change is salient 
for the observer (Kelley et al., 2003), it was predicted that the ASD group would 
preferentially attend to non-social information in the task and therefore show 
attenuated change blindness for the non-social changes. The change blindness 
images and task procedure were kept the same to enable comparison of results with 
the initial study. See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2 for further detail on the change 
blindness phenomenon. 
 
 Study Two contributed to findings on social attention and attention to detail in the 
NT population in relation to subclinical autistic traits. The results of the change 
blindness task in that study indicated that the lack of a bias for social stimuli found 
in clinical populations extends to the subclinical autism spectrum, and results on the 
Embedded Figures Task (EFT) suggested that poor performance on a measure of 
local processing and attention to detail was related to poor self-reported social skills.  
The findings also indicated that anxiety may play a role in performance on change 
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blindness and local processing tasks in neurotypical individuals. The present study 
sought to explore these findings further in a clinical sample, using the same change 
blindness task, the EFT and the STAI with an ASD sample and a matched group of 
neurotypical controls. The findings of this study did not support the results of Study 
Two, finding no differences between ASD/NT groups in response times to either 
the social or non-social changes and that across the whole sample, all participants 
took longer on average to spot the non-social changes than the social changes. The 
NT group also performed significantly better on the EFT than the ASD group, a 
surprising finding given that most research finds superior or equivalent performance 
on the EFT in ASD samples compared with controls. This chapter presents the 





The sample size for the ASD group was calculated on the basis of the results of the 
change blindness study with a neurotypical population detailed in Chapter 5. The 
effect size of the paired samples t-test used in that study was large, with an eta 
squared statistic of 0.68. Using the G*Power software, a sample size of 15 was 
calculated using this effect size, for statistical power of 0.8 (See Chapter 3 Section 
3.5.2). Participants were recruited from the University of Bath and University of 
Oxford populations, and from various Autism support groups and online through 
the Call for Participants website (Jisc, 2015). Participants with ASD provided 
evidence of diagnosis in the form of a report by their doctor or clinician (see 
Chapter 3 for further detail). 
 
A total of 17 participants were recruited for the ASD group (10 male, 7 female) and 
16 for the NT control group (10 male, 6 female), matched by age, sex and education 
level. The age range for the ASD group was from 19-64 years, with a mean age of 
35.71, and for the NT group, ages ranged from 19 to 67 with a mean age of 39.63. 
Age was not normally distributed for the NT group, so a Mann-Whitney U test was 
performed, which confirmed that the distribution of age was the same across both 
groups (U=150, z=0.505, p=0.631). As with the first studies with the NT sample, 
participants initially completed an online survey before being invited to complete the 
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rest of the study in the lab. Participants were each paid £10 on completion of the 
study. See Chapter 3 for further detail on participants and recruitment. 
 
8.3.2 Measures 
As in the initial study with the NT sample, participants were administered the full 50 
item Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) 
online, using Bristol Online Surveys (2012) as a self-report measure of autistic traits. 
AQ scores were calculated for each participant, with a maximum possible score of 
50 and a minimum possible score of 0. Mean AQ score of the whole sample was 
17.7, SD=6.7. Scores were also calculated for each of the theoretical subscales 
suggested by the original authors—social skill, communication, imagination, 
attention-to-detail and attention switching (with a minimum score of 0 and a 
maximum score of 10 for each subscale). For more detail on the AQ and the 
subscales, see Chapter 3 Section 3.3.  
 
The change blindness task used for the present study was the same as that used in 
Chapter 5, which was based on Rensink et al.’s flicker paradigm (1997) and it used 
the same images, which had been used previously in a change blindness study by 
Ashwin et al. (2017). Participants were shown 54 scenes, each of which included 
both social and non-social details such as people and machinery or vehicles and the 
images each featured either one social change (e.g. to a person’s face) or one non-
social change (e.g. a change to a vehicle), totalling 27 social and 27 non-social 
changes (see Chapter 5 Figure 5.1 for an example). 
 
As with the initial study with the NT sample, participants were sat approximately 60 
cm from a 20 inch Dell monitor, with a keyboard positioned in front of them on a 
small table. Each image was displayed for 240ms and was interrupted with a blank 
screen for 80ms, before displaying the changed image for a further 240ms, as 
detailed by Rensink et al. (1997). This cycle repeated for 30s (at which point it timed 
out) or until the participant pressed the keyboard to indicate they had spotted the 
change. The experiment was run on E-Prime software, and reaction times were 
recorded from the start of each image cycle to the press of the keyboard, in order to 
establish how long it took the participant to spot the change. An average response 
time for all correct change detections was calculated for each participant for both the 
social and non-social changes, and the number of misses was calculated for each 
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participant for each condition. See Chapter 5 Section 5.3.3. for further detail on how 
the Change Blindness experiment was run. 
 
Again, participants were presented with a computerised version of the EFT (Falter 
et al., 2008; Brosnan et al., 2012 and see Chapter 5 Section 5.3.4). They were asked 
to select, as quickly and as accurately as possible, which of two shapes—presented at 
the bottom left and right of the screen respectively—appeared in a larger complex 
picture at the top of the screen (see Chapter 5, Figure 5.2 for an example). There 
were two initial training tests with practice images, to ensure participants were 
familiarised with the task, before they were presented with 18 trials, half of which 
contained the shape on the left and half the shape on the right. Response times were 
automatically recorded by the program, along with the number of correct and 
incorrect responses. Mean response times for correct answers were calculated and 
this was divided by the number of correct responses to provide an inverse efficiency 
score for each participant—the lower the score the more efficient the performance 
(see Falter et al., 2008 and Brosnan et al., 2012). 
 
As before, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI Form Y; Spielberger et al., 1983) 
was used to measure both trait anxiety and current anxiety levels in the participants. 
The trait anxiety questionnaire was completed online prior to coming to the 
laboratory for testing, and the State anxiety questionnaire was administered when the 
participant arrived for testing, prior to undertaking the EFT and change blindness 
tasks. Further detail on the STAI Form Y can be found in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3. 
 
 
8.4 Statistical Analysis 
The data were explored using IBM SPSS Statistics 24 and the alpha was set at 0.05. 
 
8.4.1 Change Blindness  
Reaction time data for both conditions of the change blindness task were not 
normally distributed and were positively skewed, so a square root transformation 
was applied to achieve a normal distribution so that a bivariate Pearson correlation 
could be performed to investigate the relationship between AQ score, AQ subscale 
scores and mean response times for both social and non-social changes. Bivariate 
correlations were also run to explore the relationship between response times to 
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social and non-social changes. A linear regression analysis was planned, to explore 
whether change blindness response times could be predicted by AQ score. A one-
way repeated measures analysis of variance was planned, to investigate whether there 
were any within-subjects differences in response times to the social and non-social 
changes. The change blindness mean reaction time data for ASD participants for 
both non-social and social conditions were not normally distributed and were 
positively skewed as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test (p<0.05). A logarithmic 
transformation was applied to the data, which resulted in a normal distribution so 
that an independent t-test could be performed to explore differences in response 
times to the social and non-social changes between the NT and ASD groups and 
between the sexes.  
 
.8.4.2 Embedded Figures Task  
The AQ score data were normally distributed but the EFT final score data were not 
normally distributed and were positively skewed, so a square root transformation 
was applied to give a normal distribution. A bivariate Pearson correlation was then 
run to investigate whether there was a relationship between AQ score and EFT 
score. Independent t-tests were performed to investigate any differences between 
ASD and NT groups and between the sexes on the EFT score.   
 
8.4.3 Change Blindness and EFT Performance 
A bivariate Pearson correlation was run to investigate the relationship between EFT 
efficiency score and response times to spot the social and non-social changes on the 
change blindness task. 
 
8.4.4 Anxiety Analyses 
A bivariate Pearson correlation was run to explore the relationship between Trait 
and State anxiety scores and reaction times to social and non-social changes and 
between anxiety scores and EFT efficiency score. To investigate any influence of 
anxiety levels on the performance on the measures of attention, partial correlations, 
controlling for State and Trait anxiety, were run between AQ and EFT efficiency 
score, AQ and change blindness reaction times, and between EFT score and change 





8.5.1 Change Blindness 
The bivariate Pearson correlation showed that AQ was not significantly correlated 
with reaction time to social (r=-.178, p=0.321) or non-social (r=.142, p=0.431) 
changes. An alpha of 0.01 was set for correlations with the AQ subscales due to the 
lack of significant relationship with the overall AQ score in order to avoid Type 1 
error. There were no significant correlations between change blindness response 
times for either condition and any of the AQ subscales (all rs<.269, all ps>.13). The 
independent samples t-test found no significant differences between ASD and NT 
groups on mean reaction time to the non-social changes (t(31)=1.093, p=0.283), 
total non-social errors/time-outs (t(31)=.1.074, p=.291) or to the social changes 
(t(31)=1.236, p=0.226) or social errors/time-outs (t(31)=1.119, p=.272). The linear 
regression showed that AQ did not predict reaction time to either non-social 
(R2=0.014, F(1,31)=0.45, p=0.51) or social (R2=0.028, F(1,31)=0.88, p=0.356) 
changes on the change blindness task. The two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed that participants overall took longer to spot non-social changes (M=73.23, 
SD=18.06) than social (M=67.27, SD=21.26) changes (F(1,32)=13.682, p=.001, 
partial η2=.300). Response times for spotting social and non-social changes were 






















































Figure 8.1 Correlations between AQ and response times to each 








8.5.2 Embedded Figures Task 
 
On running the bivariate Pearson correlation, no statistically significant relationship 
between AQ score and EFT score was found (r=0.266, p=0.134). There was a 
statistically significant difference between groups on mean EFT score (t(31)=2.1, 
p=0.044, d=0.73), with the NT (M=5813, SD=3181) group outperforming the ASD 
(M=9060, SD=5362) group and no significant differences in EFT scores between 












































Figure 8.2  Mean change detection response times across 
participants for each condition. Standard deviations are 
represented by the error bars attached to each column. 






8.5.3 Change Blindness and EFT Performance 
  
EFT efficiency score was significantly correlated with reaction time to both social 






8.5.4 State/Trait Anxiety 
 
Trait anxiety was correlated with reaction time to social changes (r=0.352, p=0.045); 




































Figure 8.4  Mean EFT efficiency scores for ASD and NT groups 
Figure 8.5  Correlations between EFT efficiency score and response 
times to each Change Blindness condition 
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changes. There was, however, no significant correlation between trait anxiety score 
and reaction time to the non-social changes (r=0.249, p=0.163). Controlling for 
Trait anxiety and for State anxiety did not affect the strength or significance of the 









The change blindness study presented in Chapter 5 found that autistic traits were 
related to enhanced change blindness for social changes. It would therefore be 
expected that in a group with ASD, this enhanced social change blindness would be 
even more pronounced. However, this study actually found not only no difference 
between ASD and NT groups on response times for detecting social and non-social 
changes, but that non-social changes took significantly longer to detect than social 











































Figure 8.6  Relationship between Trait anxiety scores and mean response 
times to each Change Blindness condition 
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ASD, although it is curious that non-social attention is. However, results from 
Studies 1 and 5 (Chapters 4 and 7) would suggest that the salience of non-social 
stimuli is related to autistic traits, so it may be that the images used in these change 
blindness studies and the location of the changes in them are not suitable for making 
these comparisons. Both the present study and Kikuchi et al.’s study used images of 
naturalistic scenes in which there were multiple objects/vehicles etc. It is known that 
the more complex the scene in a change blindness task, the more enhanced the 
change blindness will be (Rensink, 2002). Given the heterogeneity in ASD with 
regards to non-social objects of interest, it may be that different aspects of the 
images capture initial attention and that slower, conscious visual search strategies 
then take over, enabling those in the ASD group (who were all high functioning 
adults) to consciously choose to attend to social aspects of the images. While many 
change blindness studies have found attenuated change blindness in children and 
adolescents with ASD, there have been very few to have replicated these results in 
adults (Ashwin et al., 2017), so the poor performance of the adults with ASD on this 
task is not inconsistent with findings from other change detection studies with ASD 
samples. As mentioned in Chapter 5, change detection is complex and depends on a 
variety of factors. The naturalistic scenes used in this study, while attempting to be 
ecologically valid, may make it difficult to understand what aspect of attention is 
being measured. Future studies on change blindness to social compared with non-
social information should employ eye-tracking measures to better be able to 
understand what processes and strategies are being employed, and what is being 








This chapter summarises the findings of the six experimental studies presented in 
this thesis and explores what they contribute to the understanding of non-social 
cognition across the autism spectrum. The results from Studies 1 and 2 with the NT 
sample and Studies 4 and 5 with the ASD and matched controls are then 
consolidated and analysed as a larger sample that represents the spectrum of autistic 
traits. These findings are presented and discussed along with the limitations of the 
research and suggestions for potential future research. 
 
9.2 Summary of the Research 
 
The aim of this thesis was to explore aspects of non-social cognition across the 
autism spectrum in order to contribute to understanding of some of the cognitive 
processes and mechanisms that might underlie the systemizing drive and abilities 
seen in ASD. Experiments were designed that measured aspects of attention and 
affective response in relation to non-social and social stimuli alongside a test of 
aptitude for local processing and measures of anxiety, which is thought to be related 
to non-social behaviours and interests in ASD. Another study was designed in order 
to better understand the components of systemizing, which included separate 
measures of drive and ability to systemize along with measures of Type 1 (intuitive) 
and Type 2 (deliberative) cognitive processing styles in order to investigate whether 
dual process accounts of cognition could help explain the characteristics of 
systemizing. This design was administered separately to a NT sample and later an 
ASD/matched control sample (although confirmation of diagnosis was not possible 
for all participants).  
 
This work makes several novel contributions to knowledge. Research into the non-
social features of ASD that include special interests is a relatively new area, and the 
affective motivation towards non-social stimuli in ASD is only more recently being 
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explored. This research was the first to use electrophysiological measures to 
investigate orienting to non-social images of special interests in relation to autistic 
traits in the neurotypical population, and was the first to tailor stimuli to each 
participant’s personal hobby or interest in a large NT sample in order to investigate 
special/circumscribed interests in the autism spectrum (Singleton et al., 2014). This 
work also sought to elucidate the relationship between anxiety and restricted 
interests in ASD, finding that preferential attention to RIs is related to autistic 
symptomatology and not to anxiety. The use of exactly the same methodology for a 
study with an NT sample, assessed for level of autistic traits, and a second study with 
a group of ASD participants and matched controls enables a very precise 
comparison of findings, to explore attention and orienting to non-social stimuli and 
restricted interests across the autism spectrum. Studies 3 and 4 (Chapter 6) 
contributed valuable findings on the drive and ability components of systemizing, 
which a recent paper by Baron-Cohen and Lombardo (2017) has called for, and 
contributes to the new area of dual process accounts of autism. 
 
9.2.1 Summary of Results 
 
Study 1 (Chapter 4) measured electrodermal activity in 46 NT participants as they 
view images of social and non-social objects, and objects that were directly related to 
their own professed hobby or interest. Autistic traits were measured with the Autism 
Quotient and the data revealed that a higher number of autistic traits was related to 
preferential orienting towards non-social stimuli and that the higher the score on the 
AQ, the greater the difference between physiological response to social and non-
social stimuli. Fewer autistic traits was related to preferential orienting to cartoon 
faces, supporting the theory that physiological arousal to social and non-social 
stimuli differs across the subclinical range of the autism spectrum. The hypothesis 
that AQ would be correlated with arousal to the non-social stimuli of interest was 
not borne out. Response to the non-social of interest and social-faces conditions was 
significantly correlated, suggesting that in the NT population, items of interest 
prompt a stronger orienting response, with human faces being of inherent interest in 
neurotypical individuals. Consistent with previous research, Trait anxiety was 
significantly correlated with autistic traits—as there is a high prevalence of anxiety in 
ASD, it would be suspected that subclinical autistic traits would be related to a 
general disposition towards anxiety. When controlling for anxiety, the significant 
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positive relationship between AQ and response to the non-social of interest 
condition remained so, indicating that in the subclinical autism spectrum, anxiety 
does not play a role in the stronger orienting response towards non-social stimuli. A 
significant correlation between Trait anxiety and SCR to the non-social of interest 
condition suggested that anxiety may play a role in preferential orienting to special 
interests, a relationship that has been suggested in the literature on restricted 
interests and repetitive behaviours. 
 
A change blindness flicker paradigm was used in Study 2 (Chapter 5) to explore 
attention to social and non-social information in naturalistic scenes that contained 
both people and mechanical type objects, with a sample of 46 NT participants 
having to detect changes that occurred at either social or non-social locations. 
Participants were also administered the AQ to measure autistic traits and the 
Embedded Figures Task, a test of local processing or field-independence that people 
with ASD usually perform well on. Participants overall took significantly longer to 
detect non-social changes, which is consistent with evidence from other research 
that neurotypical individuals exhibit an attentional bias to social information. AQ 
score was significantly related to enhanced change blindness for social changes, 
which is consistent with results from other research suggesting that autistic traits are 
related to reduced attention to social stimuli. Contrary to predictions, AQ was not 
related to reduced change blindness for non-social changes. Enhanced change 
blindness to social changes was associated with the Social Skill and Imagination 
subscales of the AQ. Enhanced change blindness to non-social changes was also 
correlated with the Imagination subscale of the AQ, as was the efficiency score for 
the EFT, indicating that worse performance on the EFT was related to poor ability 
to detect non-social changes. Poor performance on the EFT was also related to 
enhanced social change blindness, but the relationships between EFT and time taken 
to spot social and non-social changes became weaker and insignificant when 
controlling for Trait anxiety, suggesting that general predisposition towards anxiety 
interferes with attentional processes, as has been demonstrated in the field of 
attention research. EFT score was correlated with the Imagination subscale of the 
AQ, indicating that the poorer self-reported imagination ability was related to poorer 
performance on the EFT, which was unexpected. Performance on the EFT and 
autistic traits were otherwise unrelated to each other in this sample. Change 
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blindness to social and to non-social changes were significantly correlated, 
suggesting that the social and non-social attention are related to one another. 
 
Chapter 6 reported two studies—Study 3 and Study 4—that both used the same 
methodology, one with an NT sample and one with an ASD group and NT controls 
matched for age and sex. These studies consisted of a battery of measures that were 
administered online so confirmation of ASD diagnosis could not be confirmed for 
all participants in the ASD group. Participants completed the Systemizing Quotient 
Short, the Test of Logical Thinking and the Rational Experiential Inventory. Both 
studies found that SQ was correlated with correct responses on the TOLT but was 
not correlated with the ability to justify those responses using appropriate logical 
reasoning. In the ASD/NT study, those reporting an ASD diagnosis exhibited 
significantly greater performance on the TOLT in terms of getting the answer 
correct but were significantly more likely to get the correct answer along with the 
incorrect reasoning than were the NT group. SQ was significantly correlated with 
both subscales of the “need for cognition” construct of the REI in the NT sample, 
and with only the Rational-Engagement subscale in the ASD/NT sample. There was 
no significant relationship between SQ and the “faith in intuition” subscales of the 
REI in either study. In the ASD/NT study, the SQ was only correlated with the 
Rational–Engagement subscale, and the ASD group scored significantly higher on 
this subscale than the NT group. Sex differences were found in the NT only study, 
with males scoring higher than females on the SQ and the Rational–Engagement 
and Rational–Ability subscales of the REI. In the ASD/NT sample, sex differences 
were found only in SQ score, with males scoring significantly higher than females.  
  
Study 5 (Chapter 7) used the same methodology as Study one, including 
administering the AQ to measure autistic traits, but with a group of ASD 
participants and NT controls matched for age, sex and educational attainment level. 
It was found that the ASD group exhibited a significantly stronger physiological 
response to images related to their special interest than controls, and there were no 
differences between the two groups on responses to any of the other stimulus 
conditions. Overall AQ score was significantly correlated with SCR to the non-social 
of interest condition when State anxiety was controlled for. AQ was again correlated 
with Trait anxiety, as well as State anxiety. 
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Study 6 (Chapter 8) followed the same methodology as Study 2, but with a group of 
ASD participants and NT controls matched for age, sex and educational attainment 
level. There were no differences between the ASD and NT groups in change 
blindness response times to social or non-social changes and AQ was not related to 
performance on the change blindness task. Response times to the social and non-
social changes were significantly related to one another. Overall, participants across 
both groups took longer to detect non-social changes. The NT group performed 
significantly better than the ASD group on the Embedded Figures Task, and EFT 
performance was related to performance on both conditions of the change blindness 
task. Higher trait anxiety was associated with enhanced change blindness for social 
changes. 
 
9.3 Combined Analyses 
 
9.3.1 Physiological Response to Social & Non-Social Stimuli 
The data from Studies 1 and 5 were combined for an analysis of physiological 
responses to social and non-social stimuli in relation to autistic traits across the 
spectrum. This resulted in a sample of 77 in total with an age range from 18 to 67 
(36 females (mean age=30.33, SD=11.64) and 41 males (mean age=31.93, 
SD=14.60). The mean AQ score of the whole sample was 22 (SD=9.54; females 
mean AQ=20, SD=8.87; males mean AQ=23.46, SD=9.95) which would be fairly 
high in an NT sample but because the sample includes 17 people with a diagnosis of 
ASD, it represents the wider autism spectrum. As with the original analyses, bivariate 
correlations were run to investigate the relationship between AQ scores and 
orienting responses to the four stimulus conditions. AQ was significantly correlated 
with SCRs to both the non-social (r=.330, p=.003) and non-social of interest 
(r=.305, p=.007) conditions, was not significantly correlated with the Social-Faces 
condition (r=.191, p=.097) and was significantly negatively correlated with the 
Social-Cartoon condition (r=–.306, p=.039). AQ was also significantly positively 
correlated with both Trait (r=.530, p<.001) and State (r=.291, p=.010) anxiety. 
Independent samples t-tests revealed no significant sex differences on AQ, anxiety 
scores or any of the stimulus conditions.   This suggests that, across the spectrum of 
autistic traits ranging from low AQ to a clinical diagnosis of ASD, there is a pattern 
of preferential orienting to non-social stimuli that is related to autistic 
symptomatology. The results of Study 1 found stronger orienting to the non-social 
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condition was related to higher autistic traits and in Study 2, a diagnosis of ASD was 
related to stronger orienting to images of restricted interests.  
 
Put together, these relationships with autistic traits (non-social and non-social of 
interest) both emerge as significant, suggesting that fewer or less severe autistic traits 
relate to stronger autonomic arousal to general non-social items and clinically 
significant ASD traits relate to specific personal interests. This could imply a 
narrowing of focus with more severe ASD phenotypic expression, which would 
support the characterisation of the cognitive style of ASD as being narrow in focus, 
locally-oriented and preoccupied with an insistence on sameness. This could support 
both the EPF and E–S theories, as a general preferential orienting towards novel 
non-social stimuli (as opposed to social stimuli or the same non-social stimuli again 
and again) due to a certain level of enhanced perceptual functioning could underlie 
some milder social dysfunction associated with subclinical autistic traits, while a 
stronger bias towards the same, specific non-social perceptual features could 
manifest as an orientation away from social input and lead to much more severe 
socially-related deficits. This type of attentional bias could be characterized as a drive 
to systemize along with reduced empathizing. The negative correlation between AQ 
and the cartoon face condition also supports E-S theory, indicating that across the 
spectrum, those with few autistic traits exhibit a larger response to abstract face like 
pictures, most people along the middle of the subclinical spectrum orient to 
photographs of human faces (hence why there is no relationship between the faces 
condition and AQ) and those with the highest number of autistic traits and an ASD 
diagnosis orient strongly to items related to their restricted interest.  
 
A bottom-up attentional bias for certain non-social stimuli (manifesting as a drive to 
systemize) is analogous to the apparent neural basis for being socially motivated that 
appears to be hardwired early in life in NT individuals. Evidence suggests that 
infants are born with visual biases that ensure they will fixate on faces (Johnson, 
1991; 2005) and it is proposed that this initial exogenously controlled orienting 
towards others leads to eventual expertise in faces and social behaviour, facilitating 
social understanding. If the drive to systemize is analogous, then it is possible that 
the mechanisms by which NT infants innately and preferentially orient to faces or 
protoface stimuli may in others instead preferentially orient towards other types of 
shapes or patterns. Developmental accounts of face perception deficits in ASD had 
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suggested that innate social orienting may be impaired or absent, but studies revealed 
intact orienting to protoface stimuli in autistic individuals (Shah et al., 2013).  
Conversely, there is intact orienting towards systems-related stimuli in the NT 
population in people who might generally be empathizers but have little real skill 
with systems-related thinking beyond simple arithmetic (Baron-Cohen & Lombardo, 
2017).  
 
These results would not support the Social Motivation Hypothesis (Chevallier, 
2012), as they indicate that the socially relevant autistic symptoms arise from 
motivation towards the non-social domain in varying degrees, and not away from the 
social. These results together suggested a bottom-up attentional bias towards non-
social stimuli across the autism spectrum from neurotypical to clinical populations, 
which could be consistent with both the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (Mottron 
& Burack, 2001; Mottron et al., 2006) and Empathizing–Systemizing theories. 
Further research therefore needs to establish whether increased physiological arousal 
increases attention or vice versa. The results of this current study provide a 
foundation for further exploration of physiological responses to non-social stimuli in 
an ASD population and across the autism spectrum; future studies are needed to 
investigate the relationship between attention to both social and non-social stimuli 
and physiological response in ASD and NT samples to determine whether 
autonomic arousal and motivation towards non-social stimuli does indeed plays a 
role in the restricted interests and repetitive behaviours characteristic of autism.  
 
9.3.2 Change Blindness & Embedded Figures 
The data from Studies 2 and 6 were combined for analysis of performance on the 
EFT as a measure of attention to detail and the change blindness flicker paradigm 
with social and non-social changes, as a measure of attentional biases, in relation to 
autistic traits and anxiety across the autism spectrum. Results are similar to those in 
Study 6 with the ASD and control group sample. AQ score was not correlated with 
response times to either social or non-social changes, nor was it correlated with 
performance on the EFT. Again, response times to the social and non-social 
changes were significantly related (r=.723, p<.001). State and Trait anxiety scores 
were correlated with AQ but not the other measures. Partial correlations controlling 
for anxiety scores revealed no significant relationships between the other measures. 
These results (and those from Study 6) conflict with evidence that people with ASD 
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and a higher number of autistic traits have superior performance on measures of 
attention to detail and local processing.  
 
The findings in Study One (Chapter 4) indicated that autistic traits were related to 
stronger physiological responses to non-social stimuli, and in Study Five (Chapter 7) 
it was found that those with ASD exhibited stronger autonomic responses for non-
social stimuli related to their interests than did controls. This indicates that autistic 
traits are related to a stronger orienting response to non-social stimuli, and that this 
non-social orienting is more pronounced in ASD for items related to restricted 
interests. As the change detection paradigm used in these studies measures 
attentional preference, stronger orienting to non-social stimuli would be expected. 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 8, it may be that the change blindness paradigm 
used involved scenes that were too complex with too many competing and 
distracting features that make it difficult to really understand what the results mean. 
Naturalistic scenes were chosen in order to make the experiment as ecologically valid 
as possible, but given the nature of the task itself, change blindness paradigms do 
not really mimic visual search and change detection in real life settings. One way of 
using such complex scenes for change blindness studies, with multiple social and 
non-social features, would be to use eye tracking concurrently in order to evaluate 
which aspects are attended to first and in order to understand whether the changed 
non-social/social feature is being overlooked for some other background feature 
that may have salience for the individual observer, instead of concluding that longer 
detection times for social or non-social changes means that there is a deficit in 
attention to that domain. This is especially important when studying a heterogeneous 
disorder like autism, because the many idiosyncratic interests present across and 
within individuals with the disorder could mean some other detail in the background 
of a scene not considered as a factor, but which would fit into the category of stimuli 
under study, has salience for individual participants, meaning that the full picture is 
not grasped. Eye tracking has been used in conjunction with change blindness tasks 
to clarify areas of attention (Bayraktar & Bayram, 2013), and future research on 




9.4 Interpretation & Conclusions 
 
The results of this research provide some evidence for the role of exogenous 
orienting to non-social stimuli in the autism spectrum, including to general non-
social images in NT participants with a high degree of autistic traits, and to images of 
personal restricted interests in those with ASD. Skin conductance responses, as used 
in these studies, have been associated with the emotional and motivational salience 
of a stimulus (Critchley, 2002; Sequeira et al., 2009). This suggests that there are 
perceptual features of certain non-social stimuli that exogenously engage the 
attention of the sympathetic system in ASD and its broader phenotype in a way that 
other, social stimuli do not. The perceptual and attentional systems of NT 
individuals will typically be engaged in this way in response to social stimuli (Mares 
et al., 2016; Driver et al., 1999). There exists a lot of research to suggest that reduced 
attention to social information in ASD is related to the preferential orienting 
towards, and enhanced motivation to engage with, non-social stimuli (Klin et al., 
2009; Watson et al., 2015; Unruh et al., 2016) rather than reduced social motivation. 
The results of the current research, while finding enhanced responses to non-social 
stimuli in ASD and high AQ participants, did not find a corresponding reduction in 
social orienting and other studies have found intact social orienting in ASD 
(Johnson, 2014).  
 
This evidence seems to point towards a great motivation towards non-social things 
in ASD (i.e. drive to systemize) that originates at a perceptual level with the 
particular sensory qualities of various objects, systems and the rule-governed 
relations between them prompting an autonomic response that stimulates 
motivation (Mottron et al., 2006). The fact that the ASD group in Study 5 responded 
more strongly to their restricted interest and the high AQ NT participants 
responded more strongly to unrelated non-social stimuli suggests that there might be 
degrees of intensity of non-social response throughout the autism spectrum, with 
those in the subclninical spectrum who respond affectively to non-social items and 
concepts simply maintaining an enhanced interest in these domains, responding to 
non-social novelty, but less strongly than those with ASD, who perhaps experience 
such   intense motivational stimulation when perceiving particular non-social 
qualities early in life, that they become more fixated on the stimuli and so reinforce 
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their attachment and drive towards to it, akin to the more pronounced autonomic 
responses people typically experience towards loved ones. This would be consistent 
with the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning theory of autism which suggests that 
restricted interests and repetitive behaviours (and savant abilities) in autism are 
driven by low-level enhanced perceptual processes that involve stronger and more 
discriminatory sensory experiences (Mottron et al., 2013). In future research, the use 
of saliency maps in change blindness tasks could help to clarify whether (and which) 
non-social features are attend to exogenously in people with ASD and across the 
autistic spectrum. 
 
The parallels between the NT individual’s experience and understanding of, and 
behaviour towards, people (empathizing) and the ASD individual’s experience and 
understanding of, and behaviour towards, the rules, things and patterns (systemizing) 
suggest that the non-social features of ASD might involve a kind of domain-swap 
synaesthesia, whereby the structures, networks, neurons and processes in the brain 
that usually guide social interaction and understanding of the social domain and its 
relationships, beginning with the innate protoface recognition system (Frank et al., 
2009), are instead tuned to the non-social domain. As discussed in Chapter 1, there 
is evidence that areas of the ‘social brain’ thought to be dysfunctional in ASD are 
actually intact and will function in a non-socially directed way (e.g. Grelotti et al., 
2005; Rosset et al., 2008).  
 
The mirror neuron system has been implicated in ASD (Gallese & Goldman, 1998) 
and contributes to the mapping of one’s own body and the states of the body while 
executing motor functions, as well as mapping the bodies of others (Murata et al., 
2016). Alongside MNs are canonical neurons, which respond to the presentation of 
objects or the objects themselves (Rajmohan & Mohandas, 2007). Alexithymia is a 
condition characterized by an inability to identify one’s own emotional states, it has a 
high co-occurrence rate in ASD (Shah, 2016) and a recent study found that 
alexithymia in people with ASD was associated with reduced awareness of their own 
physiological arousal as measured by skin conductance responses when viewing 
images with emotional salience (Gaigg, Cornell & Bird, 2018). Synaesthesia is more 
often found in ASD, along with cortical hyperconnectivity and difficulties with 
interoception, so it seems plausible that a kind of object-social synaesthesia occurs in 
ASD, whereby the system that in NT individuals is set up for mirroring others, 
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orienting to others and representing self-other relationships mediated by an 
awareness of one’s own mental and physical states, somehow crosses wires with the 
canonical system used for representing and attending to non-social stimuli and 
patterns and rules in the environment—i.e. the canonical neurons activate for social 
stimuli and the mirror neurons for the non-social, which sounds like Mottron et al.’s 
(2013) concept of veridical mapping, which describes how low-level, enhanced 
perception allows for the bottom-up, rapid and unconscious cognitive mapping of 
various non-social phenomenological qualities of the world and the relations 
between them.  This could explain the strong emotional drive towards the non-social 
and seemingly intuitive understanding of patterns in mathematics and music seen in 
some savants with ASD. It could also explain the wide heterogeneity seen in ASD, as 
there is a higher prevalence of synaesthesia among people with ASD (Johnson et al., 
2011) the condition has been linked to savant syndrome (Baron-Cohen et al., 2007) 
and like autism, it is a heterogeneous and polygenetic condition (Brang & 
Ramachandran, 2011) that is also thought to constitute a continuum across the 
general population (Simner, 2012). Future research could investigate these ideas 
further. 
 
Some of the findings of Study 3 and Study 4 in this thesis may support the notion 
that hyper-systemizing is perhaps more of a lower-level, affective, perceptual and 
spontaneous process than it would appear. The idea that systemizing drive and 
ability could arise from bottom-up, sensory and affective processes seems 
unintuitive, given that conceptions of systemizing involve rules, patterns, logical 
reasoning, mathematics and engineering etc., which are usually conceived of as 
requiring a higher-order, more rational and deliberative cognition. However, the 
studies outlined in Chapter 6 both found that while those who reported high drive 
to systemize also exhibited superior ability in answering correctly on the Test of 
Logical Thinking, they were also those who made the most errors on identifying the 
logical reasoning behind their right answers. So, while these studies established that 
systemizing drive and ability are indeed related, the comparative inability of both 
high SQ individuals and individuals with ASD to justify their answers with the 
correct reasoning suggests that there may be something other than slow, deliberative 
System 2 type cognitive processes mediating the relationship between being 
motivated towards rules and systems and the knowledge of how to successfully 
operate on or manipulate them.  
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High systemizing drive was, however, related to self-reported preference for 
deliberative type thinking and not for intuitive type thinking. It may be that if we 
define concepts such as mathematical and logical reasoning problems as being 
inherently related to, or solved by, Type 2 cognitive processes, then we may miss an 
intuitive, Type 1 type mechanism for solving such problems. The measures used in 
these studies (the TOLT and the REI) were developed with NT population and it 
has been suggested that self-report measures may not be reliable in people with 
autism (Berthoz & Hill, 2005). Future research could attempt to examine further 
whether high systemizers really cannot provide the reasoning for responses to the 
reasoning tasks they perform well on, and if not, to further investigate the 
mechanisms by which they formulate their answers. To explore further the cognitive 
dimensions of empathizing and systemizing in relation to deliberative and intuitive 
styles of thinking, it may be useful to develop a more thorough conception of 
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